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Abstract
As the world becomes increasingly globalized, the question of economy, of who hinders
it or allows it to blossom, has become a point of contention that has led to many acts of
violence. This research utilizes globalization as an economic theory as the underlying
factor that causes these violent conflicts and imminent mass movements of migration. In
using this lens, I emphasize that economically fueled violent conflict leads to the
migration of populations and their ultimate elimination. Thus, the purpose of this study is
to investigate and draw data from major violent conflicts in different nation-states and
perform a quantitative analysis that demonstrates that economics is indeed the root cause
of conflict. I also seek to prove that economics is the driving force of mass-migration.
The central research questions of this study are: what is the relationship between
globalization and violent conflict and what is the main cause of mass migration? Here,
we will be examining population, GDP, and structural balance (economic infrastructure)
are the variables in correlational calculations. In using quantitative methods and nation
state and its economic stability in relation to conflict and migration can be used as
predictors in order to prevent or deter devastating consequences.

x
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The question of economy, of who hinders it or allows it to blossom has been
around for centuries and has been a point of contention that started many acts of violence,
including war. As our world has become more internationally integrated, the concept of
globalization (to explain economy in an interconnected world) naturally came to light in
order to dissect the new fear that nations have as a whole – the fear of coming up short.
Because of this, it appears as though there have been more acts of violence in the last
century than there ever was; and with acts of violence come large movements of people.
Thus, this research analyzes and provides an assessment that concludes that globalization
is an underlying factor that causes violent conflict and the imminent mass movement or
eliminations of populations. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background of
the problem, outline vital research questions, and present the significance of the study as
it relates to modern theories and conflict research.
Background
At its core, globalization is an economic phenomenon whose implications are
largely bound to a state’s welfare (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 283). The state’s
welfare, in turn is associated and affected by the flows of goods for economic
advancement, largely cross-border flows that turn domestic transactions into international
ones (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 285). In utilizing globalization as an economic
theory, I emphasize that economically fueled violent conflict leads to the migration of
populations. In doing so, we can begin to understand the push and pull factors of
migration of mass populations and address one of the most prevalent political issues of
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the 21st century; how to deal with international migration. International migration (people
moving across national borders) is a global challenge that has been made prevalent in the
Obama administration. In fact, if the world’s migrants were in one place, they would be
in the top ten most populous countries, among the likes of China, India, or Brazil (Martin
and Widgren, 2002, p. 1). The presence of international migrants has raised major
socioeconomic issues in both their countries of origin and destination, and the major
question asked is why do so many people across national borders. In the United States,
1.1 million migrants are admitted each year (this number is not inclusive of the migrants
who arrive undocumented or migrants that have overstayed their visas). This was not
always the case. US immigration occurred in waves, the first of which was mostly
English speakers from the British Isles that started in 1820. The Germans and Irish
dominated the second wave in the 1840s through the 1850s. The third wave brought 20
million European immigrants in a 35-year period reaching through 1914, followed by a
brief pause during the depression (Martin, 2013, p. 6). Immigration increased in the mid20th century and has been admitting over 1 million every year since 1990. Considering
the staggering jump in numbers in a short period of time, debates arose in relation to the
education and welfare systems that are in place and have continued to cause heat in the
political arena for nearly four decades. While unauthorized migration is a primary
concern for public policy, it is still important to consider the implications behind all
migratory movements.
As it relates to violent conflict, large migratory movements are essentially one of
the consequences that occur after a major act of violence, particularly one in which the
state’s welfare has already deemed to be one that is unstable or lacking. Yet, there has
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never been a scholarly study to explain the nexus between the two. In doing so a
comprehensive pre and post war analysis will be performed in order to prove that
economic infrastructures is the primary thread behind violent conflict, thus a principal
factor behind mass migration.
Violent Conflict: An Overview
It has been said that since the beginning of man, conflict in any of its forms, has
existed. As such, a myriad of theories has developed in order to explain the rationale
behind it. Scientists have come up with psychological theories that claim man is
inherently violent, and in large part because we are of the same genes as chimpanzees.
Interestingly, chimpanzees have been studied for several years and under observation will
go to war with each other. More modern-day theorists pose that violent conflicts occur
because it is a matter of territory that they are trying to protect; although this was counterposed with the idea that man was even in conflict 12,000 years ago, when territory was
not a matter of scarcity. Regardless of what theory has been confirmed or debunked, it is
clear that conflict is caused by human beings and given the growth of the modern-day
state system, it is important to understand the factors behind conflict in today’s world so
that it can be avoided tomorrow.
Before we look at what causes violent conflict, we must have a working definition
of what violent conflict is. Violent conflict is often a term that is used loosely to define an
act of war or maybe an act of genocide. However, these are not mutually exclusive to
violent conflict, but rather are in categories of their own right (due to their detrimental
nature as it relates to death tolls and other varying factors). As per the Payson Conflict
Study Group of Tulane University, violent conflict is “the use of armed force by two
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parties, of which are grouped into three categories: minor armed conflicts, in which the
battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict are below 1,000; intermediate
conflicts, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the
course of the conflict, and in which between 25 and 1,000 deaths have occurred during a
particular year; and wars, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during
one particular year. The two latter categories are sometimes referred to as major armed
conflicts.” Under this definition, war falls under the category of a major armed conflict.
That said, international violent conflict is the type of conflict that involves more
than two nation states. These conflicts generally fall under one of three categories. The
first is that of structural systemic conflict, which usually takes the shape of competition
for power, alliances, and resource appropriation. The second is dyadic conflict, which
involves territorial contingencies, geographic proximity, and historical grievances. The
third is unit-level conflict, a top down, elite generated conflict. This study does not
examine international violent conflict per se, it is important to understand the concept of
a systemic conflict, as it stems from inequality in resources. A systemic conflict is most
clearly grasped in a cause and effect model in varying stages, “if X, then Y.” The first
stage is if there is resource inequality, then once of the parties will undoubtedly face
resource scarcity. The second stage is if there is resource scarcity, then alliances will
begin to form in order to retain those resources from the opposing party. The third stage
is if there are alliances that form, then there will be an overlap of opposing parties (i.e., if
A and B are having a conflict, and C joins A, then B and C have a conflict). The fourth
stage notes that if there is an overlap in opposing parties, then there will be a change in
the balance of power, and once this occurs the systemic conflict is at hand.
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The former Yugoslavia is a perfect example of this. One of the primary
arguments that have been presented to cause the fall of Yugoslavia is that of ethnic
hatred; and while that is an important catalyst of the problem, the economic argument
needs to be further explored. A major point of contention was the high unemployment
rate (impart due to a myriad of factors that will be examined in more detail later this this
study). In applying this aspect in the model of systemic conflict, one can deduce that the
resource of employment was scarce; therefore, opposing parties (both political and
otherwise) saw the opportunity to form alliances and change the balance of power. This
imbalance of power, thus, led to the dissolution of what we now know as Bosnia, Croatia,
Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro (Yarashevich and Karneyeva, 2003, p. 3).
Statement of the Problem
In a world that has become increasingly globalized, the fear of losing resources
and the opportunity to gain financial power has become greater; particularly with
countries that are competing in the same geographic region. The question of nationalistic
survival is one of the haves versus the have-nots, and those who have more, will
ultimately survive. Scholarly research has only begun to scratch the surface where
globalization and violent conflict come together. In fact, more the more recent analyses
of violent conflict are often indicated to stem from terrorism or acts of terror, when in
fact not all acts of violence are necessarily related to politics.
There is an undeniable gap in the connection between the economic performance
of a nation to its resulting upheavals that are often followed with violence. Thus, it is
critical to conduct a thorough historical analysis of a nation’s economic infrastructure as
it relates to its stability and time of peace. Indeed, serious violent conflict has been
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detrimental to humanity, as it has led to the movements of large populations. As such, it
is vital to understand the causes behind violent conflict in order to foresee and deter the
possibility of mass movements that have had intrastate impacts.
Purpose and Goals of Study
While globalization is considered a modern theory in international relations, its
essence has been present since the beginning of man. In other words, when man is
suffering economically there will be a point in which man must find a solution in order to
overcome their economic dilemma, and should there be something or someone in the way
of that, man will find any means by which to eliminate the impediment. In order to
demonstrate that conflict increases when a country’s economic welfare is impacted, I
utilize data that will provide concrete deductions where poor economic infrastructures
inevitably lead to conflict in any nation. With this paradigm, I outline the related
theoretical and conceptual frameworks that support the notion that conflict, and economy
are perpetually connected. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate and draw data
from major violent conflicts in different nations and perform a quantitative analysis to
demonstrate that economic is inherently the root cause of conflict. In doing so, I exhibit
real data that it is economics is also the driving force behind mass migration. Here there
are two independent variables, conflict and a nation’s economy and one dependent
variable, the population index. In using quantitative methods, a nation’s economic
stability in relation to conflict and migration is quantified, which, in turn, can be used as
predictions to deter or prevent devastating consequences for the future.
In examining academic work, much of the studies that have been done are related
to the political aims that violent conflict stems from, as opposed to taking it from an
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economic perspective. For instance, let us consider the case of Colombia. Colombia has
one of the largest displaced populations in the world (Ibanez and Velez, 2008, p. 2); and
this displacement is largely due to internal violent conflict. While the writers note that
armed groups deliberately targeted civilian populations in order to migrate, it is not
clearly evidenced as to why it was the case. This further explains the need to perform
this study in order to bridge gaps.
More specifically, the goals of this study are:
•

To engage in a historical study of the economics in nations that have been
affected by violent conflict, which include Rwanda, Colombia, [former]
Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany, and Cambodia

•

To highlight and provide concrete data that economic breakdown and violent
conflict are indeed related

•

To debunk the argument that violent conflict is politically fueled

•

To explore new territories of conflict prevention

•

To explain the relationship between violent conflict and mass migration

•

To develop a quantitative tool which can be utilized in practice by conflict
resolutionists

Considering the lack of scholarship on this subject, this study involves exploring
the economic state of several countries pre and post violent conflict. In doing so, it will
provide a context that explains the phenomenon that we are largely faced with today –
international migration. This historical examination provides numerical patterns that
allow scholars to see if history repeats itself, and if it does, what are the conditions in
which it can be deterred or prevented, should the outcomes be of serious detriment.
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Significance of Study
The lack of accountability of a nation’s economic infrastructure is the driving
force behind this study. Completely rejecting the notion that economics does not have an
impact on violent conflict and its consequences is what will continue to push large
populations into foreign countries, further fueling political administrations to take a stand
on more restrictive immigration policies as opposed to providing aid in a person’s darkest
hour. It is difficult to imagine that thousands of migrants have a burning desire to move
to a foreign country to which they have no ties with, along with their families, only to
start from the beginning. It is even more difficult to believe that the nation that
“welcomes” these migrants does so without rejection or criticism from the citizens
within, that they themselves have fears of economic stability.
While there is literature on economics pulling migrants towards a nation that
would be economically wealthier, there are virtually no studies that demonstrate that
economics pushes migrants. The only real hypotheses that have been studied are those
involving violent conflict and political uprisings causing a migrant to “voluntarily” move
from one country to the next. Therefore, this study is an attempt to bridge that gap and
demonstrate the nexus between economics and movements of populations.
Theoretically, the foundation of this study is based on a more modern approach to
international relations. I did not develop a new theory; however, I did examine current
theories with a critical eye to redirect the root of the problem, which would contribute a
working tool in the field of conflict resolution. The ever-changing dynamics of our world
has been increasingly difficult to follow; therefore, academia has lost its footing on
patterns and trends that could potentially change the realm of international relations.
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In that respect, I employed an analysis to determine the conditions that would lead
to violent conflict. By using data pre and post violent conflict along with modern
theoretical framework, the study will explain the pivotal breaking point that drove that
nation to violent conflict and what can be done to prevent not only the conflict, but also
mass migration.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The central research question that this study is aimed to answer is, what is the
relationship between globalization and violent conflict? One of the most dominant
findings in literature is that economic conditions, such as low income, slow growth, and
severe economic downturn are the drivers that are directly related to the outbreak of
violent conflict (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). In fact, empirical studies have found
that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict (Ibid, p.
32).
The study also examines what roles resources play in the power of a nation. The
power of a nation state is what allows it to define itself in the international realm. These
days, while the more dominant powers are prone to have a pseudo big brother keeping
checks and balances, they are also more likely to have more leverage in dealings related
to foreign policy and international trade. The power of a state that be separated into three
categories. The first is that of resources or capabilities, which are frequently material and
include (but are not exclusive to) agriculture, technology, energy, and environmental
resources (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. ix). The second is how that power is converted
through national processes, and the third I which state prevails within specific scenarios
(Id.). Here, the category of resources and capabilities and its relation to power is what is
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most important. In assessing world powers, Strategic Assessment Groups used metrics in
gross domestic product, which was then summed as a percentage of a total world power.
In doing so, it demonstrated that the US holds about 20% of global power, the highest
percentage among 164 countries (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. 3). The assessment also
examined the most likely locations for future conflict and Asia was noted as the most
dangerous region, and not coincidentally with six (of eight) conflict prone situations
involving China, which holds the second highest percentage of 14 (Id.). This asserts that
power begets power, and for a nation such as China to gain more strength, it must flex its
muscles and often clash with conflict amongst its neighbors.
Finally, this study takes an in depth look at the global implications of continuous
violent conflict, as it relates to large migratory movements of populations. Since the
1990’s there has been a substantial increase in the number of intrastate violent conflict
around the world. In fact, in the last two decades there have been more than 125 violent
conflicts resulting in 7 million deaths (Smith, 2013). As it relates to globalization,
economic shocks caused by violent conflict can be dangerous because their impacts can
be long-lived, particularly in developing countries (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29).
Continuous violent conflict may transform itself into a regenerating cycle, which destroys
the physical, social, and human capital (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). Studies have
shown that once there has been a conflict (either inter or intrastate) the probability of it
reoccurring is high (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). This means that those nationstates will be in a constant state of social, political, and economic vulnerability. Thus,
violent conflict is a major threat to human development. If a country has low levels of
human development it “has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing
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productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of
conflict, potentially trapping a country in a loop.” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). As
a country becomes more and more defined by its reoccurring cycle of conflict, its citizens
begin to realize that it is no longer a place in which they can thrive as human beings; thus
giving them the opportunity, or rather reason, to move elsewhere and seek economic
stability and growth there. Therefore, the overarching hypothesis examined here is: if
there is a causal link between economics and violent conflict, then we can make
assessments on the emigration and immigration of international populations. More
specifically, if violent conflict is economically driven, then we can conclude that mass
migration is inevitable.
Philosophical Assumptions
In its most classic of forms, international relations as a theory has focused on the
analysis of cause and effect between war and peace. (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p.
2). More contemporary scholars pose several other questions outside of that analysis,
including what are the limits and possibilities in tackling urgent world problems?
Urgency, of course, is subjective, and among those urgent problems are economic crisis,
violent conflict, and migration. While policymakers can describe the urgent situation that
they are in, their question often is ‘how did we get here?’ And, in explaining it, they are
thrown into the realm of theory (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 3). “Theories offer
accounts of why things happened (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 3),” in this research
social theory and Marxism is offered as theoretical perspectives as to the cause and effect
between economy and violent conflict. In addition, globalization, which is under the
umbrella of international relations, is the theoretical foundation that dictates the
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importance of a stable economy in a nation state. Finally, social movement theories (as it
relates to the escalation of violent conflict) is briefly examined as theoretical perspectives
behind human conduct.
Violent conflict, even in the most historical sense has never been an expression of
inherent aggression, but rather serves as a tool of social destruction and economic
construction. It is used as an attempt to settle disputes over power, money, and resources
with violent means (Stewart, 2002, p. 345). This attempt is used so frequently that “8 out
of 10 of the world’s poorest countries are suffering or have recently suffered from large
scale violent conflict” (Stewart, 2002, p. 342). Economic factors which predispose
countries to war are separated into four categories: group motivation, private motivation,
failure of the social contract, and environmental degradation. The hypothesis of group
motivation stems from the groups that are deprived (relative to their geographic location)
and seek economic equality; and where politically it is not possible, a violent course of
action often follows (Stewart, 2002, p. 323). The hypothesis of private motivation is
when the possibility of enrichment through violent conflict lures those who are
uneducated and unemployment to follow. This often leads to an enduring conflict if the
recruitment is substantial. The failure of social contract stems from the proverbial
contract between the state and its people, whereas the state delivers reasonable economic
conditions so that the people accept its authority. When there is economic decline, the
power of the contract (and the state) weakens, giving the people a purpose to react.
Finally, as it relates to environmental degradation, the scarcity of resources is notorious
for provoking conflict in that people will fight to protect their security of having food and
water for their families (Stewart, 2002, p. 323).
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While violent conflict has been widely recognized as a matter of international
concern for a number of years, it was not until around 15 years ago that migration was
recognized as an important phenomenon in international relations, and more recently
capturing attention as it relates to violent conflict, and not just as a by-product (Mitchell,
2011, p. 125). In revisiting the categories of economic factors predisposing countries to
war, migration may be a strategic economic response. For instance, in the case of linking
conflict to the scarcity of resources, (forced) migration of populations would be necessary
in order to secure a reasonable volume of resources for the state. This, in turn, is linked
with the failure of the social contract, in which the state did not deliver reasonable
economic conditions for every citizen, thus weakening the state and provoking violent
conflict. In provoking the violent conflict, the hypotheses of group and private motivation
emerge in that groups begin to feel the deprivation and in turn seek personal enrichment
through the participation of violent conflict. Migration and violent conflict, therefore,
have an undeniable cyclical relationship that scholars have only begun to examine.
The first assumption is that this study largely utilized archival data based on
previously examined violent conflicts that were prominent over the last century. This
analysis relies heavily on literature published by other authors; thus, the data comes from
secondary sources. Scholars that have written on these matters are both native and nonnatives of the countries that are presented as case studies; therefore, while some
information was skewed, the data extracted was numerical in nature and was objective
and neutral.
It is also important to consider the assumption that globalization, as a theory is not
one with one definition. Therefore, if one were to study globalization, it would not
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necessarily capture the economic piece that will be presented in this study. This study
only examines the economic piece of globalization as a theory and does not take into
consideration its other well-known components such as communications. To that end, the
assumption here is that while globalization is not limited to its economic drivers, it is
only those drivers that have the direct impact on violent conflict and mass migration.
Limitations
One of the limitations of the study is the lack of primary sources that would
support my theory in bridging the gap between globalization, violent conflict, and mass
migration of vulnerable populations. I believe that this is largely because the idea of
placing vulnerable populations (i.e., refugees) in the same category as an economic
migrant would de-bunk the idea of a refugee as an immigration status and cause the
major breakdown of the UNHCR – who was in fact formed to protect refugees (and
rightly). It is critical to emphasize that while my purpose here is not, in any way, to
diminish the circumstances by which the immigrants arrived and remained in their
country of resettlement, it sheds light to a more pure meaning of what cause their
movement in the first place.
Another limitation of the study is that a large part of the data is extracted from
historical events. That is, I used economic figures of a country pre and post violent
conflict, which would render more recent events moot, as the data would not be available.
My intention here was to collect data from countries that have suffered violent conflict
from different regions of the world. In doing so I believe this approach can be treated as a
global phenomenon whose projections can be applied at an international level and used as
a preventative tool of measurement. The approach to this study will undoubtedly be met
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with criticism, but the hope is to provide hard information that can be utilized in
conjunction with contemporary theories of international relations.
The delimitations contained within this research helped in condensing what could
have been an exhaustive study in terms of analyzing any and all countries that have
experienced an act of violent conflict. In terms of what countries were presented as case
studies, I attempted to capture a large framework using a limited number of case studies.
In doing so, I performed an in-depth quantitative analysis that would also be supported by
the literature that is published on those case studies. That said, I have not limited myself
to a specific region of the world, but rather used case studies from all areas so that
generalizations would be avoided.
In terms of theoretical perspectives, I used scholarship from theories whose
orientations were pre-globalization and those that have been developed in more recent
years. The reason behind this is to demonstrate that the theme of economics being a
driving force behind [violent] conflict has existed since the beginning of man. In paying
close attention to the language in the varying theories, one begins to see a pattern that the
overall survival of man depends on his economic well-being.
Structure of the Dissertation
The structure of my dissertation has been established in order to provide a
thorough understanding of globalization as the phenomenon behind mass migration of
vulnerable populations. In Chapter One, I present the background on globalization and
international migration, with a small piece on violent conflict, the scope and significance
of the problem, and the purpose of the study and research questions. Chapter One also
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includes definitions that would clarify open questions, in addition to assumptions,
limitations, and delimitations.
Chapter Two provides a literature review, which includes major theoretical
perspectives used as the foundation for my premise. This involves an in-depth
examination of international relations theory and social theory. Theories that stem from
these that are also included in the literature review are those of globalization and
Marxism. Relative Deprivation as a social movement theory will also be examined as it
relates to the escalation of violent conflict. In addition, Chapter Two provides a literature
of the conceptual framework of the study namely that of globalization and violent
conflict. Finally, Chapter Two provides an overview of the case studies that will be
utilized as a basis for the analysis.
Chapter Three includes the methodology and philosophical paradigm used to
examine the nexus between globalization and the mass migration of vulnerable
populations. It also provides the empirical analysis to highlight the relationship between
the variables and establish concrete measures that would facilitate projections.
Chapter Four lays the groundwork for this research by way of presenting case
studies for five different countries that over the last century have endured violent conflict.
These overviews include the economic transformations that transpired post conflict, the
state of affairs in which these nations were left in, and what it all means for the future of
our global impact.
Finally, Chapter Five provides some of my concluding thoughts and implication
for the future.

17
Definitions
Globalization
Globalization is frequently confused with internationalization, but they are two
different animals. Internationalization “refers to the increasing importance of
international trade, international relations, treaties, alliances, etc.…among nations” (Daly,
2004, p. 41). Globalization is a theory within international relations that can be applied
socially and economically, both of which involve an integration of many to form one.
Economic globalization is comprised of two components; the first is that of flows of trade
and the second is that of policy restrictions of the trade measured by tariffs and capital
controls (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 5). For the purposes of this study I will largely
focus on the former, which would essentially represent the outcome of the economic
game (Ibid) -- in this case large population movement. Hashimov describes economic
globalization as “the increasing interdependence among economies…with the effect of
expanding international trade of goods and services…” (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p.
2). In other words, economic globalization implies the free movements of goods,
services, and capital in the global economy (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 2). What we
must consider here is that not all nation-states can provide (or purchase) goods and
services at the same economic level. Therefore, if economic globalization means the
increasing interdependence, then relationships among different nation-states can be
highly skewed.

18
Socio-Economic Status
Often utilized to uncover social inequities as it relates to resources, privileges or
control, socio-economic status is the social standing of an individual or group in relation
to others based on income, education, and occupation.
Migrants
Migrants are people who move from one place to another; not to be confused with
immigrants who are people who leave their home country to permanently reside in
another. Based on definition alone, both migrants and immigrants considered to be people
who move voluntarily.
Economic Migrant
Economic Migrants are those who travel from their home country to another in
order to improve their socio-economic status.
Refugee
Someone who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion, is
outside his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country” (1951 Refugee Convention).
Asylee
An alien in a foreign port of entry who is found unable or unwilling to return to
their home country, or to seek the protection of that country because of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion. Unlike refugees, asylees must seek approval to remain in the country in which
they are seeking asylum.
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Push/Pull Factors
Economic, social, and physical motives behind why people migrate or emigrate.
Violent Conflict
The use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of
a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Payson Conflict Study
Group, 2001). The use of armed force is considered to occur when a party in an active
conflict uses arms against the other party. However, it is important to note that the use of
arms does not necessarily result in death.
Arms
Anything material other than corporal strength – this can include weapons of mass
destruction, firearms, or even sticks and stones (www.pcr.uu.se, 2016).
Armed Conflict
A. Conflict between two or more parties, but usually between the state and an
anti-state group or groups using weapons on a sustained basis (Payson
Conflict Study Group, 2001).
B. Combat between forces that both possess weapons. Hostilities of a kind,
which breach or threaten to breach, international peace and security, such as
invasions, interventions, border clashes and incursions, and civil strife with
some external dimension. Most commonly, this dimension would involve
either support from external patrons, or the threat of spillover effects in
neighboring countries from refugee flows and the like (Payson Conflict Study
Group, 2001).
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Balance of Power
Conflict management method in international relations counter-balancing the
hegemonic tendencies of any single power by an alliance or realignment among other
states. A balance of an interstate power system is generally considered stable if no single
state achieves a dominant position, the independence of the great powers is assured, and
major wars are avoided (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
Basic Needs
Minimum requirements of a community for a decent standard of life: adequate
food, shelter, and clothing plus some household equipment and furniture. They also
include essential services provided by and for the community-at-large such as safe
drinking water, sanitation, health and education facilities, protection against human rights
violations and gainful employment (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
Conflict
Conflict is commonly defined as two or more parties that have or perceive
incompatible goals (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16).
A. The struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in
which the aims of the groups or individuals involved are to neutralize, injure
or eliminate rivals (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
B. Two or more parties with incompatible interests who express hostile attitudes
or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other(s). Parties may
be individuals, small or large groups or countries. Interests can diverge in
many ways, such as over access to and distribution of resources (e.g. territory,
money, energy sources, food); control of power and participation in political
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decision making; identity, (cultural, social and political communities); status;
or values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or
ideology (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
Dynamic Variables
Short-term, often sudden, political, economic, or other developments or
perceptions that impact a country’s stability. These variables must be traced to assess
whether a country is moving toward or away from violent conflict (Payson Conflict
Study Group, 2001).
Economic Infrastructure
The underlying amount of physical and financial capital embodied in roads,
railways, waterways, airways, and other forms of transportation and communication plus
water supplies, financial institutions, electricity, and public services such as health and
education. The level of infrastructural development in a country is a crucial factor
determining the pace and diversity of economic development (Payson Conflict Study
Group, 2001).
Nation
A large group of people bound together by common tradition and culture and
usually language. Sometimes used synonymously with state, but this can be misleading,
since one state may contain many nations. For example, Great Britain is a state, but
contains the English, Scottish, Welsh, and part of the Irish nations (Payson Conflict Study
Group, 2001).
Nation-state
A. Usually used to describe the modern state, but strictly speaking applies only
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when the whole population of a state feels itself to belong to the same nation.
This is certainly more the case now than it was in the nineteenth century and
earlier, when large empires, such as Austria-Hungary, were states but
contained many nations. But many states today still contain many nations
(partly because of the arbitrary way that the borders of states were redrawn
after both World Wars, and by the colonial powers as they withdrew from
Asia and Africa), and with the rise of nationalism that has followed the fall of
communism, this has been one of the main reasons for instability in states
such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Payson Conflict Study Group,
2001).
B. The definition of the nation-state is really a combination of the nation and the
state. It is a special form of state with people seeing themselves as belonging
to a nation. This state has the legal right to enforce its power in a defined
piece of territory with the aim of uniting the people through a shared or
common culture (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
Revolution
Forcible, pervasive, and often violent change of a social, political, or economic
order. Revolution is the most extreme political option of a dissenting group, a course
taken generally when more moderate attempts to achieve reform have failed. A
revolution is distinguished from a coup d’état, which is a sudden seizure of state power
by a small faction that does not necessarily change the social system, and a revolt or
rebellion, which may be either a failed attempt at revolution or a violent expression of
grievances (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The complexity of violent conflict and the rationale behind its occurrence
deserves a comprehensive analysis, which will provide objective data to scholars. As
such, it is important to understand that one of the primary driving forces of violent
conflict is that of economics. Current literature provides brief explanations as to why
economics and violent conflict are connected, further blurring things by simply stating
the interplay between economics and conflict is complex and providing no substantial
rationale behind this logic.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in depth look at theoretical
perspectives that lay the foundation to this study; in addition, it provides a general
understanding of violent conflict and a synopsis of the countries from which the data will
be extracted. In order to develop a thorough understanding of the relationship between
globalization as an economic theory and violent conflict, my primary focus will be to
examine violent conflict through an economic lens. In doing so, I will be able to explain
the dynamics of violent conflict and its outcomes as it relates to large population
movements. Using the historical data of countries pre and post violent conflict, I will
provide the groundwork that will allow scholars in the field of conflict resolution to really
understand how much of an impact economics truly has on violent conflict. Furthermore,
it will provide, by design, an assessment of international migration that has previously
not been developed. As a result, the literature review in this chapter provide a
comprehensive assessment of theories that relate to economics and human conduct and
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will be used to set up the general framework of the explanation between globalization,
violent conflict, and its consequences.
A Brief Explanation of International Migration
The history of migration begins with mankind, where colonization and expansion
depended on migration (Koser, 2007, p. 2). In more recent history, international
migration is what allowed for economic growth in “new worlds” that needed cheap and
expedited labor. And, while migration did not carry the stigma that it does today, it
continues to rise every year – more than doubling in the last 25 years (Koser, 2007, p. 5).
There is a myriad of perspectives on the notion of international migration. More
specifically, it has been widely seen that the consensus falls under two categories; one of
which supports free movement of people with programs that would assist migrants with
the full integration of their new home country. The other one that would place heavy
restrictions on the movement of people and would go out of their way to extradite
migrants who have been settled for several decades but have no legal documents that
would permit them to stay. Considering this, the scholarly work that is readily available is
largely based on those notions (either for or against) and is often times accompanied with
push-pull factors that do not really address movements of mass populations. For instance,
Martin and Widgren argue that international migration is a decision that is carefully
considered and the factors that encourage a migrant to move are grouped into three
categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors (Martin and Widgren, 2002, p.
8). In further explaining these categories they use examples that would classify all
migrants in what we know now as economic migrants, leaving migrants with no
economic motivation (noneconomic) out of the equation. Therefore, the general public
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concludes that all migrants must be economic migrants, which is not the case, and therein
lays the belly of the problem.
There are three main categories of international migrants. The first is that of
forced migrants, which are usually described as refugees, but are not exclusive of that.
Forced migrants are those who are forced to leave their own country due to conflict,
persecutions, or environmental reasons such as draught or famine (Koser, 2007, p. 16).
The second category of international migrant is a voluntary migrant, which are what
people often identify as economic migrants as described above. The most common type
of voluntary migrants are the spouses and children of those individuals who were able to
obtain work and will be joining them abroad through the process of family reunification.
As of 2007, 190 million migrants were voluntary. The final category, and most
controversial, is that of irregular migrants. Irregular (undocumented) migrants are those
who enter a country without documents or with forged documents, or those who enter a
country with documents and overstay their visa or permit (Koser, 2007, p. 17).
Irregular migration is often depicted as one of the threats to state sovereignty,
where a state has the right to control their borders and allowing irregular migration to
occur undermines the control of the state that is trying to assert their sovereignty. In the
United States irregular migration has also been perceived as a threat to national security.
This suggests that migration is a channel for terrorists to enter; and while there have been
more recent cases of this seen in national news, the actual rate of occurrence is extremely
low. Another widespread sentiment related to irregular migration is the fear of job
security. Following the mindset that large corporations would rather pay unskilled
workers less money to produce more work than pay a skilled worker a substantial salary
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for the same result. While the more prevalent topic that involves migration are those
individuals who fall under the category of irregular migrants, it is imperative to
understand that the number of legal migrants far exceeds the number of irregular
migrants both within and outside the United States.
However, the types of migrants that exist are not as distinct as their categories.
For instance, a migrant can legally enter a country on a work visa, overstay, and suddenly
become an irregular migrant. On the same token, an individual can return to their home
country, a war has occurred, and then they become an involuntary or forced migrant.
Regardless of the migrant category that an individual fall under, it is critical to remember
that the lives of these individuals are no less important than ours.
Controlling Immigration
At it has been previously noted, international migration has been around for an
extensive period, and largely due to the need and demand of labor in advanced economies
or economies that are attempting to catch up to the superpowers of today’s world. And,
while there is a consistent need for affordable labor, governments continue to impose
restrictive limits on immigration that have been difficult to enforce.
One of the reasons why this is happening is because foreign workers have been
embedded in the structure of some nations for decades (Cornelius, et. al., 2004, p. 9).
This means that the economic structure of those nations is dependent on those
immigrants, not only because of they provide a work force, but also because their
families (in turn) give back to the local economy simply by residing there (paying rent,
purchasing essentials for the family, etc.). If a government were to impose laws that
would uproot these families back to their “home countries” (which in some cases is no
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longer existent if their families have resided in that foreign country for several
generations), they would essentially be uprooting millions of dollars and forcing
thousands of people to become part of a society that is foreign to them. For example, in
the United States our current presidential administration has come to the realization that
the immigration system is not only broken, but a detriment to our national growth.
In response an immigration reform was previously formulated to streamline the
system. In order to ensure the reform is successful, it has been larger based on four
legislative pillars: (1) creating a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants already
residing in the United States; (2) reforming the immigration system so that will build the
American economy; (3) creating an effective employment verification system; and (4)
established an improved system for accepting future workers (www.whitehouse.gov,
2016). Creating a path to citizenship does not automatically mean that every one of the 11
million undocumented individuals will be eligible for US citizenship. Individuals must be
able to pass a criminal background check, must come current with their tax payments,
and will have to pay the fees associated with their application prior to going through the
process of naturalization.
Another reason that governments have been finding it difficult to implement
measures of restrictive immigration are due in part to the international pressures that
advocate for human rights. While there is not an international convention that would
protect the rights of a migrant (whether legal or irregular), there are organizations that
argue that all individuals have the freedom of movement and are free to leave any
country as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The departure from one
country to another does have its complications; but nonetheless, it is a factor that is
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contributing to the difficulty that has become of implementing measures to control
immigration.
Finally, and likely the most controversial of why policies are difficult to enforce is
that of the actual policies’ ambiguity (Corneluis, et. al., 2004, p. 14). In other words, the
declarations of the immigration policies are not always what they intend. This is usually
because societies have the tendency to turn the other way, particularly when they are
beneficiaries to what they are turning away from. For instance, in the states that border
Mexico, there are several local businesses that are willing to pay cash to a migrant worker
as opposed to paying minimum wage to a person that is authorized to work in the United
States.
Conflict: An Expanded Overview
Generally speaking the structure of conflict can be divided into three components:
(1) conflict situation (which is the actual conflict); (2) conflict behavior (the way that the
opposing parties act and react to the conflict): and (3) conflict attitudes and perceptions
(those attitudes, emotions, and perceptions that arise from a conflict situation) (Mitchell,
1981, 26). As defined in Chapter One, conflict is commonly defined as two or more
parties that have or perceive incompatible goals (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16). It involves
two or more parties with incompatible interests who express hostile attitudes or pursue
their interests through actions that damage the other(s). Parties may be individuals, small
or large groups or countries. Interests can diverge in many ways, such as over access to
and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, money, energy sources, food); control of
power and participation in political decision-making; identity, (cultural, social and
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political communities); status; or values, particularly those embodied in systems of
government, religion, or ideology (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
Understanding the Phases of Conflict
Scholars believe that the foundation for conflict in general lies in the relationship
between the opposing parties. While this may be true as an overall assumption, for the
purposes of this study it would be the inequalities in [economic] resources that cause
friction between the adversaries (Young, 2010, p. 400). With, violent conflict is generally
not one that occurs from one day to the next. Rather it is the type of conflict that usually
stems from a series of economic inequalities that have developed over an extended
period. Often when violent conflict erupts, the international community appears to be in
astonished, as if they were unaware of the internal turmoil that the nation(s) were facing.
Considering this, it is crucial to understand the phases of conflict because it has
been understood that conflicts move through theses phases and eventually form a
recurrent outcome. This provides for a framework, which allows for an in-depth analysis
and possibly determines the juncture in which conflict transforms into a violent and
largely catastrophic event (Young, 2010, p. 400).
1. Emergence: In this phase, there is the initial overt manifestation of the
conflict. Essentially this is where the ‘argument’ would begin but violent acts
are not taking place at this point.
2. Escalation: Young writes that conflict at this phase begin to grow in two
dimensions. The first is that of scope, where conflict increase is indicated by
the growing number of parties (whether in groups or as individuals) who
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engage in the conflict. The second dimension is that of intensity, which is
commonly indicated by the growing violence.
There is a de-facto transitional phase that occurs between escalation and deescalation that generally results from a change from one (or more) of the
parties in the conflict; or in the case of [international] violent conflict, when
external parties begin to intervene as the death tolls rise.
3. De-Escalation: When the scope and intensity of the conflict subside, the
conflict enters the phase of de-escalation. De-escalation is not necessarily a
joint movement by the adversaries but is often the case for violent conflict,
particularly because the adversaries are multiple individuals that have to
undergo serious crisis management when the resulting deaths are catastrophic.
4. Termination: The termination phase, like conflict itself, is a process and likely
the most time consuming of all phases in conflict. In most conflicts, the
adversaries decrease their demands or alter their expectations so that they
meet at a middle ground in order to settle their differences, at least
temporarily. In some extreme cases where violent conflict is concerned, the
termination phase can occur when one of the adversaries is no longer present
to engage in conflict with.
5. Post-Termination: Scholars have varying opinions as to whether conflicts ever
fully resolve, or the parties involved simply negotiate terms until the next
disruption occurs (only to bring in the issues of the previous conflict).
However, large scale conflicts often transform to smaller scale conflicts that
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continue in a non-destructive manner and involve a third party that participate
in mediation and peace-building efforts.
It is important to note that these phases are not limited to time and space. In other
words, different conflicts can and will spend varying times within each phase, and
sometimes will move forward in one phase only to return to the previous phase sometime
later. Due to the erratic nature of violent conflict it would be difficult to discern how long
a conflict would remain in a stage. Therefore, it would be almost impossible to quantify
when a violent conflict would move on to the next phase (i.e., from escalation to deescalation) in order to assist and possibility alleviate the countries that have been through
a violent conflict. However, this study will demonstrate that the juncture in which a
conflict transforms itself into a violent conflict is indeed quantifiable through the analysis
of the factors that contribute to the development of such conflict.
The phases of conflict are best examined through the lens of the violent conflict
that occurred in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Where violent conflict
moves from one phase to another, but not necessarily in a particular order. To provide
some context, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (which will be further discussed in Chapter
Four) was said to be carried out primarily the Rwandan elite who were vastly richer and
better established than the masses, was a conscious effort to keep people in order and
keep themselves in power (Rayner, 1999, p. 8). After the death of an estimated one
million people (at the astounding rate of 5 lives per minute), the Congolese military saw
good reason to fight back when the Rwandan army entered.
In the case of the war between Congo and Rwanda, it would appear as though the
emergence phase of conflict was virtually non-existent, as the Rwandan army invaded
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Congo to destroy Hutu refugee camps in 1996, which continued for a period of two years.
During this time the conflict escalated, and the Congolese military fought back
(escalation); primarily for two reasons. The first was to protect the Tutsi group from
discrimination and violence, and the second was to prevent genocide from happening
within their borders (Cohen, Herman J., 1999, p. 33). While the Rwandan forces were
present, they also controlled the major provinces in Kivu, which had extensive mineral
and timber resources for the Congolese. Thus, in 1998 The Rwandan forces were asked to
leave, to which they complied (de-escalation), but then returned for a second time
(escalation), and grew to what is known as the Great of War of Africa, which involved
Congolese forces supported by Angola, Nambia, and Zimbabwe against the soldiers of
Rwanda and Uganda (www.enoughproject.org, 2011). After four years, the invading
troops ultimately pulled out (de-escalation) and peace deals soon followed (termination).
As of 2006, Congo has seen a successful democratic transition (post-termination), and the
Kivu province as been economically integrated into Rwanda, accounting for 50% of their
GDP (Cohen, Herman J. 1999, p. 34).
International Conflict
International conflict is the type of conflict that involves more than two nation
states and can include violence, usually unfolding due to a crisis with identity. These
conflicts generally fall under one of three categories. The first is that of structural
systemic conflict, which usually takes the shape of competition for power, alliance (how
it affects balance of power), and resource appropriation. A systemic war is described in
stages by an “if X, then Y” model. The first stage notes that when there is multipolarity,
then there will be resource inequality because as resource scarcity increases in a
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multipolar setting, then inequality in resource distribution increases. The second stage
states that where there is resource inequality, then alliances will form because as
inequality in resource distribution increase, then less-favored actors seek stronger allies to
attain resources. The third stage notes that once there is alliance formation, the there is an
overlap in conflict structures, which means that in forming alliances each nation-state
assumes both the good and the bad of the other state. For example, if nation-states A and
B unite and B has a conflict with C, then A will have a conflict with C. The fourth stage
says that once there is an overlap in conflict structures, then there will be an inevitable
change in the balance of power. Once the conflict reaches this stage, it becomes the point
of no return. The fifth and final stage of this model is that once that change in balance of
power occurs it will result on systemic war. Systemic wars are few and far between, as
they usually involve a high number of deaths and last for an extended period in light of
the fact that it is multipolarity.
One of the most notable examples of systemic war is World War II (of which
Nazi Germany will be further examined later in Chapter Five). Here, the first stage really
occurred pre-World War II, after the Treaty of Versailles was signed to end the state war
between Germany and the Allied Powers. Due to its financially punitive provisions Italy
and Germany fell by the wayside, creating their notion of resource inequality. The second
stage of systemic war in relation to alliance building occurred early in the mid 1930’s,
when the Rome-Berlin axis was formed, followed by a pact signed by Japan and
Germany (Dickson, 2008, p. 38). The United States issued warnings as the war entered its
third stage and conflict structures began to overlap. In 1938 Germany announces that it is
no longer bound by the Treaty of Versailles and proceeds to sign a pact with the Soviet
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Union (Dickson, 2008, 41). Soon after, Great Britain and Poland sign a treat of mutual
assistance and are later allied with France, China, and the United States (Dickson, 2008,
p. 43). As we are all well aware, several outbreaks of war throughout Europe, Asia, and
the Mediterranean follow for several years after, which encapsulated the fourth stage of
systemic war and inevitably bled into the fifth stage where there were surges of shifting
powers across the globe.
The second is dyadic conflict, which involves territorial contingencies,
geographic proximity, and historical grievances. Dyadic conflict is directly correlated
with democracy and democratization. It is important to note the following premises; (a)
democracy is different from democratization, as democracy is something that is
actualized and democratization is a process that has the potential to be actualized (in fact
most nations only want democratization and not full blown democracy of their state), (b)
democracies do not wage war against each other, and because of this the idea of
spreading democracy emerged, and (c) democratization is a principle source of ethnopolitical conflict. Because of the nature of democratization, which is to take over a nation
state and implement regulations that may not be sought after, there are several conditions
that should be avoided. The first is that of identifying the regime with a specific ethnic
group, this is because the entire population will then turn against that ethnic group during
democratization resulting in the failure of the democracy process. The second is to avoid
any reference to historical grievances, because that would only add fuel to the fire and
skew the public’s perspective. References to historical grievances can develop a
precondition for ethnic strife and it would serve to ignite tensions between groups and
because intrastate instability based on grievances that are not easily resolved. The third is
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to avoid any manipulation of ethnic mix. The fourth is to avoid conflating democracy
with liberal democracy as liberal democracy is usually not the intended goal.
Since the end of World War II, 236 conflicts have been active in 150 locations,
many of which are dyadic conflicts (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008, p. 697).
One dyadic conflict that will be discussed in Chapter Six is that of the Colombian
government and its struggle with FARC (Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia). It is
claimed that Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world, largely
due to internal violent conflict over a ten-year period (Ibanez, A.M. and Velez, C. E.
2008, p. 2). As with dyadic conflict, it can be deduced that the conflict in Colombia was
highly influenced by territorial grievances. High populations were forced to migrate in
light of the need for land in order to produce, among other things, illegal drugs, that
would be a primary financial stream for the Colombian elite for several decades, and in
some instances in present day.
The third is unit-level conflict, a top down, elite generated conflict. The root cause
of international conflict, as mentioned previously, is usually identity as it relates to
ethnicity. It is the collective cultural identity of the ethnic community. There are six
elements of collective identity that should be noted: (1) the notion of identity is not using
biological or genetic means, (2) collective identity is not static or a fixed state of affairs,
it refers to stories passed from generation to generation, (3) language is a key identifier in
distinguishing groups, (4) territorial attachments and descendants from common land or
region play heavily in international war, (5) ethnic community exists through the
recognition of communal actions that are usually contingent on literacy, transportation,
and communication, and (6) religion is a vital factor in group identification.
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Elite generated conflict is said to be concentrated within the military regime itself,
rather than between the masses and rulers. In particular it can be expected that, for elites
that have a monopoly on power and resources in countries with low government
constraints, non-institutional means of asserting control and authority (such as violent
conflict) will be utilized (Carment and James, 1997, p. 202). Again, to put this type of
conflict in less abstract terms the genocide in Rwanda is a prime example of elitegenerated conflict. Whereas the Belgian Troops (the elite in this case) took full advantage
of their power and manipulated the Hutus to believe that they were different than the
Tutsis in order to main their control over the mineral resources. The most compelling
factor of this conflict is that both the Hutus and Tutsis met most, if not all, of the factors
that would classify both tribes as a collective identity, and a foreign nation was able to
make them believe otherwise.
Violent Conflict
As with conflict, violent conflict is the struggle over values or claims to status,
power, and scare resources, in which the goal of one party is to neutralize injure or
eliminate the opposing party. What makes violent conflict its own category, is that it
involves the use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of
a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Payson Conflict Study
Group, 2001). The use of armed force is considered to occur when a party in an active
conflict uses arms against the other party. The use of arms is generally known as the use
of anything material that is not corporal force (such as guns, nuclear weapons, or even
sticks). While we generally associate the use of arms as resulting in deaths, it is not
necessarily the end of its means.
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On Religion and Conflict
In the last several decades more and more acts of violent conflict have been said
to be done in the name of God, and yet religion never really played a dominant role in
violent conflict, and when it did, literature and teachings set out to restrain it. For
instance, Islamic traditions mandated for good treatment of prisoners and forbade looting
and the killing of children (Pearse, 2007, p. 121); the church’s Christian Knighthood
warriors were supposed to respect their enemy, defend the weak, honor women, refuse
harm to noncombatants, and ensure that even when killing was necessary it was civilized
(Pearse, 2007, p. 122-123); and Orthodox monarchs recognized that making war on coreligionists was a sin, thus deterring them from doing so (Pearse, 2007, p. 121). The
question is, when did religion become the fundamental premise for violent conflict?
If violent conflict has existed since the beginning of man, it can be said that it all
began when Cain murdered Abel outside the gates of Eden. This was the first incident of
the fall of humanity and the consequent estrangement from the presence of God (Pearse,
2007, p. 111). What is implicated further in this account is that violent conflict flowed
from the first appearance of property (i.e., resources that one party had and the other saw
an inequality). This only leads us to understand that religion is not a primary driver of
violent conflict, but rather intermingles with a party’s justification to be involved in such
acts so that others may follow in their footsteps with a sense of morality.
Genocide
Lemkin’s definition of genocide is the destruction of a nation or ethnic group.
Genocide, according to Lemkin, does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of
a nation except when accomplishing mass killings of all members of a nation. It is
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intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves.
One of the most notorious occurrences of genocide is that of the Holocaust, led by
Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany. “The Holocaust was the systematic, bureaucratic, statesponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its
collaborators” (www.ushmm.org, 2016). During the era of Holocaust, Nazi authorities
also targeted groups due to their perceived “racial inferiority” including, gypsies, the
disabled, Poles and Russians; and other groups based on political and ideological grounds
including communists, socialists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals
(www.ushmm.org, 2016). Hitler wrote that he wanted a government for the people, and
he was merely an instrument that would help Germany get there. The primary goal of
Hitler was to destroy Germany as a nation by way of destroying specific ethnic groups
that he found intrusive, and then rising as a global leader with unconfined measures of
control.
Explaining genocide in terms of why perpetrators begin can be boiled down to
four questions. The first is that how does the machinery of destruction get set in motion?
A common theory on how destruction sets in motion is largely dependent on the nature of
the state (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 64). In theory when a state is unstable, the government is
held responsible for the instability; therefore, they react by killing those who they see as a
potential threat. For the case of Germany, post-World War I and the Treaty of Versailles,
Germany was essentially told that they would have to take financial responsibility and aid
will not come their way considering what had happened. Hitler fed off this and was able
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to create his regime because he believed that if no one was going to help Germany as a
nation, then he should be the one to lead the nation into helping itself. Another reason
why the wheels of genocide begin to turn is that of the social and ethnic composition of
the state; in other words, where there is large competition there will be death. A third and
final reason behind the beginning is that of poverty. It is noted that “because the political
and economic spoils are so meager, deadly struggle ensues” (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 65). It
is either kill or be killed in this scenario.
The second question is that of why do some groups get targeted and others do not
when they live in the same country? (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 64) The nature of this question
leans more closely to that of a trick question. The reality is that the state’s leaders (or the
perpetrators that are in power) are not necessarily hungry to kill masses of people because
they are affiliated to that of a group. The motives behind the mass killing are ones to
promote fear (so that they feed off of it to gain more power), to promote nation-building
projects in their favor, or to lead that nation to war so that they may gain total power and
control of that state. Therefore, ethnicity becomes more of a non-issue and it is really a
matter of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.
For instance, let us assume that the perpetrator decided to target the group of
people with large noses in country X for their mass killings; had a group of people with
small noses been in the place of the group with large noses, then they would have been
killed instead. In other words, the perpetrator must target a specific group in order to
ignite fear and the movement of genocide and in order to gain power through that terror –
so whether a group has a large or small nose, it is irrelevant. This is notable in the
Rwandan genocide, particularly because the opposing parties had such similar traits; it
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just so happened that the resources that were being sought after was on land that did not
belong to the perpetrators.
The third question is when a group is slated for elimination, why is this
(destruction of the group) chosen? The reason behind the destruction of people is the
promotion of re-building or starting anew (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 68). The destruction of
the weak allows people to feed of the energy of feeling victorious and triumphant. If a
perpetrator happens to also be a state leader and that leader gives the people the euphoric
feeling of being unstoppable, then it is likely that the perpetrator will be supported by
those who do not suffer from the mass killing.
In addition, there is the idea of mass killing in order to “start fresh.” Often a
perpetrator sees their target group as the negative opposition. As people who are trying
to stop the growth and progression of their nation, thus, in order to be able to move
forward, then that group of people must be eliminated. Once the people begin to believe
in this idea of rejuvenation by elimination, then everything else becomes somewhat of a
domino effect.
The fourth and final question is why does the assault begin when it does – why
not earlier or later? There is no real explanation behind why genocide begins when it
does. Genocide is does not have a real systematic process (Goldhagen, 1990. P. 68). The
only thing we do know that is true to genocide is that it goes through a cycle of phases.
Lemkin’s two phases of genocide:
1. Destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group. The oppressor will
attempt to destroy the cultural practices, religious beliefs, economic parties,
social institutions, or identity of the targeted group. National pattern is
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synonymous with characteristics of the oppressed group. Imposition of the
national pattern of the oppressor. Attempt to convey/replace previous national
pattern (of the group) with new national pattern (of the oppressor).
2. Assimilation is coded in the opportunity (although, there really isn’t an
opportunity) to become part of the new population. To become part of the
social group of the oppressor to reap whatever benefits that may provide.
Imposition of the national pattern does not always follow the extermination of
a group of people (enforced assimilation).
Lemkin’s eight techniques of genocide:
1. Political: destruction of a local government and imposition of a new national
pattern. Can be done by a) name changes, b) sabotage (fifth column), c)
special privileges (to increase unity)
2. Social: abolition of local laws, courts, clergy, and intelligence, and replace
them with those of the oppressor
3. Cultural: prohibition of speaking the native language (largely used as a
genocide tool in African nations) and imposition of the oppressor’s language
and educational system → everything ends up being regulated (all matters of
aesthetics)
4. Economic: affects all other techniques
5. Biological: policy of depopulation through acts of euthanasia, abortion, and
forced sterilization
6. Physical: actual extermination/destruction of human lives a) racial
discrimination, b) endangering health, c) mass killings
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7. Religious: destruction of religious buildings and artifacts, and destruction of
forced migration of religious leaders
8. Moral: “moral debasement” promotion drugs, alcohol, and prostitution →
encourage violence to create more violence, in order to kill each other off.
In the field of academia, there are five distinct terms that have been developed in
defining genocide. These are as follows:
1. Crimes against humanity (CAH): crimes that have willfully been directed to
civilian populations (i.e., noncombatants – people that do not participant in
war); this is devoid of intent
2. Genocide: intentional destruction of group or nation
3. War crimes: war has a standard of conduct – the idea of just war; a war crime
is identified of a violation of that proper conduct in war. These crimes are
classified as mala in se, “evil in themselves”
4. Ethnic cleansing: attempt to purge or remove, either through extermination or
forced emigration, civilians from their native lands
5. Mass murder: deliberate killings of four or more civilians consecutively
Terrorism
One of the most contested terms of our time, terrorism and understanding how to
define it is notoriously challenging (Held, 2004, 62). Widely known as a tool used to
manipulate international relations, terrorism is a concept that has been increasingly
difficult to define. In fact, it has been noted that the term “terrorism” is problematic to
clearly define due to objectivity, its lack of connection to a specific ideology, and the idea
that understanding terrorism will curb it. Even still, somehow the media and political
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leaders have managed to adhere the idea of terrorism to conflicts that are related to ethnic
identity and the need for power between those individuals (or groups) in conflict. In fact,
governments have defined terrorism as something that only their opponents could commit
and something only those who seek radical change engage in (Held, 2004, 62).
Over the years, terrorism has evolved and developed a new face. For the most
part, today’s terrorism/terrorist factions lack hierarchical organization, where only the
“architects” have full knowledge of the group, they maintain clear political goals, they
have a high influence over public opinion, and they attempt to doctor terrorism into
something that is justifiable, giving it a human face – “we are not terrorists, we are the
victims of the state.”
While terrorism certainly is violence, and generally violence that is intertwined
with matters of political freedom, the reality is that the only real effect that terrorism has
is that of increasing fear of the foreigner. In a globalized era, terrorism has taken a toll on
international relations and has become a tool widely used in ethno-political conflicts,
particularly the structural systemic conflicts that involve a competition for power.
Theoretical Perspectives
Theories Related to Human Behavior
Social scientists have come to believe that, people do things in certain situations
because those are the rational things to do. In other words, there is a reason behind
actions or our human behavior (Mohr, 2009, p. 8). The question is, are humans’ rational
actors? And, if so, does that mean that all actions are/should be considered rational? As a
rational scholar, one can conclude that no, not all human behavior is rational, but the
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theories that follow can shed light as to why certain individuals act in the manner that
they do.
Social Theory
In formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying the relationship between
globalization and violent conflict, social theory provides a platform by which human
behavior and patterns can be identified, that can later be utilized to foresee and prevent
catastrophic consequences. Social theory as a basis for the comprehension of man was
developed several hundred years ago, as civil societies developed and people were
permitted to express their independent thinking (Lemert, 2010). Its foundation began as
the attempt to account for what was different between modern societies and its preceding
traditional ones (Lemert, 2010).
Today, social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept
human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or
around them” (Lemert, 2010). As children, we begin to formulate our own social
theories, why do girls play with other girls, why don’t we talk back to adults, why do we
have to listen to our parents when they tell us to do something – these are all questions
that will eventually lead to our own understanding of race, gender, socioeconomic status,
sexuality, poverty and occupation status. Indeed, it is social theory that leads to the
understanding of a society that is observed and analyzed in all facets. But what is a
society, and why should it be under the scrutiny of observation?
Culture, institutions, land, religions, or artistic creations today can identify
societies. And a society that is drained of their essence is one that could potentially be
wiped out (Lemert, 2010). Because social theory is adaptable to varying conflicts, it also
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means that at times it can cast a net that goes too far. As such, social theory’s effort to
draw boundaries around social facts or generalizations has its limitations (Lee, 1999, p.
551); this is because societies change as time progresses.
Societal norms shift as societies develop; it would be infinitely impossible to form
actual boundaries. The inability to form boundaries within societies is directly reflected
on the current state of economic affairs, whereas countries (in particular developing
countries) have become more dependent on other nations to fill in the gaps of missing
resources, whether it is through imports, exports or aid. This highlights that economic
communication has become more global, which leads to us to discuss what we have come
to know as globalization, a theory that has fallen under a myriad of umbrellas to explain
economy in our world, as we know it today.
This, in turn, goes back to the central theme of social theory where we as humans
attempt to decipher what others to do, and in this case, for gain of power economically
and politically. As social theory is expanded, it is also important to remember that the
theory is based on learning from historical events, and what nations or societies do to
adapt and evolve from them (Lemert, 2010, p. 9). In fact, often, political leaders have
used historical references to rally up people’s emotions and get them to understand their
point of view. In doing so, a conflict can largely be emotionally driven based on an
individual’s interpretation of the past.
With, there has been a wrench to derail our own nature to learn from the past.
Western societies have been flooded with social innovation, technological progress, and
the explosion of social media that has brought about an ahistorical worldview. This
means that there has been a historical amnesia of sorts, causing the consciousness of
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history to become what it is, followed by the relentless importance of the “here and now.”
It enforces the notion that historical references have become more mystified than actual
reality and are dismissed as irrational occurrences that have no substantive weight on its
lasting effects (Sardamov, 1998, p. 56). Phenomena such as these are the very reason why
studies such as this one are critical to the fields of conflict resolution and international
conflict. It is imperative that scholars in academia and politics have the tools that will
allow our leaders make rational decisions based on hard evidence.
Social Movements Theory and Social Revolutions
Social movement theory began in the late 19th century and refers to the study of
social mobilization, including its social, cultural, and political manifestations and
consequences. Social movements are defined as “a persistent and organized effort on the
part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or to resist social change”
(Defronzo, 2011, p. 9). Social movements are not necessarily classified as events that
bring about violent conflict; but modern-day theorists that have taken social movement
theory to explain modern day revolutions are aware and have noted that violent means are
not exclusive. Social revolutions are “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and
class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts”
(Skocpol, 1993, p. 33). The concept of social revolution is different from other
revolutions in that it makes successful sociopolitical transformation; in other words, it
changes the state and its class structures, not necessarily for the better of that state, but
nonetheless it is changed. Social scientists have attempted to classify revolutions into two
types; the first is a left wing revolution, in which the central goal is perceived to change
major social and political institutions in order to alter the dominant economic, social, or
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political relationships and the other is a right wing revolution, in which the primary aim is
the restoration of traditional institutions (Defronzo, 2015, .p 12).
Like conflict, there are several factors that contribute to the development of social
revolutions, five of which have proved to be enough for the success of revolutionary
movements. They are as follows (Defronzo, 2015, p. 13-14):
1. Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings among urban or rural
populations. Here, a large portion of the population is unsatisfied with either
the government or their socio-economic status, so much so that it leads to
protests and mass rebellions.
2.

Dissident elite political movements. Here we are dealing with the division
among the elite groups within a society and are pitted against each other for
power and control.

3. Unifying motivations. As it is presented, motivations that cut across several
classes within a society are among the more powerful factors behind a
revolution.
4. A severe political crisis paralyzing the administrative capabilities of the state.
A state crisis can come in several ways, including defeat in war, natural
disaster, catastrophic economic downturn, or withdrawal of financial or
military support from allied states. Should a state become subject to a crisis, it
only weakens the administration, giving more power to the population(s) that
are seeking to make changes by way of social revolution.
5. A permissive or tolerant world context. This is likely one of the more
controversial factors of our time considering our globalized world. On the one
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hand, we want to intervene when a nation is suffering because we know that a
social revolution would only devastate that nation and likely affect others (that
likely have economic partnership with them, which leads to an economic
domino effect). On the other hand, we refrain ourselves from intervening
when there is an uprising in a foreign country because we want to allow that
nation to make claim to its sovereignty and allow it to exercise their authority.
A myriad of theories has been developed to understand the drivers of social
movements and revolutions, among them is relative deprivation, which is also
a theory that assists in the understanding behind human behavior in violent
conflict.
Relative Deprivation
First developed as a theory in psychology by Samuel Stouffer to explain the
satisfaction of internal promotions of military police in different regions of the United
States, relative deprivation is now widely used as a theory in political science to
demonstrate its implications concerning the relationship between inequality and political
stability. The theory of relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by
inequalities. There are four conditions for an individual to feel relatively deprived: (1)
they do not have X; (2) they see some other person or persons as having X; (3) they want
X (4) they see it as feasible that they should have X. the relativity of the concept come
from conditions 2 and 4 and the feeling of deprivation is defined by conditions 1 and 3
(Stark and Taylor, 1989, p. 2).
Relative deprivation has been assumed to increase according to three different
patterns. The first is known as decremental deprivation, where an individual’s
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expectations remain stable but receive less and less. This is usually as a result of an
increase in the difference of power between the actors (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). For
instance, when someone new comes into power of a nation state their power is
subjectively weaker than when they are in office for a second or third term. Thus, in their
first term of being president/dictator/ruler, the head of the nation will generally keep the
citizens’ standard of living stable, and as they have an increase in power they would be
more inclined to slowly chip away of the resources that the citizens may have.
The second pattern of relative deprivation is aspirational deprivation, where an
individual’s expectations rise while their achievements remain stable (Korpi, 1974, p.
1575). This pattern is more visibly seen in relationships between peers (individuals of
equal standing) or individuals that do not have high degrees of separation as it relates to
power. For instance, if two colleagues performed the same duties, the expectation of
reward has the same baseline, but there will come a point where one of the other has a
higher expectation of reaping (more or better) benefits because they believe that their
performance if superior to that of the other.
The third pattern of relative deprivation is that of progressive deprivation.
Progressive deprivation occurs when there is a relatively steady improvement on an
individual’s social and economic condition, which leads to increased expectations, but is
followed by a sharp reversal in that trend (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). This pattern has the
tendency to occur with individuals that fall under the low to low-middle class
economically, have had a sudden improvement in their lifestyle, and then their new
success is taken from them; either because they themselves have fallen into a financial
blunder or their country has taken an economic hit that affects most citizens under the
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same umbrella (i.e., when the real-estate bubble caused thousands of families to lose their
homes). Regardless of the pattern, an increase in relative deprivation strongly affects the
probability for collective violence.
Relative deprivation theory is distinguished in two categories, egoistic and
fraternal. Egoistic deprivation refers to a single individual’s feeling of comparative
deprivation, whereas fraternal deprivation (also known as group deprivation) refers to the
dissatisfaction arising from the status of an entire group (Victoroff , 2005, 101). As it
relates to violent conflict, relative deprivation will largely fall under the category of
fraternal deprivation, as an individual [intrinsically] cannot wage an act of violent
conflict that would cause serious detriment to a nation’s economic welfare.
Theories in Economics
Economics is the social science that deals with tangible wealth, in general the
goods that are produced by people (Foldvary, 2014, p. 6). Economics enables us to
understand reality empirically, because wealth is not an end, rather it is a means by which
utility is measured and then pursued by individuals. In order to understand economics
(and its driving theories) it is important to consider the following universal principles
(Foldvary, 2014, p. 8-9) (in no order):
•

Some natural resources are scare relative to human desires

•

Resources vary in quality

•

All human beings belong to the same species and have the same human nature

•

Humans haves ends (i.e., goals and needs)

•

Humans are able to rank their needs on importance

•

Human desires tend to b unlimited
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•

Human values are subjective

•

Humans beings economize

•

People tend to have time preference (desiring different goods at different
times)

•

The future is uncertain

These principles lay the foundation for an economic theory. “An economic theory
is defined as a theory that has economic structures as its relational structures…” by which
are distinguished by a set of rules (Klein, 1998, p. 7). An economic theory has a
mathematical component where the theorist is concerned with an economic structure, for
instance an individual consumer. Thus, an economic theory, in its classical sense, would
explain the means by which a consumer would perform choices based on patterns and
facing different budget situations. (Klein, 1998, p. 22).
Theories in economics can be confined to strictly explaining phenomenon as it
related to market prices, wages rates, and GDP. History has taught us that our social
lives have an inseparable relationship with its elements (i.e., economics). Therefore,
human behavior goes beyond the economic doctrine. The theories below will explain the
economic reality of individuals and allows us to make the connection between human
behavior, economics, and conflict.
Marxism
In general, a theory is at the center of the economic realities of human culture; and
with Marxism getting and keeping economic power is the motive behind all social and
political activities (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). This would make economics the foundation of
the social and political constructs that are in place within a society at large (Id). In
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Marxism, a human event cannot be properly understood without the historical
circumstances by which that event occurred; and in his Communist Manifesto Marx
writes that the history of all existing society is [found within] the history of struggle
(Love, 2006, p. 250). Thus, the history of economics is found within the web of societies
arranged in orders and social ranks that have established modern-day’s bourgeoisie (Ibid,
p. 251).
Marx further notes that each development of today’s high-class society is
accompanied by a responding political advancement of that class; which marks an
important point in the relationship between economic globalization and large migratory
movements. Let us take for instance the notion of the oppressor and the oppressed. If an
oppressed class exists under the oppressor (in this case a class of high stature) and the
oppressor wants to build a system of successful industry where the oppressed class
resides, the oppressor has the upper hand by way of resources. Therefore, in finding the
means to build this industry the oppressor forces the oppressed to relocate resulting in
their likely economic ruin. The same is understood today. If a higher power (political or
otherwise) wants to create an infrastructure where a society of low-income citizens
reside, the high power has the upper hand and will essentially “buy” them out of their
homes, or in some cases result in movement by force by way of violent conflict.
Between 1975 and 1979, under the regime of Pol Pot, Cambodia lost 1.5 million
people due to starvation, execution, disease, or over work. Pol Pot wanted a classless
peasant society, espousing Marxist principles, and took particular aim at intellectuals, city
residents, ethnic Vietnamese, civil servants, and religious leaders (www.history.com,
2016). In order to build his successful industry amongst the Cambodians, 2.5 million
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were evacuated, and the remaining population was stripped of their possessions and
forced to work in the fields as part of their reeducation. Under his regime, the state
controlled all aspects of a person’s life. Money, private property, most reading material,
and religion were outlawed; agriculture was collectivized; children were taken and forced
into the military; and strict rules governing sexual relations, clothing, and vocabulary
were laid down (www.history.com, 2016).
The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical
perspective is infinitely more significant that the division of race, religion, or gender
(Tyson, 2006, p. 54). In fact, it is this frame of thinking that allows for the Joneses to rise
in the global society. It is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is more important and
the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society will place a large
significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them to create revolutions amongst
themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in their own battles.
Globalization
Over the last decade, the idea of globalization has grown to have several different
interpretations. Some have deemed it as an economic concept that supports market
forces; others have called it the gateway for international communication, removing
borders and barriers to make for better negotiations, and reconfiguring the fundamental
properties of the nation-state (Lemert, 2010, p. 625). At its core, globalization is an
economic phenomenon whose implications are largely bound to a state’s welfare (Dunne,
Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 283). The state’s welfare, in turn is associated and affected by
the flows of goods for economic advancement (Ibid, p. 285).
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Globalization has so many facets (encompassing themes of economics, politics,
and society) one can say that it is challenging to gauge; but, economic flows, unlike other
themes, can be recorded and quantified (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 289) to
provide hard data to nations as to what direction they should take. Economists Hecklman
and Young provides an in-depth statistical analysis on the social and economic
dimensions of globalization, where they describe globalization as an “extension going
beyond borders…” (Hecklman and Young, 2013, 2). The social dimension (which will
not be further developed in this research) is comprised as personal contact, information
flows, and cultural proximity (Hecklman and Young, 2013, p. 6). The economic
dimension is comprised of two components actual trade flow and policy restrictions
(Ibid.). The primary goal in their research was to determine whether globalization was
indeed global. In gathering data from 129 countries, Hecklman and Young found that no
matter what the economic status of a nation, whether it is a superpower or a third world
country, globalization did exist; which further asserts that boundaries are indeed
disappearing as societies economic needs shift. While globalization here is not applied to
violent conflict on its face, this research is important in that it proves statistically that a de
facto global economy exists, which means that if a country is lacking resources, they will
find a way to fulfill that need – even if it is by violent means.
In developing the notion of the role of a nation and economic globalization,
Hashimov states that it is characterized by the application of economic policy tools to
maintain growth. These policy tools are related to rate control, which we know as tariffs,
quotas and subsidies (Hashimov, 2013, p. 6). For developing countries, however, where a
government is continuously unstable, infrastructure is not available, and economics are at
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a constant downturn, these policy tools may be acts of violence, which will be
demonstrated later as particular countries are examined.
In the 1950’s the “third world” referred to the nation-states who were reluctant to
take sides in the Cold War. In the 1960’s, the term was cited as the European colonies in
Asia and Africa. More notably at that time, third world countries were those regimes that
formally allied with the USSR and had a political and economic path that was between
liberal capitalism (“first world”) and state socialism (“second world”). Following the
wars between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China in the late 1970’s, the term third world was
used to represent the countries that struggled economically in a world-system that was
continuously expanding (Berger, 1994, p. 261-263).
Third world countries, or now more aptly known as developing nations, are the
main construct of this study. With that being said, it is important to note that there have
been several publications in the last decade by well-regarded economists, including
Robert Zoellick (former President of the World Bank), who have made claims that thirdworld countries are coming to an end. This is largely in part due to what he calls
“sustainable globalization.”
Globalization is largely driven by the free flows of goods and capitol, but if we
pay close attention, we would notice that the consequences of the globalization are
equivalent to those that would be attached to the free flow of labor (Daly, 2004, p. 41).
What has been a common notion is that nations out-source for labor in order to obtain the
best value (i.e., the cheapest wages); but what has actually been occurring in our current
state is that there is a growing population of workers moving to the wealthier country
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because even within borders companies have been managing to secure employees at a
low cost.
As per Zoellick (2010), globalization is not limited to the movement of
populations to other countries for better opportunities. In fact, he claims that within the
developing countries themselves there has been a shift in their economic growth
internally, with an increase of nearly 10% in purchasing power lone in the last 30 years.
While this number may appear to be small in the amongst the larger scales of the super
powers (i.e., the United States, China, and Brazil); it is important to note that in the grand
scheme of things that within that small percentage 60 million people were lifted out of
poverty (www.worldbank.org, Zoellick, 2010).
As it relates to this study, I will analyze and evaluate the reasons behind the
economic growth of these developing countries. We must ask ourselves, how is it
possible that millions of people on Africa who earn less than $2 a day can return that into
their own country’s growth? The truth is, that they cannot, therefore, conflict occurs.
Thus, globalization has been an accelerator of social change, and acts as a catalyst for
conflict (Tidwell and Lerche, 2004, p. 47).
Globalization and Banking with Developing Nations
If a state is unable to make economic advancements independently, economic
institutions are in place to alleviate debt and provide financial assistance as the institution
see fit in accordance to the needs of the state. Three economic institutions in particular
are well known in the context of economic globalization, these are the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Intrinsically these institutions are global banks that supply loans to developing countries
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and in return demand the nation to implement a structural adjustment program (Sterger,
2009, p. 54). While the process is seemingly uncomplicated, the list of qualifiers in order
to obtain the loan is extensive (Steger, 2009, p. 55), and it includes:
1. A guarantee of fiscal discipline, and a curb to budget deficits
2. A reduction of public expenditure, particularly in military and public
administration
3. Tax reform, aiming at the creation of a system with a broad base and effective
enforcement
4. Financial liberation, with interest rates determined by the market
5. Competitive exchange rates, to assist export-led growth
6. Trade liberation, coupled with the abolition of import licensing and a
reduction on tariffs
7. Promotion of foreign direct investment
8. Privatization of state enterprise, leading to efficient management and
improved performance
9. Deregulation of the economy
10. Protection of property rights
Despite this, developing nations have been consistent in obtaining loans from the
institutions, and yet often the political leaders do not follow through in complying. In
fact, it has been recognized that large portions of the loans end up being pocketed by
authoritarian political leaders or enriching local businesses that serve those political
leaders. As such, those developing nations continue to see poor growth and internal
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conflict because they do not have the enough wealth (liquid or otherwise) by which to
support their citizens.
Theories Related to Conflict
Rational Choice Theory
In his greed theory of conflict, Paul Collier writes that people will conduct civil
war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of the rebellion (Denmers, 2017, 100).
He further argues that wars are often not about winning but serve economic and political
functions. As it relates to this study, Rational Choice and Greed Theory provide the
framework by underlining that violent conflict is utilized as a tool by individuals or a
group of individuals in order to highlight their economic injustice with the hope of
establishing a form of equality and stability. Collier’s greed theory of conflict is now
more commonly known as rational choice theory, where the premise is the same and the
idea is that “people are rational agents, and have choice, [even] in settings of war.” Thus,
violence is the product of a rational actor perceiving that the benefits of that violence
outweigh its costs/consequences.
There are two assumptions both theories share; the first is that the individual is the
starting point for all social action and the second is that the individual’s objective is to
achieve the maximum of their goals (otherwise the purpose of that violence is deemed
irrational). Because this theory is largely based on the action of the individual Collier set
out to study what people do and not what they say (Denmers, 2017, 102) – the “true
cause…is not the loud discourse of the grievance, but the silent force of the greed.”
Collier breaks down motivation of violent conflict into two categories; greed, where
violent actions arise because opposing parties aspire to acquire wealth by capturing
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resources and grievance, where opposing parties set out to rid of each other or the unjust
regime (Denmers, 2017, 102).
The explanation that Collier provides as to why greed drives violent conflict is
that individuals are utility maximizers and would be willing to put their lives on the line
for a cause that is likely to benefit them (Denmers, 2017, 104). Consequently, Collier
provides an economic perspective that violent conflict based on greed is like a market,
whereas individuals make investment in violence and reap a return; and violent conflict
based on grievance involves investments with no potential for returns. Therefore,
grievance-based conflict would not produce a ‘sufficient amount’ of violence (Denmers,
2017, 105).
In determining whether a violent conflict is driven by greed or grievance, Collier
developed an empirical model quantifying such factors using proxies. Greed’s proxies are
primary commodity exports in GDP, the proportion of young males within a total
population, and the average years of education of a population (Denmers, 2017, 103).
Grievance’s proxies are the extent to which a society is factionalized by ethnicity and
religion, land ownership, levels of repression and autocracy, and variable growth rate in
the five years prior to the outbreak of the violent conflict (Id.). While it is not of my
opinion that grievances themselves are not sufficient to propel violent conflict, for the
purposes of this study it is important to note that limited proxies from both categories will
be examined in order to quantify the point in which a conflict becomes violent. These
would include primary commodity exports in GDP, land ownership (as it related to
economic inequality), and the variable growth rate (of which pre and post will be
examined). The proxy of the extent to which a society is factionalized by ethnicity and
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religion will briefly be discussed to debunk the myth that it is a primary driving force of
violent conflict.
Prospect Theory
The prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky; it is a theoretical
process that attempts to see what results will be based on what an individual has. The
prospect theory analyzes how much we will gain or lose because of our decisions – it is
decision making with a risk. Built on the concept with reference dependence, the ability
make a decision that is contingent on reference, the prospect theory (a) emphasizes asset
changes rather asset levels (posing the question of “if I get something then what will I
lose?”), (b) analyzes asset changes pertaining to the gains and losses, and (c) considers
reference points as the implications for our choices, as in our gains and losses reflect on
some previous reference point. It is noted that specific behaviors pertain to decision
making under risk, it is a form of behavioral theory that attempts to describe individuals’
behavior based on their decisions. As such, people respond differently to gains and
losses, often overvaluing losses relative to comparable gains. For instance, if someone is
offered a choice between a 75% chance of having $5,000 with a 25% chance of having
nothing versus a 100% chance of having $3000 most people would choose the latter
because there is a guarantee of no losses. More people are risk averse with respect to
gains; this means that people will choose something with a guarantee as opposed to
anything else. On the same token, if a person is offered the choice between a 100%
chance of losing $3,000 or a 75% chance of losing $15,000, most people would choose
the latter because people are risk seeking with respect to losses. This means that people
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would rather take a chance and not lose something as opposed to a guaranteed loss – even
if that means that the risk would be greater.
In light of these observations the prospect theory found that (1) people value
things they have more than things that they do not, (2) it is more difficult to lose
something than to gain something, this is known as the endowment effect – loss is a
greater trauma than gain, (3) people are generally risk averse with respect to gains and
risk seeking with respect to losses, (4) the change in choice is a consequence of a change
in frame, in other words how our choices are framed will greatly influence our decision
making – also known as the framing effect, (5) reference points are not always fixed and
will be discussed with respect to X, and (6) reference point reorientation after gains occur
faster than losses, it is often easier to “renormalize” or readjust after a gain than a loss.
The prospect theory is comprised of two phases. The first is the editing phase,
which is the assessment of options, outcomes, and valuations, all of which are compiled
in the decision-making process. The second is the evaluation phase, which is a
combination of value of possible outcomes with eight probabilities; this phase
emphasizes guarantees (although there are thresholds) and places an emphasis on
retention pertaining to losses. While the prospect theory is a useful tool in the analysis of
our decision making with respect to gains and losses, there are also problems that come
with its application, including (1) the prospect theory only applies to individuals and
international relations is concerned with nation states (not individuals), 2) it is difficult
for nations to adapt to economic deficiencies, which means that national renormalization
would be the state adjusting to surplus, making it difficult to explain national
renormalization, and (3) collective risk assessment is different from individual risk
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assessment, there is a distinction in the logic of risk assessment between an individual
and a group.
Because of these difficulties with the prospect theory, there are numerous state
implications that follow. The first is that the state will always attempt to preserve the
status quo, in other words they will always try to preserve what the current government
norm is. The second is that in the application of prospect theory, territorial defense
receives greater weight than territorial acquisition or encroachment, which makes it
difficult to assess which party is the risk seeker. The third implication is that states
maximize their security by aiming to preserve the status quo in the international system;
this is also known as defensive realism. The fourth is that political candidates are more
concerned with the avoidance of alienating key constituents rather than strengthening the
support among those groups.
The idea of maintaining and preserving political relationships that already exists
is something that politicians should stay away from because “democrats will vote for
democrats” anyway. The fifth state implication is that framing of the issue is essential in
attaining public support, as framing issues is directly correlated to the public interest. The
sixth and seventh note that frames above the status quo define the status quo as a loss (for
example, the national education expenditure) and frames below the status quo define the
status quo as a gain (for instance, pre-social security America), respectively. The eighth
implication asserts that the decline in relative power is typically framed as a loss with a
reference point in the past as goal from power. This means that incremental increases in
power are avoided for a return to the original reference point, going back to the instant
endowment effect. The ninth notes the notion of bargaining is at the expense of another,
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and the final implication is that in dyadic bargaining, concession aversion leads to a
greater tendency on both sides to risk the consequences of a non-agreement or deadlock,
and hence a lower probability of a negotiated agreement.
Parable of the Tribes
The Parable of the Tribes (“parable”) notes that if we have different ethnic groups
living in close proximity and one becomes an aggressor, then the use of force transforms
the state of affairs of the relationships between all of the ethnic groups in that proximity,
causing them all to become aggressive. The parable demonstrates this: ethnicities A-D
live in proximity, if D goes into war with C, then C has two options, to refuse to right or
to fight back. If C refuses to fight, then one of four things could happen, (1) they can
withdraw from the region, or be cleansed from the land, (2) they can allow themselves to
be destroyed or if C is pacifist then it would be genocide, (3) they become tributary, in
other words, permit to remain but become members of D, or (4) they can completely
assimilate, which often times is done by mass rape by the opposing group. In refusing to
fight, C in one form or another will lose its identity as C and disappear, or become D. If C
decides to fight back, because the possibility of winning does exist, then the conflict
becomes the ambition to preserve identity. Because of this notion, the parable concludes
that identity preservation requires conflict.
One of the worst ethnic related conflicts on the 20th century is that of the genocide
in Rwanda, where nearly 500,000 Tutsi were killed (Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 483).
The Hutu and Tutsi shared the same language and culture, the same clan names, the same
customs, and symbols of kinship served as a unifying bond between them (Parsons and
Totten, 2009, p. 484). Yet, the bloodshed that occurred during that time would lead
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people to believe otherwise. The truth is that ethnic conflict began for the Hutus and Tutsi
decades before, when Belgian politics shifted within Rwanda, provoking Tutsi who had
maintained higher authority to press their claim. In response, the Hutu-led, Belgian
assistance coup forced into exile nearly a quarter million Tutsi into surrounding countries
(Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 485). The ethnic conflict here was manifested by a third
party who saw an economic opportunity in mineral resources and created a system of
apartheid where Hutus came to accept the physical dissimilarities and started to view the
Tutsis as foreign immigrants (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 50).
People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies
(Ross, 2001, 160), however, when ethnicity and identity are linked with social
uncertainty, it can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). It has
been proposed that in collectivist cultures, terrorism is more likely to be carried out
because the only morality that they have is the one for their “in-group,” their identity
(Victoroff, 2005, 21). Usually preservation of identity is linked to the collective fear of
losing the ability to protect one’s own group, and often the weaknesses of other groups
are sought after in order to maintain preservation. Thus, in order preserve their identity
the factors that embody identity are those often placed in the frontlines of justification for
igniting and escalating conflict. Some of these factors include emotions, attitudes and
perceptions (of one another), and dehumanization and deindividuation.
Emotions have a powerful effect on human behavior; one of the emotions that are
commonly identified in conflict related to identity is that of image threat. A threat to a
party’s image is a great source of escalation, as having power, resources, and status are
what give that group a legitimate stance in the world. Once that image is tarnished, a
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collective will feel the need to defend itself by developing an image that sends out a
message of being ready to fight (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, 104). The attitudes and
perceptions of each group is also an identity factor that can lead to the escalation of
conflict. Attitudes and perceptions can often take form of stereotypes (Pruitt and Kim,
2004 107), and once in a state of conflict there is no gray area to negotiate. Negative
attitudes will invoke negative ones, and positive attitudes will invoke positive ones.
Looking at conflict de-escalation through the lens of the parable, one can assume
that ethnicities in proximity have at least one overlapping common bond. This bond can
be political, social, economic, or religious. Once a common bond is formed, then the
groups can further de-escalate their conflict by learning more about the other and learning
to accept each other’s limitations through compromise and negotiations.
For instance, let us assume that ethnicities A-D are land locked communities, in
proximity, in an arid region of Africa and water resources are often scarce. Commonly,
each of the ethnicities would get in conflict with each other so that the winner takes the
water from the loser. The better solution to this dilemma is to acknowledge the fact that
they all need water to survive (the common bond), and instead of wasting time and other
resources on war, they should work together on building a plan where they could each
have water in equally distributed amounts. Now, this example of course is not pragmatic,
but it scratches the surface on what could erupt to be a very complicated conflict.
Drivers Behind the Cause of Ethnic Conflict
There is a myriad of theories that have specific premises that lead to a certain
number of conclusions or consequences that can explain conflict, including ethnic
conflict. However, there are overarching drivers behind ethnic conflict that should be
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acknowledged. These include insecurity, greed, social-psychological motivations, and the
dynamics of the international dimension. Generally, it has been posed that insecurity is
heightened when segments of an ethnic group are geographically isolated or vulnerable to
small bands of armed forces that are willing to commit acts of violence at a moment
notice (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 26). These small bands are usually formed in
response to fear, so that an ethnic group is ready to act. To dig deeper, this fear is
produced by government breakdown, geographic isolation or vulnerability, changing
balances of political or demographic power, redistribution of resources, and forced or
voluntary arming (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 27). There are three dilemmas that arise on
the basis of these fears; the first is that of information failure (the opposing parties are
either lacking or misinformed, thus, causing unnecessary conflict); the second are
problems of credibility as it relates to commitment (one party is not reassured by the
other that they will not defect from the accorded agreement); and the third is that of preemptive use of force, which is essentially derived from the former dilemmas (Cordell and
Wolff, 2010, p. 28).
Greed explains that ethnic conflict is more economically motivated than
traditionally believed. The primary argument here is that conflict occurs of the economic
incentive is sufficiently great in relation to the costs (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 32).
The findings behind this argument is that violent conflict is largely:
•

A phenomenon of low-income countries (where military labor costs are low),

•

Where the presence of natural resources is a lootable commodity of which is
often scarce (therefore, must be fought for),
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•

Said countries have higher populations (which often are those that are lowincome) have a higher risk of violent conflict,

•

And a high degree of ethnic division exists (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 33).

With social-psychological motivations, the conflict is perceived by the individual
who places themselves in that conflict. Here, the basic assumption is that people strive for
a positive social identity. Social identity is derived from membership in groups; therefore,
a positive social identity would be one where the membership enhances an individual’s
self-esteem and develop loyalty for that group. This, in turn, develops a strong “band of
brothers” should a violent conflict erupt.
The dynamics of the international dimension essentially explains that ethnic
conflict isn’t confined to the limits of the opposing ethnicities (Cordell and Wolff, 2010,
p. 41). Rather, outside minorities, surrounding states, and in some cases international
organizations may see it as appropriate to become involved in order to prevent or deter
serious violent conflict or a degree of economic sabotage that would be detrimental to
that nation and nations that are involved in importing or exporting good to them.
On Globalization and Culture, as it Relates to Identity
Cultural globalization refers to the expansion of cultural flows across the globe;
concerned with the symbolic construction, articulation, and dissemination (Steger, 2009,
p. 71). Individualism, consumerism, and religious discourse now circulate more freely
and widely thanks to easier access to technologies such as the Internet that facilitate
world-wide communication. There are two ends to cultural globalization spectrum as it
relates to conflict. On one end, there are the theorists that believe that cultural
globalization is slowly chipping away at an individual’s identity as it relates to race,
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religion, ethnicity, tradition, etc. Some proponents advocate that this is a good thing,
because finding “sameness” amongst each other will allow conflict to subside. Others say
that having “sameness” will strip us from our heritage and mean that we will have no
identity at all. On the other end of the spectrum there are theorists that believe cultural
globalization is forming a unified front because it allows us to learn about the differences
that exists in the world; therefore we will be more educated on all the elements of
different cultures, which would subside conflict because we know the rationale behind
why cultures act as they do. I believe that whether cultural globalization is depicted as a
positive or negative notion, it is something that is undoubtedly here to stay, and it is
important to accept the fact that our modern world is becoming more and more
intermingled as technologies become more advanced.
Current Conflict Regulation Tactics
Conflict regulation today is comprised by three elements: prevention,
management, and settlement (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict prevention refers
to “a set of policies adopted at an early stage in a conflict, before violent escalation or
after a ceasefire has been negotiated to prevent the resumption of violence” (Cordell and
Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Generally, this would take place in either the emergence phase of a
conflict or de-escalation/termination phases of a conflict. The primary aims for conflict
prevention is provide incentives for peaceful means of negotiations; for instance, making
the costs of violent conflict high so that the opposing parties are not inclined to engage in
violent conflict. Conflict management is “the attempt to contain, limit, or direct the
effects of an ongoing…conflict” (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict management
can potentially be implemented at any stage of the conflict should the opposing parties be
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willing to do so, in order to minimize the costs of both lives and resources lost during a
conflict. Finally, conflict settlement aims at “establishing an institutional framework in
which the opposing parties…can be accommodated to such an extent that incentives for
cooperation and the non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise
outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent conflict” (Cordell and Wolff,
2010, p. 79). Conflict settlement takes place in the post-termination phase of conflict
(should both parties continue to exist after a violent conflict). Because of the elements of
conflict regulation is that of settlement, as research scientists we would need to
determine: (a) the concerns and demands of the conflict parties; (b) the relevant actors at
the local, state, regional, and global levels; and (c) the factors that shape their opportunity
structure and motivations (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 81).
The condition for violent conflict often deals primarily is preservation (of the self,
resources, or surroundings). This means that individuals and groups alike will have
concerns that deal with the conditions that they are living in and normally fall into the
categories of security political participation, cultural identity, and economic opportunities
(Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 81). When presenting claims that fall under these categories
concerns and demands can look like the need for more liberal political rights (i.e., the
inclusion of women of people of color to vote), or the need for more territory to reap the
benefits of natural resources (i.e., land for agriculture, so that the farmer will not only be
able to feed his or her family by what they produce but also by what they sell).
Once these claims are properly recognized, the relevant actors must be established
in order to address the claims and avoid conflict (or prevent violent conflict). For
instance, in the case for more political rights, depending on where the individual lives the

70
relevant parties can either be in a state or regional level, or a combination of the two –
depending on what the rights call for. In the case of accessing more land for agriculture,
the potential relevant parties could be at a local level (land from another individual) at a
state level (land within the nation) or a global level (land from a neighboring nation that
is necessary to acquire in order to fulfill the needs of the individual(s)).
When the relevant parties are clearly identified, then (and only then) can the
parties begin to set structures that will motivate everyone involved equally so that
conflict is evaded. Again, taking the example of political rights; if what the people are
asking for is the right to vote by women or another minority, then a potential politician
coming into office can make those changes so that in their next term they are guaranteed
those votes by the minorities and, therefore, secure a second term in office. In the case of
acquiring land for the ability to produce goods for self-use or sale, a city (county, state,
nation) can potentially provide this land to an individual at a low-cost and then collect
taxes on everything they produce and then an additional tax when items are sold (much
like a state and federal tax). This way the individual can provide the basic necessities for
their family and the government is reaping the benefits financially.
Having the elements of settlement determined, the settlement itself follows a
process, which is the negotiation of the terms, the implementation of that settlement,
followed by the actual operations (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 89). The negotiation of the
settlement is often interlaced with the identification of the elements, which depending on
the number of factors involved can be a short or lengthy process. The idea behind the
negotiation is to attempt to put into writing terms that all relevant parties are partial to in
order to avoid conflict in the future. Once the terms are established, them the
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implementation phase begins. Implementation is the process of putting those terms into
place, which often runs parallel with operation. At times, this could mean that the
implementation process is not fully complete because the terms are being placed in a
more “trial and error” situation where the relevant parties would have to go back and renegotiate terms that are not necessarily working for either of them. In doing so, the
agreement can be designed in several phases or packages until the implementation period
is complete and the phase of operations is one of stability and predictability.
It is important realm of conflict (violent or otherwise) and conflict regulation is
not confined to the finite processes that have been delineated in this chapter. Perspectives
behind what constitute violent conflict and political regulations are constantly changing
based on the needs of the individual. What can be deduced is that no matter the
circumstances, individuals will be involved in violent conflict if they are driven to do so;
and the following chapter will provide the methods in which this study will be done so
that those drivers are identified with hard evidence.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Current theories and studies have been limited in the realm of globalization as it
relates to violent conflict, and in turn its effects on mass migrations. These studies have
examined only the nexus between violent conflict and voluntary movements from one
country to the next or the economic pull factors of migration (with the exclusion of the
push factors). Here, I will provide an empirical analysis to bridge the gap and
demonstrate the relationship of economics and mass migrations while simultaneously
formulating a tool would serve as indicator of when violent conflict will erupt on a large
scale. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the research design
and explain the rationale behind the methodologies that will be utilized.
Quantitative Research: An Overview
Quantitative research is the attempt to summarize data and describe relationships
using numbers (Crammer and Howitt, 2004, p. 134). Quantitative inquiry requires
evidence that is observable and testable, where researches must give explanations for
their conclusions (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001, p. 31). Quantitative methods are focused
on highly specific problems and the ways to deal with them (Vogt, 2011, p. 5).
Quantitative research and its designs are more commonly known by the methods
used in which data is extracted and then manipulated by formulations in such a way that
the data is no longer actually what it once was. In fact, often, it is a practice where words
are turned into numbers so that it can be utilized as hard data to prove or disprove
theories. While there will be extraction of data in this study, the research here will largely
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be comprised of what is known as archival research, which will be further explained in
the methodologies section of chapter.
Research Design
The central research question that this study aims to answer is, what is the
relationship between migration, globalization (as an economic theory), and violent
conflict? Recent empirical studies have demonstrated that poor economic infrastructure is
associated with higher incidence of violent conflict (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 32);
but what does that mean for the national that have an established economic
infrastructure? Why has violent conflict occurred there? In attempt to answer these
questions, this study will follow the structure of two research designs. The first is that of
causal research design, where the phenomenon will be understood in terms of conditional
statements that take the form of “if X, then Y.” The second is that of case study research
design, where an in-depth study takes place and is then used to narrow down a broad field
of research. The idea of using a combination of the two designs is two make broad
numerical assumptions while still having the ability to apply it to a specific number of
countries that can serve as representatives for a more global perspective. The overarching
hypothesis that will be examined in this research is: if there is a causal link between
economics and violent conflict, then we can make assessments on the emigration and
immigration of international populations. More specifically, if violent conflict is
economically driven, then we can conclude that mass migration is inevitable.
Causal Design
A casual law is a statement that a change in the value of one variable is sufficient
to produce a change in the value of another. John Stuart Mill wrote on the law of
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universal causation, where a cause is said to be the cause of another (Mill, 1875, p. 375).
Thus, “between phenomena…there is an invariable order of succession where the
invariable antecedent is termed the cause and the invariable consequent is termed the
effect…” (Mill, 1875, p. 377). In this first systematic analysis of a causal relationship,
Mill further argues that three fundamental conditions must be meet; the first is that the
cause must precede the effect, the second is that the cause must be statistically associated
with the effect, and the third is that there has to be no other plausible alternative
explanation for the effect other than the cause (Rutter, 2007, p. 3).
Causal research designs assist researches in understanding why the world operates
in the manner that it does through the process of proving a causal link between variables
and through the process of eliminating other possibilities. In order to identify the causal
link, there must be an empirical association (a valid conclusion based on the association
between the independent and dependent variables), and appropriate time order to
conclude that causation was involved, and a demonstration that the relationship between
the two variables was not caused by a variation in a third variable that is not within the
study (www.usc.edu, June 2016).
As mentioned in Chapter One, when man is suffering economically, there will be
a point in which man will find a solution in order to overcome their economic dilemma.
Thus, the causal relationship in this study posits is that poor economic infrastructure will
lead to conflict. This relationship is depicted in a study on the economic crisis, violent
conflict, and human development. Where as far as drivers of conflict are concerned, “one
of the most robust findings in literature is that many economic conditions (low income,
slow growth, and severe economic downturns) are correlated to the outbreak of

75
conflict…” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). Considering this causal relationship, a
self-reinforcing cycle from conflict to low human development illustrates that conflict
destroys physical and human capital, forcing replacement of labor, and deteriorating
institutional capacity.

Figure 1. Conflict – Low Human Development Cycle (Kim and Conciecao, 2010, p. 32)
In exploring the theory behind the outbreak of conflict, there are several models
that have been studied; and, a distinct model that is consistent with the nexus of human
development and conflict is that of the contest model. The contest model provides
framework where two competing parties allocate resources to be produced and
appropriated, predicting that if human development is low, the resources will not be
allocated efficiently, which in turn could potentially be exploited by skillful revolutionary
leaders, only to increase the incentive to organize and rebel or create conflict, (Kim and
Conceicao, 2010, p. 35).
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This research will further assert should violent conflict erupt, then populations
will begin to migrate (as depicted in the chart above) to places that are safe for
themselves and for their families – asserting that poor economic infrastructure is also a
driver for movements of large populations.
Limitations
Indeed, causal effect occurs when variation in one phenomenon, an independent
variable, leads or results to variation in another phenomenon, the dependent variable.
This is essentially the relationship between cause and effect, whereas as X caused Y. One
of the most provoking assertions in causal relationships is the idea that they can be used
for change, where the manipulation of the cause will inevitably result in the manipulation
of the effect (Reiss, 2009). The problem here is that not all causal relationships are
permeable to manipulation where the effect will change in that manner. Furthermore,
with causal research design it is assumed that the causal links are automatic (i.e., because
X will always affect Y in manner Z). This is not the case; Reiss writes of three instances
that are not automatic:
1. Knowing that X makes a difference to Y, does not automatically allow the
inference that there is a continuous process between X and Y. Here, Reiss
discusses that while X and Y have a possible causal relationship, the omission
of X will negate that automatic relationship (Reiss, 2009).
2. Knowing that X and Y are connected by some causal process does not
automatically allow the inference that X raises the probability of Y. This
instance lends itself to statistical data as it relates to cost benefit ratios. Reiss
uses the example of having more wives means having more individuals to

77
provide for, thus a decline in wealth. However, it does not consider the
contribution that those additional household members can potentially make to
increase wealth (Reiss, 2009).
3. Knowing that X raises the probability of Y does not automatically allow the
inference that we control Y via X. This inference is the most controversial as
it relates to this study; as the primary function for this study is to bridge the
gap in the relationship between globalization and violent conflict, to then
make a measurable tool to prevent and deter violent conflict through the
knowledge that a state’s economic welfare is a primary driver of that violent
conflict.
Case Study Design
In approaching case study research, there is no one ideal methodology; it all
comes down to the questions the researcher is seeking to answer. Case studies are an indepth analysis of one or multiple cases that are often used for teaching to further explore
topics. Due to the uncertain nature of case study research, the researcher must justify their
work, and then that could be used to generate new theories. Case studies can be used as a
method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the
application of theories and ideas. It also allows an empirical inquiry to investigate a
complex phenomenon where the parameters are not clear (Yin, 1984). To date, much of
the studies that have been conducted are qualitative and have been related to the political
aims that violent conflict stems from. In utilizing case studies, we will examine the
effects of violent conflict of Rwanda, Colombia, [former] Yugoslavia, and Cambodia
from an economic perspective. In doing so, the argument that violent conflict is solely
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politically fueled will be debunked. In addition, it will allow for exploring new territories
of conflict prevention.
There are six types of case studies. The first is known as single exploratory, a
single case study aimed at defining questions and hypothesis of a subsequent study. The
second is single descriptive, a single case study presenting a complete description of a
phenomenon within its context. The third is single explanatory, a single case study that is
used to present data on cause and effect relationships (explained which cause produced
which effect). The fourth, fifth, and sixth types of case studies are the same as the first
three (respectively) only using multiple case studies as the foundation for the research.
Each of these case studies can be further classified as particularistic, naturalistic,
thick descriptive data, inductive and heuristic. This case study in this research is
inductive, where “generalizations, concepts, or hypotheses emerge from the examination
of data grounded on the context itself” (Willis, 2007, p. 239). Furthermore, due to the
nature of the data the variation of this case study design is considered to be interpretive,
where the data will be used to develop conceptual theories (Ibid, p. 243) and provide an
understanding as it relates to economics, violent conflict and its relationship to mass
migration.
A case study research design excels in bringing and understanding of complex
issues through the analysis is limited events or conditions and their relationships.
However, utilizing a small number of cases offers little basis for establishing the
generalization of wider theories. What is more interesting about this research design is
that it does not facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationships (www.usc.edu,
June 2016); which is why a combination of the two will be used in this research. A final
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limitation found in case study design research is that the use of unique criteria to decipher
a study will more than likely be applicable only to that particular case (www.usc.edu,
June 2016), which can depict the research to be an invalid contribution to that field.
Correlational Research
A correlational study is a method in which there are two or more variables within
a group and the researcher is attempting to determine whether those independent
variables have a direct relationship (correlation) with the dependent variable. In this study
the dependent variable is violent conflict and independent variable is economics.
Correlations can be either positive or negative; whereas if X increases, then Y
increases, or if X increases than Y decreases, respectively. The degree of correlation is
calculated by obtaining what is known as a correlation coefficient, known as the Pearson
Correlation Coefficient, and would be found in the range between -1 and 1, where 1
would be the perfect positive correlation (which rarely occurs). While correlation does
not necessarily prove causal relationship, in this study it will be utilized as a tool for
prediction to support the hypothesis that globalization is a primary driver of violent
conflict, thus opening the doors for mass migration.
Variables and Target Populations
A variable is a concept, which can have two or more values, and is defined in a
way that one can tell what those values are. The simplest kind of variable is one that has
two values, which is often represented by a one or zero. The most complex of variables
are continuous, and those must be consistently observed so that it is connected to a single
value. In using quantitative methods, a nation-states economic stability in relation to
conflict and migration will be able to be quantified, which, in turn, can be used as
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predictions to deter or prevent devastating consequences for the future. While there are
not target populations per say, there are several countries that will be analyzed, and they
include Rwanda, Colombia, Nazi Germany, Cambodia, and [former] Yugoslavia. These
countries were selected because not only are they geographically located in different
hemispheres of the world, but they are also representative of different governing bodies
that have ultimately led their own nations to catastrophic events.
As it relates to economics the independent variables that will be analyzed includes
GDP, of which will be examined pre and post conflict. This will be examined to explain
the relationship with the dependent variable of violent conflict; length of time (of
conflict) and the death toll (if any) will be factored in (see Figure 1). As it relates to the
populations that have migrated, both economic infrastructure and violent conflict serve as
the independent variables, whereas the number of individuals that have relocated will be
considered the dependent variable (see Figure 2). For this study, it would be important to
include what the socio-economic status was pre-conflict for those populations that have
migrated to determine whether that could have been a push factor.
IV1: GDP

IV2: Housing
DV1: Violent Conflict
IV3: Education

IV4: Job Security

IV5: Resources

Figure 2. Variables
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The data that will be gathered throughout this research will largely be sourced
from publications of government entities, such as the US Department of State. These
publications will represent the best sources of data because they have previously
demonstrated their integrity, as a nation’s administration is highly dependent on the
published data. For instance, an International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is
published annually by the Department of State covering drugs and chemical control
activities, money laundering, and financial crimes. Reports such as these are useful in the
case of Colombia (which will be analyzed in Chapter Six).

Figure 3. Variables
Data Operation and Analysis Plan
Multiple Linear Regression
The statistical test that will be used in this study will be multiple linear regression.
Multiple linear regression is often used in studies to make predictions that are based on
causal design. It is a statistical method used for studying the relationship between one
dependent variable and multiple independent variables. Within this study, there will be
two linear regressions: the first to illustrate the relationship between globalization and
migration, the second to illustrate the relationship between violent conflict and mass
migration. To date, there have not been any published studies that quantify the
relationship between violent conflict and mass migration; however there have been
publications that demonstrate the relationship between economics and violent conflict,
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and publications that have quantified mass migration movements based on factors other
than violent conflict.
In 2010, a multiple linear regression study was published on the economic crisis
and violent conflict, with the framework that low human development leads to conflict,
which in turn destroys that nation’s economic system (Kim and Conceicao, 2010). The
study showed a positive correlation, whereas the higher the political stability, the higher
the human development index became (as obtained from the World Bank in 2008).

Figure 4. Migration
From 2005 to 2012 a migration study was developed to highlight the motivation
behind migration in the European Union, in particular movements from East to West. In
this study, the independent variables included GDP, unemployment, minimum wages,
and childbirth (Molnar, 2013) and the dependent variable was net migration. After
calculating the standard deviations within each of the independent variables, the study
concluded that the real push factor with net migration (the different between immigration
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and emigration) was unemployment (Molnar, 2013). This was largely seen in the
countries that are considered to be under in Europe. The table below (as extracted from
the study) demonstrates a net migration forecast in the thousands in 2010, 2011, and 2012
strictly based on unemployment rates.
Table 1
Migration Forecast
Member State
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece

Net Migration
2010
21.9
10.8
13.7
72
152.6
-0.9

Net Migration
2011
33.3
-2.7
11.8
9.8
70.5
150.4
2.3

Net Migration
2012
-18.7
72.6
-75.3
63.6
57.8
80.5
-34.8

Based on those previous studies, below is a brief overview that would depict the
relationship between GDP and mass migration during the time period in which conflict
erupted in the selected sample.
See Table 2 below:
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Table 2
Sample Countries Mass Migration in the Thousands
Location
World
Africa
Eastern Africa
Rwanda
Asia
South-Eastern
Asia
Cambodia
Europe
Southern
Europe
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
South America
Colombia

1965 - 1970 - 1975 - 1980 - 1985 - 1990 - 1995 – 2000 - 2005 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
2000
2005
2010

- 20

- 20

225

125

- 85

- 89

- 78

409

100

- 75

- 75

- 30

- 56

281

290

287

274

254

Figure 5. Sample Countries GDP Index

- 50

30

1348

20

1210

- 73

- 75

348

- 35

296

748

160

35

4

224

190

159

143
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Table 3
Data
Sample Country
Colombia (1975-1980)
Rwanda (1990-1995)
Cambodia (1965-1970)

X (mass migration)
287
1348
225

Y (GDP Index)
2
-42
5

Pearson Correlation Coefficient Formula

Table 4
Correlation Coefficient Data
X
287
1,348
225

Y
2
-42
5

XY
574
-56,616
1,125

X^2
82,369
1,800,000
50,625

Y^2
4
1,764
25

r = [3(-54917)-(1860)(49)]/sqrt[3(2,560,000,000)-(1860)^2][3(3,200,000)-(-35)^2]
= [-164,751-91,140]/sqrt[(7,680,000,000-3,500,000)(9,600,000-1,225)
= -0.94
This coefficient indicates a near perfect negative relationship where was the higher GDP
index, the less people will migrate from their native country.
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Figure 6. Linear Regression
y=

+ x

where:
is the y-intercept
is the slope of the line (formula below)

The slope for this sample is -0.033, which means that the deviation between the
relationship of GDP and mass migration is nearly null.
Threats to Validity
The primary threat to the validity to this study is that there are no current studies
that can be used as primary sources to cross check the statistical analysis. This means that
this study is largely based on historical figures that will be manipulated to project
findings that may or may not be valid. In addition, statistical analyses will only provide
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measures of association between variables, which can trace causal relationships but
cannot assert them (Healy, 2012, p. 308). However, “measures of association…are
amongst the most important and powerful tools for documenting, measuring, and
analyzing cause and effect relationships (Healy, 2012, p. 30).
Ethical Procedures
“Social research is a dynamic process that often involves an intrusion into
people’s lives...central to this is ethical responsibility…[whereas] a mutually respectful
relationship is established, valid results are obtained, and the community considers the
conclusions constructive” (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 96). This is especially important
when social research is being conducted with live subjects (i.e., people) and requires
researchers to extract data or information from people via interviews or surveys.
However, for the purposes of this study, the data that will be utilized is largely
archival; this means that data will be extracted from public records and scholarly articles
that provide the economic state of countries that have been inflicted with violent conflict.
This means the ethical rules that would normally be applied when dealing with live
subjects will not necessarily be effective here. Yet, it does not mean that ethical
implications are negated. This is because ethics within social research does not rest on the
relationship between the researcher and participant alone (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p.
99). For studies such as these there is an ethical responsibility upon the researcher to their
academic community. Ethical violations in that respect involve the following: (a)
falsification of results, including the inappropriate analysis and reportage of findings, (b)
the concealment of shortcomings that are related to the research, (c) replication of results
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as their own, and (d) criticizing other research studies on the basis of personal bias
(Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 100); all of which will be avoided.
Methods Summary
As this chapter comes to a close, it is important to consider that there are a myriad
of research methods that can be implemented for the analysis of this data, but only a
select few have been chosen to accurately highlight the relationship between variables
and confirm the underlying causal relationship. Doing so will provide findings to
establish a reliable tool that can be utilized in the realm of international relations to
prevent or deter violent conflict, or at the very least start a conversation that will motivate
academics to explore other avenues of conflict resolution.
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Chapter 4
Findings
In this chapter I will provide the overarching background on the countries that lay
the groundwork for this research. I will examine Rwanda, Colombia, [former]
Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and [former Nazi] Germany as they were in there most turbulent
eras. In doing so, we will be able to put the theory of quantitative measures into practice.
For each case study, I provide a brief introduction, the historical context and background,
an abbreviated synopsis on the violent conflict that shifted the country’s future along with
notable current affairs and highlight the underlying economic lens. With each data set,
the variables that will be examined are structural balance (which serves as the index to
quantify the impact of violent conflict), purchasing power (which serves as the index to
quantify the economic state for each case study), and a nation’s population in a specific
year (which demonstrates the influx or efflux compared to other years). As the chapter
ends, each case study will conclude with the data operation at work, with statistical tables
and charts demonstrate the accuracy of my overall hypothesis: if economics is the driver
to violent conflict, then mass migration is inevitable.
Rwanda
Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Eastern Africa, bordered by the
Democratic of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi (www.worldbank.org, 2016).
Traditionally, Rwandan society was comprised of three ethnic groups, Twa, and more
notably Hutu and Tutsi (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 9). All three groups shared the same
language, religious beliefs, and coexisted and intermingled within the same territory –
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which juxtaposes the subsequent documentation of the country’s ethnic polarization
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 9).
Historical Context and Background
The first inhabitants of Rwanda are said to be the Twa, hunters and gatherers, who
were followed by the Hutu and then the Tutsi (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 10). In the 17th century
Rwanda was divided and ruled by kings, and from then on, the monarchy was given its
essential government institutions (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 13). The centuries that followed
were ruled by Tutsi kings with varying clans living in harmony until the 1900’s, when it
was colonized by Germany (www.gov.rw, 2016).
The first elected president of Rwanda, President Gregoire Kayibanda came into
power in 1924, replacing the Tutsi monarchies and asserting a Hutu majority
(www.gov.rw, 2016). It has been said that the Hutus had long been resentful of Tutsi
power and were encouraged by the Belgians (who ruled the territory) to campaign against
the Tutsi and emancipate their freedom. The three decades that followed caused
thousands of deaths and led to the creation of militarized political parties who desired
immediate independence. Although on its face, it was an independence of the two tribal
nations, the reality that had it not been for the German infiltration and their influences it
would have been moot.
Known as the Hutu Emancipation Movement that began in 1959, is the violent
uprising that led to the fall of the Tutsi monarchy (www.un.org, 2016), and where the
cycle of ethnic conflict that would swallow an entire nation began. In a matter of months,
there were hundreds of deaths and refugees in the tens of thousands, with several hundred
government officials losing their positions. Having control at the local level, the Hutu
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leaders presented the UN with a report that would dissolve the monarchy and give
Rwanda independence. Independence did indeed follow, but with constraints.
Upon gaining independence, the UN instituted that as a part of the agreement the
UNAR (Rwandese National Union), led by the Tutsi, would have two ministerial posts,
two posts of secretary of state, two prefect (chief officer) and two sub-prefect posts, and
one post in the Refugee Commission (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 33). Waves of violence
followed and nearly 300,000 refugees were registered with the UNHCR by 1964.
Between 1963 and 1966 about twelve rebel attacks took place, marking the beginning of
genocidal massacres in Rwanda (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 34). President Kayibanda took
advantage of this, as the ideal moment to promote is anti-Tutsi ideology; up until then the
racist anti-Tutsi propaganda was primarily the work of party officials, but soon spread to
state institutions and schools (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 35-36). It was at this time that Hutu
political affiliations usurped any Tutsi political parties and abolished any political
influence that remained in place. After the Tutsi’s were forced to exile, President
Kayibanda realized that his plan went beyond ethnic conflict and seeped over into an
open and brutal regional conflict. Unable to restore peace, President Kayibanda’s
administration was overthrown in July of 1973.
Major-General Habyarimana led the Rwandan National Guard in a coup in
response to the hatred, injustice, and regionalism that President Kayibanda had instilled
in the previous 50 years (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 45). That October, the first circulator was
sent out, regulating the return for refugees and the repossession of their property
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 47), any property that went unclaimed by 1975 was to be considered
abandoned and redistributed (although there are no indications as to whom or how much
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property was left to be redistributed). It was clear from here that the largest battle that the
Rwandan had to climb post-civil war was the refugee crisis.
In 1976, President Habyarimana’s sent out a directive that asked for “systemic but
discreet census of refugees living in neighboring countries…the return of refugees must
be strictly controlled and only encouraged when those applying to return are useful to the
country…embark in a…campaign to persuade Rwandan nationals to remain in their host
country…[and] those without steady employment, and undesirable elements should be
prevented from entering the country…” (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 51). In short, the policy read
that the only refugees allowed to return were those elites who had only recently left and
were seen as harmless to the new political regime.
After having made this position public, President Habyarimana went on to justify
the achievements of the revolution in 1959 and followed by putting in place an ethnic and
regional quota system for access to education and employment as part of his policy of
“ethnic balance” (Kimyono, 2015, p. 55). During attempting to enforce these rigid ethnic
quotas, it had become apparent that identifying people was not as easy feat. This was
mainly for two reasons: the first was that indications of the ethnicity of individuals in
government positions would have proven problematic for other family members and
secondly, there was an influx of Tutsis that falsified documents their documents to pass
as Hutus (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 56). Considering this, falsifying identification became crime
in the Rwandan penal code punishable by one to five years in prison and/or a fine of
50,000 francs.
In 1978, the people of Rwanda officially elected President Habyarimana into
office, carrying nearly 99% of the vote. The agenda was for the president to insert
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himself into every aspect of the citizens’ lives, creating a regime of totalitarianism. Every
year he crafted a theme for his national campaign, in which everyone had to participate;
this created a blanket for the economic and social crisis that did not trail far behind
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 64). Towards the end of the 1980’s, given the rapid deterioration of
the nation’s socio-economic status, the defiance of authority was inevitable (Kimonyo,
2015, p. 70). By 1990, Rwanda was only doing slightly better than the “worse off” states
in Africa (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 67) socio-economically, and would soon take a turn for the
worse only four years later.
In October of 1990, The Rwandan Patriotic Front, comprised of Rwandan
refugees living in Uganda and neighboring countries infiltrated Rwanda demanding the
rule of law, the abolition of discrimination policies, and the right of return for refugees
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 80). Authorities responded to this with massacre and the
imprisonment of those affiliated with the enemy. The following year President
Habyarimana publicized the new constitution and had a new action plan, which included:
“negotiate peace with the opposition party, enhance efficiency and neutrality, revive the
economy, organize the opportunity for a national conference, resolve the refugee
problem, and organize general elections” (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 82). From then until his
assassination in 1994, President Habyarimana would be faced with protest after protest
comprised of thousands of people and the continuation of killing citizens in mass
numbers.
Organizers of the genocide used racist ideology to bring the Hutu to fear and hate
the Tutsi; they used state institutions to turn this fear into the acts of hunting, raping, and
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killing that comprised the genocide. Among the false ideals promulgated by the regime
included (www.hrw.org, 2016):
•

Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there

•

Despite the first revolution (and the thousands of lives lost) the Tutsi
continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than Hutu and were
[somehow] responsible for the ongoing Hutu poverty

•

Tutsi posed a danger to Hutu, who were always the victims, therefore the
Hutu had not only the right, but a duty to defend themselves

“The regime [had] established arm caches, distributed weapons to militia, set up a
rapid communication network between the commanders of the militia, and drew up lists
of sympathizers designated as the first to kill” (Kimyono, 2015, p. 87). Nearly one
million people died in the genocide, including nearly 75% of the Tutsi residents living in
Rwanda (Kimyono, 2015, p. 88).
Social Theory
Social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept human
creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or around
them” (Lemert, 2010). Culture, institutions, land, religions, or artistic creations today can
identify societies. A society that is drained of their essence is one that could potentially
be wiped out (Lemert, 2010). Following the coup that overthrew President Kayibanda in
1973, Rwanda was seemingly at its lowest point, where “The government feared its
whole environment…The inhabitants were inward looking and bore the country’s slow
shrinkage in silence…To the generalized lack of trust, rumor, secrecy, lack of breathing
space: on top of material deprivation – the country was one of the poorest in the world
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and lacked almost everything – was added something like mental paralysis” (Kimyono,
2015, p. 38).
In this state, it was only “natural” for the people to stand up and attempt to gain
what was one lost, including pieces of their culture, religious beliefs, and the little
political drive they had left. While many were left with no other option but to seek refuge
in neighboring countries, the Rwandan citizens that were left, both Hutu and Tutsi took
whatever measure they saw fit in order to maintain their social identity – which drives to
the Parable of the Tribes.
Social identity begins to develop at the earliest stages of life (Ross, 2001, 160),
where it explains why people are the way they are and why they do the things they do.
People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies (Ross, 2001,
160), and when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it can escalate
conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). The theory of the parable of the
tribes illustrates this idea by linking the preservation of identity with the ability to protect
one’s own group, and when there are various groups of different ethnicities living in
close proximities, if one becomes an aggressor, the others will follow suit.
Government officials, soldiers and militia who had participated in the genocide
fled, along with over one million civilians (mostly Hutu) with the threats that they would
be killed if they remained. Genocide trials began in 1996, and by 2000 over 100,000
suspects were awaiting trial (www.un.org, 2016). As this was going on Rwanda’s
military entered the Democratic Republic of Congo to extradite Hutu extremists who had
used the country as a safe haven after the genocide. During this time the conflict
escalated, and the Congolese military fought back; primarily for two reasons. The first
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was to protect the Tutsi group from discrimination and violence, and the second was to
prevent genocide from happening within their borders (Cohen, Herman J., 1999, p. 33).
While the Rwandan forces were present, they also controlled the major provinces in
Kivu, which had extensive mineral and timber resources for the Congolese. Thus, in 1998
The Rwandan forces were asked to leave, to which they complied, but then returned for a
second time, and grew to what is known as the Great of War of Africa. After four years,
the invading troops ultimately pulled out and peace deals soon followed. In 2006 the
Rwandan government implemented a restructure of the administration, replacing twelve
chief officers with five larger multiethnic provinces with the intention to promote power
sharing and reduce ethnic conflict (www.britnnica.com, 2016).
The Economic Lens
In 2006 the Human Rights Watch published a report stating that the genocide in
Rwanda had several circumstances that surrounded it, including poverty, land scarcity, a
population of two groups that faced a power struggle, and a history of colonial rule (that
never provided the opportunity for freedom). It is critical to understand that the racist
ideologies that were used as propaganda were a mask that justified the more fundamental
goal of regime survival under the conditions of a severe economic crisis (Hintjens, 2016,
p. 242).
While there is no raw data for the early 20th century, during the early years of
colonialism, when workers were forced to migrate to the mines in Congo, the country’s
limited resources caused an unprecedented famine (Kimyono, 2015, p. 21). When
Rwanda gained pseudo independence in the mid-1960’s, the nation was hit with waves of
conflict and violence, subsequently (and not surprisingly) the economy was impacted
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negatively, particularly in the area of agriculture, where commodities such as coffee was
the country’s main foreign exchange earner (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 37). From 1974 to 1981,
the country experiences a growth rate of over 5% per year, and this was in large part due
to the growth in international aid that followed the regime of President Kayibanda. The
years that followed corresponded with long period of drought and famine, and by 1990
the GDP growth was 1% (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 63).
Intense demographic pressure, the shortage of land for agriculture, and the lack of
access to a seaport were always major issues of contention for Rwanda’s economy; but,
after the murder of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan citizens, the economy was
devastated. The effects of a poor economic infrastructure and violent conflict are cyclical
and undoubtedly entangled.
Data Operation
The variables presented in this dataset (and the datasets throughout this study) are
populations, enumerated in the thousands, the purchasing power during that year with
that population, and the government structural balance in that same time frame. The
government structural balance refers to the political, social, and economic structures that
are in place at the time. For all of the data sets, the study examines a thirty-five-year
period, from 1980-2015, in large part because further historical data has not been made
available to provide a more in-depth analysis. All of the datasets presented in this
research were extracted from data reports as provided by the International Monetary
Fund, and are the most recent and accurate datasets available for this dissertation (World
Economic Outlook Database, www.imf.org, 2019).
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Table 5
Data Subset Rwanda
Y (Population)

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)

X2 (Structural Balance)

4.654
4.825
5.006
5.195
5.321
5.502

0.016
0.016
0.016
0.017
0.018
0.018

8.346
8.623
11.921
11.936
13.038
12.335

5.691
5.89

0.018
0.018

11.789
11.723

6.097
6.304
6.453
6.652

0.017
0.015
0.015
0.014

10.781
9.986
9.403
9.789

6.656

0.013

11.71

6.247
5.79
5.468
5.406

0.012
0.007
0.008
0.009

12.637
7.084
15.616
15.027

5.66
6.176
6.843
7.495
8.013

0.009
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.011

13.44
12.659
13.18
13.314
13.747

8.361
8.578
8.711
8.833
9
9.2
9.5
9.7
10
10.2
10.5
10.739
11.003
11.263

0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.013
0.013
0.014
0.015
0.016
0.016
0.017
0.017
0.018
0.019

13.551
13.897
15.008
15.764
16.572
18.632
23.654
23.055
22.691
22.907
25.394
26.517
25.302
26.458
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As we consider the data, it is important to consider the primary aim of this
research, which is identify the nexus, between globalization (i.e., economics) and violent
conflict and what are those implications on the migration in masses. As it relates to
Rwanda, you will notice that R Square (see Table Nine) demonstrates a 77.8%
probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power X1
(globalization) and structural balance X2 (whose presence is directly impacted on
whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a
probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 76.5%, in likelihood of a
small sample size that is available given the data. Significance F, at approximately 1.60,
illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should
not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it
relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance
is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the
P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05,
which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly
impacted by a country’s economic outlook and whether or not they have endured violent
conflict at any level.
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Table 6
Summary Output Rwanda
Summary Output
Regression Statistics
0.882236
Multiple R
789
0.778341
R Square
752
0.764907
Adjusted R Square
919
0.985148
Standard Error
461
Observations
36
ANOVA
df
Regression

2

Residual

33

Total

35

Intercept
X1
(GDP/Purchasing
Power)
X2 (Structural
Balance)

Coefficie
nts
3.012683
6
41.40444
357
0.327500
293

SS
112.46146
51
32.027077
16
144.48854
22
Standard
Error
0.7706550
8
52.905966
44
0.0311976
08

MS
F
56.23073 57.93891
253
726
0.970517
49

t Stat
P-value
3.909250 0.000434
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Figure 7. Line Plot Structural Balance for Rwanda

Figure 8. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Rwanda
As charted, the dataset demonstrates its correlation with the independent variables
individually. Table Ten shows that Rwanda’s population was directly impacted by violent
conflict. The center of the chart has the population both increasing and decreasing in a
short period of time, and this is large part due to the genocide happening in the time
frame, where both masses of individuals were either murdered or pushed out, and other
populations came into power. However, Table Eleven shows more uniformity in the data
set, whereas the economic stability increased, so did the population, and vice versa.
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Table 7
Residual Output Rwanda
Residual Output
Observation

Predicted (Population)

Residuals

Standard Residuals

1

5.08352995

-0.42952995

-0.449023241

2

5.174247531

-0.349247531

-0.365097378

3

6.254343498

-1.248343498

-1.304996878

4

6.217851559

-1.022851559

-1.069271473

5

6.537352438

-1.216352438

-1.271553973

6

6.307119732

-0.805119732

-0.841658357

7

6.128304572

-0.437304572

-0.457150698

8

6.106689553

-0.216689553

-0.226523541

9

5.83958872

0.25741128

0.269093336

10

5.662034874

0.641965126

0.67109933

11

5.471102203

0.981897797

1.026459113

12

5.63892176

1.01307824

1.059054613

13

6.309454267

0.346545733

0.362272965

14

6.654451482

-0.407451482

-0.42594279

15

5.042864572

0.747135428

0.78104256

16

7.79569263

-2.32769263

-2.433329945

17

7.561390514

-2.155390514

-2.253208268

18

7.041647548

-1.381647548

-1.444350645

19

6.744465376

-0.568465376

-0.594263952

20

6.915093028

-0.072093028

-0.075364815

21

6.958978068

0.536021932

0.560348133

22

7.059381251

0.953618749

0.996896681

23

6.95378675

1.40721325

1.471076591

24

7.067101852

1.510898148

1.579467006

25

7.430954677

1.280045323

1.338137422

26

7.678544899

1.154455101

1.206847558

27

7.901760692

1.098239308

1.148080532

28

8.576411296

0.623588704

0.651888933

29

10.17971333

-0.679713325

-0.71056065

30

9.942136206

-0.242136206

-0.253125036

31

9.781521656

0.218478344

0.228393513

32

9.852261719

0.347738281

0.363519634

33

10.6253505

-0.125350505

-0.131039267

34

10.99313333

-0.254133334

-0.265666628

35

10.55381603

0.449183966

0.469569212

36

10.89100193

0.37199807

0.388880401
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Figure 9. Residual Plot Structural Balance Rwanda

Figure 10. Residual Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Rwanda
Residual data in linear regression allows us to analyze the dataset with
standardized values to show the accuracy in the relationship between the variables. Like
Table Eleven, Table Thirteen is less predictable by way of violent conflict (though
violent conflict as it is an unpredictable phenomenon), and Table Twelve and Table
Fourteen are more succinct in their projections for accuracy.
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Colombia
Ravaged by decade long violent outbreaks lead by armed groups, political leaders,
and drug cartels, Colombia has been making significant progress towards its national
security (www.bbc.com, 2016). With 47.5 million inhabitants, Colombia is the fourth
largest country in South America and is one of the economic leaders among Latin
American countries, trailing just behind Brazil and Argentina. Today, 14% of the
Colombian population identifies themselves to be ethnically different than the mestizo
majority or European Whites (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 23). Even with a
comparatively large indigenous populations, Colombia as a nation has continued to show
strength in their economic growth.
Historical Context and Background
Colombia was a nation-state that was at peace until 1932, when they engaged in a
brief war with Peru. Circumstances surrounding this violent conflict included labor and
land, as coffee was a major agricultural resource. When the Great Depression spread to a
global level after the First World War, the demand for coffee and other agricultural
commodities took a downward spiral (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 83). This led to the
expulsion of thousands of poor, rural residents from their lands and the pressure of the
government to react. These two factors culminated in the mass migration into ecological
regions that were easily impacted by human residency (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 25).
The war with Peru was short lived, but it was not an indication that the violence in
Colombia had come to an end.
Jorge Eliercer Gaitan Ayala was the popular candidate for the Colombian
presidential elections in 1950, a person who denounced the Colombian government for
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attacking its own workers in Peru and worked towards improving the lives of
impoverished citizens (www.ic.galegroup.com, 2016). However, the unrest that he had
ensued with his public opinion led to his assassination in 1948 and a decade long civil
war known as La Violencia followed, a destructive phenomenon that was purely social
and had no regard for race or economic status.
La Violencia was given its name, not because of the property or resources that
were lost, but because the methods of the actual killings were brutal and widespread. In
some cases the techniques were give nicknames, including “picar picar tamal” which
consisted of cutting up the body bit by bit; “bocachiquiar” which was a process involving
hundreds of small punctures for the victim to be bled out; and “corte de mica” which was
a form of beheading (Bailey, 1967, p. 563). “Crucifixions and hangings were
commonplace, political prisoners were thrown from airplanes inflight, infants were
bayoneted, schoolchildren…were raped in masse, unborn infants were removed by crude
caesarian and replaced by roosters, ears were cut off, scalps removed…to indicate…a
phenomenon of unparalleled ferocity” (Bailey, 1967, p. 563). President Mariano Ospina
Perez won the election and remained in control of the military during the violent conflict.
President Ospina attempted to suppress the violence with dictator like policies that were
deemed ineffective. Considering his populist politics, Laureano Gomez won the
uncontested election in 1950 (President Gomez ceded his presidency to Roberto Urdaneta
Alvarez due to illness, but then resumed until 1953 when he was overthrown by a
military coup) (Bailey, 1967, p. 565). Outside of the capital, La Violencia was
predominantly rural, transforming itself from a politically driven conflict to one that was
based on economics. As a result, the movement was under the auspices of highly
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organized rural bandits (Bailey, 1967, p. 568). In 1957 (nearing the end) leaders of both
political parties overthrew General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla with aims to restore national
unity (Bailey, 1967, p. 566).
After the loss of so many lives Conservatives and Liberals agreed to form a
National Front and banned all other parties. The time period between La Violencia and
the mid 1960’s is not notable in history. This is not because Colombia as a nation was
stagnant, but rather it was during recovery and unknowingly bracing itself for guerilla
warfare and a new economy that would be dominated by cocaine.
The Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC) was formed by survivors
of the government’s crackdown on a communist-inspired peasant collective in the
mountainous area of Marquetalia (www.nytimes.com, 2016). During that time, the
Colombian government made a $30 million dollar investment to the isolated region that
would include military occupation and build new roads, schools, and health centers. This
was in response to the guerilla violence that had grown in the area. What is known as
“Operation Marquetalia” no longer marks a program of support, but rather a clash of the
powers between government and rebels. Leaders Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas
met with communities and unified approximately 350 local guerillas that codified
themselves as the Southern Bloc (later renamed FARC) calling for land reform and better
conditions for those in the countryside of Colombia. Their strategy at first was to defend
their communities of followers from the Colombian government, largely by responding
with acts of violence with Colombian military infiltrated the area. This soon changed and
FARC started providing educational and medical services to loyal communities, trained
militias for combat, and carried out attacks (www.stanford.edu, 2016). FARC was able to
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“provide these services” largely by kidnapping for ransom. In the 1970’s, FARC began
trafficking cocaine for funding, and with its newfound wealth the number of members
increased, nearly tripling in size.
As the members increased, so did the number of kidnappings (disappearances)
and systemic killings. Systemic conflicts are few and far between, as they usually involve
a high number of deaths and last for an extended period of time in light of the fact that it
is multi-polarity (by way of several guerilla groups); and the FARC was a prime example
of this. Despite the peace accords in the 1980’s, and the attempts of President Alvaro
Uribe in 2002 to dismantle FARC. FARC continues to coexist among the Colombian
populations; and with peak numbers nearing 20,000 members, FARC is a forced to be
reckoned with.
In Marxism, a human event cannot be properly understood without the historical
circumstances by which that event occurred; and in his Communist Manifesto Marx
writes that the history of all existing society is [found within] the history of struggle
(Love, 2006, p. 250). Thus, the history of economics is found within the web of societies
arranged in orders and social ranks that have established modern-day’s bourgeoisie
(Love, 2006, p. 251).
The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical
perspective is infinitely more significant that the division of race, religion, or gender
(Tyson, 2006, p. 54). In fact, it is this frame of thinking that allows for the Joneses to rise
up in the global society – because it is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is the
most important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society
will place a large significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them to create
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revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in
their own battles.
In the case of Colombia, Marxists have identified La Violencia as a movement
representing the class struggle (Bailey, 1967, p. 569). The problem with this theory is that
the rebellion did not exclude anyone from death, regardless of race or socio-economic
status. The killing that took place had no scale (Bailey, 1967, p. 570). Thus, it was not the
elite watching the murder of those in despair; it was a case of full-on participation on all
sides. However, the notorious guerilla group, FARC, was very much a Marxist group,
founded to overthrow the Colombian government. Many FARC leaders sought
inspiration from leftist social movements around the world, opposing the privatization of
natural resources and claiming to represent the rural poor against the Colombian elite
(www.cfr.org, 2016).
Born in 1949, Medellin Cartel kingpin, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, played a
large role in the formation of Colombian politics and its economy, as we know it today.
Escobar was born into a lower-middle class family, and as a young man became involved
with crime when he began stealing cars. This, of course, is clouded in comparison with
his path to wealth through drug trafficking. In 1975, when Escobar was 26 years old, he
stepped into power after the death of Fabio Restrepo, a local Medellin drug lord. In less
than ten years, Escobar made billions, murdered hundreds, and was elected to Colombia’s
Congress. Escobar’s methodology was simple, following one paradigm “plata o plomo,”
money or lead. Much like the movement of La Violencia, Escobar’s victims were not
exclusive to race or social and economic status; he ordered assassinations of presidential
candidates, judges, journalists, and even criminals within his network.
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Narco-violence further ensued when drug lords like Escobar, took advantage of
poverty and hired sicarios (assassins), mostly teenage boys from the slums, to assassinate
people for $100 a head. Among the murders, car bombings, and kidnappings became part
of the daily life in Colombia (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 91). By the mid 1980’s,
Escobar was one of the most powerful men in the world, with the ability to order the
murder of anyone, anytime, anywhere. The government and elite feared him, and the
common people of his country loved him; he spent millions on parks, schools, stadiums
and housing for the poorest of the poor in Medellin. In 1991 the Colombian government
and Escobar came up with a prison arrangement in response to the U.S. pressure to
extradite him. Essentially, Escobar would turn himself in and serve a five-year sentence,
so long as he could build his own prison and select his own guards – and so it was. Living
in a resort like Fortress, Escobar ran his empire from the inside, but after word spread that
he tortured and killed traitors the Colombian government ordered for him to be
transferred. Escobar escaped without hesitation and went into hiding until his death in
1993.
The number of deaths, kidnappings, and displaced persons that is marked by
Colombia’s last 50 years is staggering. In fact, by the early 2000’s there were so many
kidnappings held for ransom, that a weekly radio show was established to allow relatives
to broadcast messages to those who have been kidnapped (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p.
27). When President Uribe was elected in 2002, he pledged to expand Colombia’s
military and police in order to demobilize any paramilitary and officials involved in
narco-trafficking. By the following year, the homicide rate in Medellin alone fell 46%
(Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 27).
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In the years that followed Colombia underwent a crucial social and political
transformation. High-quality, public infrastructures were built in the poorest
neighborhoods, digitized maps noting where drug gangs operated were created, the
thousands that were previously demobilized were reintegrated into society and introduced
to new social [welfare] programs (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 28). Hundreds of
millions dollars were invested in the “new Colombia,” and while there have been some
upticks in crime along the way, the nation has been on a steady path of renewal and the
odds of it being controlled by crime and drug driven leaders is not in the horizon.
Inspired by the Cuban revolution, FARC believed that popular forces could defeat
national armed forces in a war, that a revolution could be launched, and that the
revolutionary effort had to be initiated from the countryside (Lee, 2012, p. 30). After over
a decade of violence, FARC first participated in peace negotiations in the 1980s and
formed a political party in 1985 the Patriotic Union (UP) in hopes of legitimizing their
role in Colombian politics (Lee, 2012, p. 31). Despite these efforts, the experiment failed,
and FARC members responded once more with crime and the escalation of military
action. In the 1990s, FARC asked for official control of a territory in southern Colombia.
The administration at the time ceded this request to solidify peace talks, but this action
only confirmed what FARC believed all of these years, that they are powerful enough to
alter or overthrow the government. By 1998 FARC’s power had grown tremendously
(Lee, 2012 p. 31,), and used this territory to train members and as a site for narcotrafficking. In 2002, Colombia seized the territory, which resulted in an increase of
attacks and kidnappings over the next several years.
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In 2008 it was reported that hundreds of thousands of Colombians flooded the
streets of the capitol to protest FARC, the people of Colombia had finally had it. The
supporters that FARC thought they once had been no longer at their platform, they no
longer had territory to control, and they were losing members by the hundreds. This was
followed by the death of many high-level leaders, including FARC leader Manuel
Marulanda. Losses like these demoralized FARC and demonstrated that their reign was
nearing its end. Soon after, peace talks with the Colombian administration began.
On December 10th 2016, president Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia accepted the
Nobel Peace prize for helping to end his country’s 50 year long civil war
(www.theguardian.com, Dec 10 2016). Dedicating his prize to all Colombians, including
the 220,000 killed and 8 million displaced during the conflict, President Santos won the
award for reaching a deal with FARC earlier that year. To the surprise of many around
the globe, voters in congress rejected the peace agreement, noting that it was too soft on
the members responsible for war crimes. But, after the modifications of more than 50
points outlined in the agreement, congress approved the new deal, and FARC began the
process of demobilization and handing their weapons to the United Nations.
Relative Deprivation
Relative deprivation is now widely used as a theory in political science to
demonstrate its implications concerning the relationship between inequality and political
stability. The theory of relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by
inequalities. There are four conditions for an individual to feel relatively deprived: (1)
they do not have X; (2) they see some other person or persons as having X; (3) they want
X (4) they see it as feasible that they should have X. the relativity of the concept come
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from conditions 2 and 4 and the feeling of deprivation is defined by conditions 1 and 3
(Stark and Taylor, 1989, p. 2).
Scholars have argued that the history and the depravity of the Colombian system
have been the primary drivers for FARC to have a powerful, armed resistance; being a
movement that was willing to participate in the mass struggle without abandoning its
demands for radical changes on land tenure, property ownership, and foreign trade (Lee,
2012, p. 29). The reality was that political movements like FARC and people like Pablo
Escobar had a Robin Hood air about them. They claimed that they were against the
national government because the national government was exclusionary of those who
lived out on the countryside, those who were predominantly of mixed races, and those
who were predominantly of lesser mans. This gave them a rise to power that no one
would have ever anticipated.
For nearly half a century Colombia as a national and its government was not
stable, constantly cleaning up after FARC’s terror attacks, utilizing resources to rescue
those who have been kidnapped, and attempted to recuperate an economy that was deeply
penetrated by narco-trafficking. This was largely because those targeted factions truly
believed that they were the have-nots, and FARC and Pablo Escobar were the iconic
heroes that were going to rescue them from the depths of their despair by providing what
the Colombian government had not been able to. FARC and Escobar had acquired wealth
through the drug trade, they built schools and hospitals for the people, and supplied food
and clothing to community when they needed to gain notoriety. The truth of what was
happening in Colombia was that the relative deprivation of the people only sunk them
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into a deeper hole, of which took the nation over 50 years to get out of and continues to
recover in present day from all of the damage that has been done.
The 21st century marked the beginning of a new Colombia. President Pastrana
(elected in 1998) implemented what he called “Plan Colombia” and gained nearly $1
billion dollars in support from the United States to fight drug-traffickers and rebels who
profited from the illegal trade (www.bbc.com, Nov 15 2016). This marked the renewal of
peace talks with FARC rebels, which failed until the second term of the president that
follows, President Alvaro Uribe. President Uribe was highly praised for his ability to
work with FARC members to release hostages and declaring cease-fires while conferring
peace talks. In 2012, President Juan Manuel Santos was elected and in his first term he
successfully implemented a peace plan that is said to stabilize a nation.
An Economy on Drugs
While the drug cartels and rebels have been at the forefront of Colombia’s history
for decades, it is important to note that both its infrastructure and economic health have
also been impacted and followed the waves of highs and lows. The reality is that FARC
and Escobar’s motives were never really to support their base, but rather to gain power
and overthrow a government so that they can continue to accrue wealth and land.
Unfortunately for the Colombian people, this had a tremendous impact on their natural
resources and international trade of goods. Among its other natural resources and
agricultural exports, Colombia was famously known for its coffee industry. The
expansion of coffee laid the groundwork for its economic power after world war two, and
continued to experience sustained growth until the 1980s, which is no coincidence that it
was around the time of Escobar’s rise to power and the expansion of the drug trade. As
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the demand for cocaine grew, so did the need for land, labor, and structures that would
support the industry. Coffee growers were no longer meeting the needs for their families,
and soon were forced to provide labor and their territory to the more profitable resources,
cocaine. The effects of the drug trade were now intertwined with most aspects of
Colombian life and took nearly 20 years of economic growth away from a country that is
now recorded to have one of the highest GDP’s in the world.
Data Operation
Table 8
Data Sheet Colombia
Y (Population)
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)
X2 (Structural Balance)
28.447
0.592
29.08
0.595
29.718
0.599
30.36
0.594
31.004
0.588
30.794
0.585
31.433
0.598
32.092
0.607
32.764
0.605
33.443
0.603
34.125
0.604
34.834
0.604
35.53
0.566
36.208
0.586
36.863
0.599
37.49
0.608
38.1
0.598
38.6
0.594
39.2
0.582
39.7
0.539
40.296
0.529
40.814
0.525
41.329
0.523
41.849
0.522
42.368
0.523
42.889
0.522
43.406
0.529
43.927
0.537
44.451
0.539

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-3.721
-3.153
-2.384
-1.159
0.09
0.571
-1.328
-2.02
-1.099

115
44.979
45.51
46.045
46.582
47.121
47.662
48.203

Table 9
Summary Output Colombia

0.547
0.542
0.559
0.563
0.57
0.577
0.574

-2.16
-2.535
-2.789
-1.542
-2.67
-3.185
-3.598
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As the dataset relates to Colombia, you will notice that R Square (see Table
Sixteen) demonstrates a 62% probability of the connection between its population Y with
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square
demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 59.7%.
Significance F, at approximately 1.16, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all
values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly
correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic
performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements
(Y) increase. However, the data tells us to reject the notion of population having a
relationship to both violent conflict and globalization as the P-values of both independent
variables (X1 and X2) are less than the alpha 0.05. This means that while the data
demonstrates that violent conflict is economically driven, thus causing migration
movements, it also tells us that the probability of it being accurate is low, making the
hypothesis null.
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Figure 11. Line Plot Structural Balance Colombia
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X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) Line Fit Plot
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Figure 12. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Colombia
Despite the P-values being low in test value, both Tables Seventeen and Eighteen
tell us that violent conflict and globalization have an impact with Colombia’s population,
as both variables are nearly linear to the dependent variable.
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Table 10
Residual Output Colombia
Residual Output
Observation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Predicted Y
(Population)
34.72515765
34.49855162
34.19641025
34.57408696
35.02729902
35.25390505
34.27194559
33.5921275
33.74319819
33.89426888
33.81873353
33.81873353
36.68907657
35.17836971
34.19641025
33.51659216
34.27194559
34.57408696
35.48051108
38.72853084
48.34349853
47.29324515
45.61334476
42.77218366
39.72280843
38.65309399
42.64582132
43.68917444
41.34522422
43.26715774
44.53770072
43.85836796
40.58714866
42.74414296
43.44159855

Residuals
6.278157651
5.418551621
4.478410248
4.214086964
4.023299024
4.459905053
2.838945592
1.500127503
0.979198189
0.451268876
0.306266468
1.015266468
1.159076574
1.02963029
2.666589752
3.973407841
3.828054408
4.025913036
3.719488917
0.971469159
8.047498533
6.479245147
4.284344759
0.923183658
2.64519157
4.235906015
0.760178684
0.237825561
3.105775778
1.711842256
0.972299282
2.186632037
5.994851342
4.376857038
4.220401446

Standard
Residuals
-1.692555618
-1.460810718
-1.207353948
-1.136093893
-1.084658548
-1.202365052
-0.765363595
-0.404425848
-0.263986266
-0.121659524
0.082567699
0.273710069
-0.312480456
0.277582474
0.71889744
1.071208169
1.03202171
1.085363271
1.002753071
0.261902564
-2.169559863
-1.746767664
-1.155034995
-0.248885067
0.713128612
1.141976185
0.204939852
0.064116419
0.837299497
0.461502942
0.26212636
0.589503568
1.616177847
1.17997578
1.137796241

36

44.65154796

3.551452044

0.957451285
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Figure 13. Residual Output Structural Balance Colombia

Figure 14. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Colombia
However, Tables Nineteen and Twenty show the dataset as more dispersed
without concrete evidence that the variables have a connection.
Yugoslavia
“With the end of the first world war and the fall of the Austria-Hungary and
Ottoman Empire, the conditions were met for proclaiming the Kingdom of Serbs Croats,
and Slovenians in December of 1918” (www.kosovo.net, 2016). Yugoslavia, literally
means the land of the Slavs, had long been an idea cultivated by nations, monarchs and
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politicians alike, and soon came to fruition after the assassination of King Aleksander I,
as he hoped to curb separatist tendencies and mitigate nationalist passions.
Yugoslavia as a sovereign state is known to have one of the most troubled and
violent histories in Europe, having been dismantled and reincarnated on more than one
occasion. While there were periods of stability, the demise of Yugoslavia as a republic
that was inhabited by people of differing political, economic, religious, and social
traditions was bound to fall apart. These differences were rooted in their experience of
conflict. Today, there are four major principles that explain the Yugoslavia’s collapse.
The first is that of the ancient hatred between the Serbs and Croats; that because the
ethnic hatred was so deeply rooted a united front was never viable (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The
second holds that a combination and economic weakness and strategically motivated
international prying have prevented the evolution of a unified nation, because it would
not allow for a tangible balance of power (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The third argument for the
fall of Yugoslavia is the clash between cultural roots and the political ideology. The
communist rule repressed the variety of languages, religions, and cultural identities, but
did not eliminate them; causing groups to constantly attempt to claim their dominance as
the single defined entity (Lane, 2004, p. 4). The fourth and final principle highlights the
failure of major powers giving enough attention to the existence of external threats to
Yugoslavia, leaving the “little guy” to fend for itself (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The reality is that
the dissolution of Yugoslavia was the response of a fractured community that is
comprised of bits and pieces of all these principles and a nation tried too hard too soon to
become something that it was not.
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Historical Context and Background
The identity of the South Slav was the notion to preserve a distinct cultural and
political identity that would preserve a measure of independence. This was during the
time where European political legitimacy was tied to the strength of a nation who had
solid foundations to identity (Lane, 2004, p. 8). The problem with the Balkan Peninsula
(not yet established as Yugoslavia) was that the people were largely migrants that had no
real affinity to the territory, therefore creating a “loosely structured multi-ethnic empire”
(Lane, 2004, p. 8). This led to the production of societies within a society, with no strong
leadership, poor communication systems and the continued existence of feudal traditions
that rivaled the great powers of neighboring Germany, France, and Italy.
The events that transpired in the century preceding the First World War only
further defined the separation of a nation by its religion (Orthodox vs. Muslim vs.
Catholic) and their socioeconomic class (well-educated and poor vs. the oligarchy of the
aristocrats). The Balkan Peninsula was dismembered and put back together at least a half
dozen times before 1914 through treaties, uprisings, the Balkan Wars and local political
movements that led to assassinations of monarchs and politicos. Furthermore, it was a
major player territorially speaking in the First World War, which consequently further
weakened their economic, national security, and sovereign power.
Three weeks following the first cease-fire of World War I, the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later named Yugoslavia) was created (Lane, 2004, p. 34).
The Serbs were quick to create a united political front with three distinct, but ethnically
related people with the desire for stability and security. However, the kingdom did not
make for a free nation-state. European countries that surrounded the region did not
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recognize the SCS Kingdom for what it was (or for what it was trying to become) and
continued to engage in dispute over territory. Considering this, King Alexander renamed
the region Yugoslavia in attempt to remain above factionalism and soon followed with
the introduction of a new constitution that allowed for the return of a partial
parliamentary government (Lane, 2004, p. 60).
Less than five years later, King Alexander was assassinated as he was on his way
to France to discuss alliances. Leaving the crown to his eleven- year old son, a senior
regent, Prince Paul was appointed until the heir came of age (Lane, 2004, p. 64). Prince
Paul, an inexperienced but cultured young man, looked largely to others for political
advice and appointed a rather radical prime minister to do implement what he saw fit.
The problem here was that World War II was in the horizon and alliances needed to be
made with the right countries for the still unstable Yugoslavia to survive any sort of
warfare. Unfortunately for Prince Paul, after demonstrations broke, he was overthrown in
a coup that brought the eighteen-year old heir, Peter to the throne. King Peter’s first
cabinet only lasted three weeks, and soon after Hitler’s Germany invaded, causing Peter,
Paul, and any cabinet members to flee into exile. The years that followed the invasion
destroyed any sort of political structure that was in place. Yugoslavia was in crisis yet
again.
Josip Broz Tito was a Yugoslav revolutionary and statesmen that held various
political positions that began in 1939, just a few years before World War II. Tito was the
head of the Yugoslav communist party, who helped liberate parts of the country,
successfully obtained military aid from America, and above all defied Stalin and the
mighty Soviet Union as he fought for a consolidated Yugoslavia. Fortunately for Tito,
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Stalin’s death in 1953 marked the end of tension and uncertainty, and Tito was able to
cultivate the perception of a unified front comprised of Serbian and Croatian nationalists
(Lane, 2004, p. 115). Over the next several decades Tito experimented with communism
in Yugoslavia and was able to preserve the country’s independence, preserve the
country’s unity, create new types of socialism, foster a decentralized economy, and lead a
nonaligned movement that gave Yugoslavia the power to influence world affairs
(Campbell, 1980, p. 1049). By the 1960’s a new generation of political parties emerged,
revealing that the divisions among the people where not eliminated but rather covered up
by the communistic ideal. A fresh constitution was later adopted in 1963 (Lane, 2004, p.
131) to support the reform of the Yugoslav economy that included the reduction of
federal powers. This marked the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslav ideologists claimed that the nation was comprised of three tribes, Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes; and while they had nearly identical ethnic origins, a common
majority language, and complementary economies, because state integration was more
important than social integration. Thus, it was only a matter of time before the nation
was faced with division. The problem here was that the country was held together more
by military police, political, and administrative power than it was by economic, religious,
cultural, and civilization links (Stojanovic, 1997, p. 74). After the death of Tito in 1980,
growing nationalism among the republics threatened to split their union apart
(www.history.com, 2016). The language problem was revived, student demonstrations
ensued, and groups could choose flags to show their autonomy. By 1990, Yugoslavia
“was a multi-ethnic sovereign state without a functioning center of power…[and] none
had the power to coerce the remainder into cooperation and the international community
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did not attempt to supply he necessary power until the process of dissolution was already
beyond the point of no return.” (Lane, 2004, p. 172).
Yugoslavia’s collapse began in 1991, when the republics once again descended
into war in times of declaring independence. That year Slovenia and then Croatia
declared independence. The Yugoslav regime responded by sending an army composed
largely of Serbs to Croatia (under the guides of protecting ethnic Serbs) and carrying out
mass executions of hundreds of men. In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed with
their declaration of independence, which was again followed by the same military
response as Croatia. The remaining republics that comprised Yugoslavia, Slovenia,
Macedonia, and Montenegro also declared their independence in the same time frame.
However, their independence was not succeeded by mass murder and terror, as they were
seen as minority countries that did not pose a threat that could not have been easily
controlled by the other republics of the regime. The war launched in Bosnia, which lasted
for nearly three years, is noted as the largest massacre that occurred in Europe following
World War II. Mass executions, concentration camps, rape and sexual violence, and
forced displacement were prevalent in this ethnic cleansing that resulted in the death of
nearly 100,000 and the displacement of 4.4 million (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 509).
What makes the campaign of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina unique is the
level and kind of atrocities that were committed, even in the safe areas. Girls and women
were raped, often in front of family members as a tactic of terror; they were later sold to
other soldiers or killed when no longer deemed useful (Totten and Parsons, 209, p. 511).
In a matter of less than one week, 7,000 boys and men were systematically slaughtered.
Bosnian Serbs took safe areas without resistance; 42,000 refugees were removed and
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taken to Muslim controlled territories that were bound to face violence. When Serbian
forces refused to comply with the United Nations, NATO stepped in and proceeded with
bombing Bosnian Serb positions. Not two months after, in 1995, a federalized division
with Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia was created.
Scholars and political leaders alike have argued that at the core of the genocide in
the Balkan lands is that of the ancient hatreds. In fact, a theory known as parable of the
tribes notes that if we have different ethnic groups living in close proximity and one
becomes an aggressor, then the use of force transforms the state of affairs of the
relationships between all of the ethnic groups in that proximity, causing them all to
become aggressive.
People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies
(Ross, 2001, 160), and when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it
can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). It has been proposed
that in collectivist cultures, terrorism is more likely to be carried out because the only
morality that they have is the one for their “in-group,” their identity (Victoroff, 2004, 21).
Usually preservation of identity is linked to the collective fear of losing the ability to
protect one’s own group, and often the weaknesses of other groups are sought after in
order to maintain preservation. Thus, in order preserve their identity, the factors that
embody identity are those often placed in the frontlines of justification for igniting and
escalating conflict. The reality is, that the wars that ensued after the death of Tito were
bound to happen whether the ethnic factors were present or not. This is because during
the time of Tito, Yugoslavs enjoyed the highest standard of living and that they ever had
freedom (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 514). Once that pillar (Tito) was removed, the
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entire economic “infrastructure” collapsed and people in power had to find a means by
which to convince their citizens to fight for what was rightfully theirs; and nothing is
more powerful than the unification of identity and the protection of that individualism.
Here, we will demonstrate that in removing the element of ethnic identity, and solely
using the economic history of Yugoslavia, a war would have still erupted and could make
projections as to how to deter history from repeating itself.
Following the war, the Yugoslav nation was tasked with major economic
reconstruction. The damage was largely covered by UN aid the future was now mapped
out by Five Year Plans, prepared by the chairman of the Economic Planning Council. The
first Five Year Plan was raising output by accelerating rates of agriculture and feeding the
rapidly expanding army that Tito had created (Lane, 2004, p. 111). While the plan was
successful in meeting its goals (by the end of the five years, 25% of the national income
was reinvested in the state) it was deeply flawed in part because Yugoslavia was a
comparatively a small nation and unable to compete with the world powers at the time,
and because it only focused on one industry, leaving everything else to fall behind on the
wayside. Considering this, when a succession of bad harvests occurred, the economic
crisis began to emerge (Lane, 2004, p. 113).
The economy during this period largely focused on rapid industrialization. By
1953 Yugoslavia recovered, retaining control of the exchange rate and monetary system,
and was ready for their second installment of a Five-Year Plan. The new plan was
implemented in 1961 (after receiving $275 million in aid from the United States), which
marked the beginning of economic reforms. But, after the cost of living spiked 30%, the
rise in unemployment for older, uneducated political appointees, and the devaluation of
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the dinar, the plan had to be abandoned. Economists believed that this time around the
plan would work, as they had a structure that would revise the plan every year, but the
emphasis on short-term solutions and poor strategic planning is what caused its failure
(Lane, 2004, p. 127).
A new constitution was adopted in 1963 along with the implementation (and
failure) of the third and fourth five-year plans take us to yet another economic crisis. By
the 1970s two problems had become prevalent, the first was that of the growing
bureaucracy in the economic system and the second was the regime’s inability to control
inflation. This means that there were thousands of self-managing units, each support by
one of the two million self-managing bureaucrats who had essentially their own bank for
each of their enterprise and borrowed funds at interest rates that would lead to an
investment boom (Lane, 2004, p. 145). The fifth Five-Year Plan was implemented in
1971, with the aims of promoting greater unity of the state through economic
cooperation. By 1979 the regime had received nearly 1 billion dollars in aid and by 1980,
Yugoslavia was regarded as an economic catastrophe.
In 1981, foreign debt had piled up, inflation took off, and standards of living
plummeted 40%. International lenders were no longer motivated to provide economic
support (unless terms were punitive) and there was no one element strong enough to
provide direction or enforcement. Each of the Yugoslav entities were now running their
economies as their own republic with its unique, modern industries (Lane, 2004, p. 158).
In the decade that followed Yugoslavia was trapped in a cycle of price freezes,
devaluations, restructuring plans, price and wage freezes, and bridging loans (Lane, 2004,
p. 159).
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In 1987, Prime Minister Branko Mikulic admitted that over half of the loans were
used for consumption or ill-advised projects. In 1989 Mikulic was replaced by Ante
Markovic and executed the last attempt for economic reform with the aim of turning
Yugoslavia into a market economy. (Lane, 2004, p. 160). Self-management was
immediately abolished, and the banking system was given independence. A balanced
budget was introduced, a six-month wage freeze imposed, and promissory notes were
cancelled. International response was positive, as relationships with lenders were
restored, but this sentiment was not shared within the country. Markovic was seen as a
communist that undermined socialism and was ruining the nation (Lane, 2004, p. 161).
Yugoslavia is now known by its separate sovereign nation-states: Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. While
international response was present in the later years of the atrocities that occurred, the
process of establishing what actually occurred during the Yugoslav wars has been a
cumbersome one (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 525), and what has been even more
challenging is the rebuilding of several powers simultaneously while its citizens were still
recovering from the scars left behind. As evidenced by the data operations below, it is
clear that there has been an increase in the economic stability of all of the affected
nations, and with that increase in stability was an accompanying growth in immigration.
However, the data also demonstrates that violent conflict continues to be a living
underlying factor whose fear has not completely dissipated.
Despite the qualitative historical data that is widely published on former
Yugoslavia, datasets as it relates to migration, economics, and violent conflict are not as
readily available. This is in part because the data that is currently in use reflects the
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nation as it is now, comprised of not one, but several sovereign nations. For the purposes
of this research, I will be using datasets for three of the countries that comprised former
Yugoslavia – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia all of which endured
violent conflict. Furthermore, it is important to note that the datasets, because of their
“newness” in nature (as these nations did not ‘exist’ as independent powers prior to
1991), the correlations may be skewed.
Table 11
Data Sheet Bosnia & Herzegovina
Y (Population)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.597
7.568
7.54
7.516
7.503
7.5
7.481
7.463
7.441
7.412
7.382
7.35
7.321
7.291

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.092
0.095
0.098
0.099
0.102
0.107
0.107
0.108
0.111
0.109
0.104

X2 (Structural Balance)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.548
-1.762
-2.201
-4.114
-3.859
-3.988
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7.237
7.201
7.167
7.132
7.095

0.102
0.098
0.098
0.093
0.091

-4.678
-5.488
-5.231
-4.991
-2.999

Table 12
Summary Output Bosnia & Herzegovina

As it relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina one will notice that R Square (see Table
Twenty-Three) demonstrates a 69.7% probability of the connection between its
population Y with purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose
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presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R
Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 67.9%.
Significance F, at 2.77, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and
X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low
and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is
further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being
greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration
of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook and whether or not
they have endured violent conflict at any level.

Figure 15. Line Plot Structural Balance Bosnia & Herzegovina

Figure 16. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Bosnia & Herzegovina
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While both data tables depict the correlation between migration with violent
conflict and globalization Table Twenty-Five does so with more clarity, as the slope has a
more tangible increase in growth.
Table 13
Residual Output Bosnia & Herzegovina
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Observation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Predicted Y
(Population)
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
6.881112495
7.067918672
7.254724849
7.316993575
7.503799752
7.888550857
7.731587841
7.773038813
7.869128903
7.756683768

Residuals
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
1.152389731
6.444610269
6.415610269
6.387610269
0.634887505
0.435081328
0.245275151
0.164006425
0.040799752
0.447550857
0.319587841
0.391038813
0.519128903
0.435683768

Standard
Residuals
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
-0.560188701
3.132792452
3.118695249
3.105084156
0.308625456
0.211497584
0.119230816
0.079725239
-0.019833186
-0.217559152
-0.155354992
-0.190088057
-0.252353989
-0.211790436
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31
32
33
34
35
36

7.43922285
7.281965012
6.99447922
7.006666378
6.706703754
6.676628638

-0.14822285
0.044965012
0.20652078
0.160333622
0.425296246
0.418371362

-0.072052678
-0.021857962
0.100391911
0.07793985
0.206740953
0.203374695

X2 (Structural Balance) Residual Plot
8

Residuals

6
4
2
0
-6
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Figure 17. Residual Output Structural Balance Bosnia & Herzegovina

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) Residual
Plot
8
Residuals

6
4
2
0
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Figure 18. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Bosnia & Herzegovina
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With a residual analysis of the dataset, we see a tremendous drop in correlation
with both violent conflict and globalization, both of which negate the premise that
migration (population) is impacted by either variable.
Table 14
Data Operation Croatia (Data Sheet)
Y (Population)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.73
4.624
4.524
4.453
4.494
4.572
4.501
4.554
4.381
4.305
4.305
4.306
4.439
4.442
4.44
4.436
4.434
4.429
4.418
4.281
4.268
4.256
4.238
4.204

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.116
0.105
0.108
0.111
0.113
0.116
0.115
0.11
0.109
0.11
0.113
0.114
0.113
0.112
0.112
0.111
0.111
0.103
0.096
0.092
0.087
0.084
0.081
0.08

X2 (Structural Balance)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 15
Summary Output Croatia
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
0.987766
Multiple R
706
0.975683
R Square
065
0.974209
Adjusted R Square
312
0.339644
Standard Error
202
Observations
36
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

SS
152.74334
2
25
3.8068200
33
82
156.55016
35
26

Coefficie
nts

Intercept
X1 (GDP/Purchasing
Power)
X2 (Structural
Balance)

Standard
Error

0.082444 0.0969269
271
8
40.86677 1.1230998
488
48
0

0

MS
76.37167
124
0.115358
184

Significan
F
ce F
662.0394 2.33075E704
27

t Stat

P-value

Lower
95%

Upper
95%

0.850581
245
36.38748
145

0.401131
717
3.25151E
-28

0.114755
152
38.58181
105

0.279643
695
43.15173
87

0

0

65535

#NUM!

As it relates to Croatia you will notice that R Square (see Table Thirty)
demonstrates a 97.6% probability of the connection between its population Y with
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square
demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 97.4%.
Significance F, at 2.33, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and
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X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low
and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is
further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being
greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration
of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook.

Y (Population)

X2 (Structural Balance) Line Fit Plot
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Y (Population)
Predicted Y (Population)
0

10

20

30

40

X2 (Structual Balance)

Figure 19. Line Plot Structural Balance Croatia

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) Line Fit Plot
6
Y (Population)

5
4
3

Y (Population)

2

Predicted Y (Population)

1
0
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)

Figure 20. Thirty-Two: Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Croatia
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While both datasets demonstrate the correlation between migration and the
variables of violent conflict and globalization, the trend of clarity around globalization in
this region continues in that a more distinct increase in population aligns with an increase
in healthy economics.
Table 16
Residual Output Croatia
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Predicted Y
Observation
(Population)
1
0.082444271
2
0.082444271
3
0.082444271
4
0.082444271
5
0.082444271
6
0.082444271
7
0.082444271
8
0.082444271
9
0.082444271
10
0.082444271
11
0.082444271
12
0.082444271
13
4.822990157
14
4.373455633
15
4.496055958
16
4.618656282
17
4.700389832
18
4.822990157
19
4.782123382
20
4.577789508
21
4.536922733
22
4.577789508
23
4.700389832
24
4.741256607
25
4.700389832
26
4.659523057
27
4.659523057
28
4.618656282
29
4.618656282

Residuals
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.082444271
0.092990157
0.250544367
0.027944042
0.165656282
0.206389832
0.250990157
0.281123382
0.023789508
0.155922733
0.272789508
0.395389832
0.435256607
0.261389832
0.217523057
0.219523057
0.182656282
0.184656282

Standard
Residuals
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.249870583
-0.281832859
0.759345266
0.08469229
-0.502068018
-0.625522513
-0.760696358
-0.852023583
-0.072100802
-0.472567755
-0.82676543
-1.198340242
-1.319167731
-0.792215503
-0.659264887
-0.66532645
-0.553591306
-0.55965287
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30
31
32
33
34
35
36

4.291722083
4.005654659
3.84218756
3.637853685
3.515253361
3.392653036
3.351786261

0.137277917
0.412345341
0.43881244
0.630146315
0.740746639
0.845346964
0.852213739

0.416059389
1.249728686
1.329944685
1.909835878
2.245041311
2.562062054
2.582873749

X2 (Structural Balance) Residual Plot
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Figure 21. Residual Output Structural Balance Croatia
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Figure 22. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Croatia
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With the residuals for Croatia, it is striking that a jump in structural balance
would lead to an influx of immigration, but an increase in purchasing power shows an
increase in emigration – both of which are conflicting with the plotted data in tables
Thirty-Four and Thirty-Five.
Data Operation Slovenia
Table 17
Data Sheet Slovenia
Y (Population)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.999
1.989
1.989
1.989
1.99
1.987
1.985
1.978
1.988
1.99
1.994
1.995
1.996
1.998
2.003
2.01
2.01
2.032
2.047
2.05
2.055

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.067
0.068
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.071
0.072
0.071
0.072
0.072
0.072
0.071
0.07
0.07
0.072
0.072
0.067
0.064
0.062
0.059

X2 (Structural Balance)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.622
-1.033
-0.336
-0.584
-1.048
-0.822
-1.005
-0.665
-1.292
-1.383
-2.2
-2.73
-3.284
-4.551
-4.825
-4.386
-2.098
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2.059
2.061
2.063

0.056
0.056
0.055

-1.519
-2.303
-0.912

Table 18
Summary Output Slovenia
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
0.988840
Multiple R
332
0.977805
R Square
201
0.976460
Adjusted R Square
062
0.147533
Standard Error
479
Observations
36
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

SS
31.644354
2
76
0.7182822
33
09
32.362636
35
97

Coefficie
nts

Intercept
X1 (GDP/Purchasing
Power)
X2 (Structural
Balance)

Standard
Error

0.026264 0.0423429
987
03
28.10679 0.8669363
883
1
0.049693 0.0198054
38
58

Significan
MS
F
ce F
15.82217 726.9174 5.16589E738
244
28
0.021766
128

t Stat

P-value

0.620292 0.539325
559
545
32.42083 1.32582E
472
-26
2.509075 0.017193
065
783

Lower
95%

Upper
95%

0.059882
296
26.34300
364
0.089987
887

0.112412
27
29.87059
401
0.009398
873

As it relates to Slovenia you will notice that R Square (see Table Thirty-Seven)
demonstrates a 97.8% probability of the connection between its population Y with
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square
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demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at near duplicate rate of 97.6%.
Significance F, at an astounding 5.17, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all
values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly
correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic
performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements
(Y) increase. In fact, with the Significance of marker being so high, this dataset not only
demonstrates that the correlation is present, but that the accuracy of this study is high.
This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2)
being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of
immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook.
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Figure 23. Line Plot Structural Balance Slovenia
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Figure 24. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Slovenia
In this last sample dataset for former Yugoslavia, the pattern of having a clearer
picture between the nexus in migration and globalization is again outlined in Table
Thirty-Nine of the line plots. In light of the dataset available for this region being so
limited, there is a high possibility that perhaps that missing data is one of the reasons for
the repetition in outputs.
Table 19
Residual Output Slovenia
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Predicted Y
Observation
(Population)
1
0.026264987
2
0.026264987
3
0.026264987
4
0.026264987
5
0.026264987
6
0.026264987
7
0.026264987
8
0.026264987
9
0.026264987
10
0.026264987
11
0.026264987
12
0.026264987

Residuals
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987
0.026264987

Standard
Residuals
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
-0.183342717
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

1.909420509
1.937527308
1.993740905
1.993740905
1.962831623
2.045074167
2.03854468
2.078975437
2.073926367
2.090802462
2.09989635
2.083000601
2.086051552
2.06246685
2.103066342
2.185617432
2.213147564
2.135575083
2.064870673
1.986841681
1.78882283
1.675729967
1.714689577
1.617459286

0.089579491
0.051472692
0.004740905
0.004740905
0.027168377
0.058074167
-0.05354468
0.100975437
0.085926367
0.100802462
-0.10589635
0.088000601
0.090051552
-0.06446685
0.100066342
0.175617432
0.203147564
0.103575083
0.017870673
0.063158319
0.26617717
0.383270033
0.346310423
0.445540714

0.625309546
0.359305076
-0.033093885
-0.033093885
0.18964883
-0.405386665
-0.373768583
-0.704858935
-0.599808915
-0.70365148
-0.739209364
-0.614288104
-0.628604764
-0.450010783
-0.698512999
-1.2258973
-1.418071364
-0.723005762
-0.124746215
0.440876578
1.858049458
2.675416073
2.417419551
3.110096496
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Figure 25. Residual Output Structural Balance Slovenia
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Figure 26. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Slovenia
With residual outputs, while the plotted chart seems lacking in any real trend,
Table Forty-Two depicts the contradictory premise that with an increase in a positive
economic outlook, there would be an increase in emigration (rather than an influx in
immigration to Slovenia).
Cambodia
Officially known as the Kingdom of Cambodia, Cambodia is a country located in
Southeast Asia that is border by Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Today, Cambodia has a
population of nearly 15 million with a reestablished monarchy that has provided almost
20 years of stability following the horrors of the Khmer Rouge. For years an entire nation
was kidnapped; “freedom of the press, movement, worship, organization, association, and
discussion all completely disappeared… [as did] everyday family life” (Totten and
Parsons, 2009, p. 341). The aim was to eradicate Buddhism (among other things), but Pol
Pot was unsuccessful, as Buddhism remains the primary religion in Cambodia and what
follows are his real motives and the reasons why he failed.
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Historical Context and Background
Buddhism was first introduced to Cambodia over 800 years ago, before Phnom
Penh was founded. This was also around the time that the construction for Angkor Wat
began – now noted as one of the largest religious complexes in the world. Up until the
1400s the city of Angkor was recognized as the capitol city of the Khmer Empire, a city
that was established on the taxes of the people and where the kings lived. What followed
in the next several hundred years for Cambodia was nothing short of catastrophic. It was
attack followed by invasion, conquest, and mass murder. Cambodia today is a true
reflection of the strength and resiliency of people.
In 1432 Cambodia faced a major turning point in their history, they were captured
by the Siamese (Thailand) after the kingdom developed closer ties to China for trade
(Corfield, 2009, p. 11). Two years later, the capitol of Phnom Penh was erected, largely
due to its location; specifically, farther from Thailand and with easy access to China on
boat. While there were no serious attacks over the century that followed, Europeans
began to take notice when traders entered the port of Phnom Penh (Corfield, 2009, p. 11).
Waves of Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors arrived first, marrying locals and finding
positions on the royal court. The Dutch arrived for trading in the 1600s and the British
followed around 45 years later with plans to settle. In the 1700s the Scottish arrived, and
documented that Cambodia produced gold, raw silk, and ivory, with meat and fish
available at low prices (Corfield, 2009, p. 14).
While Phnom Penh was becoming a central hub for tradable goods, the reality
was that a large part of the population still resided in the rural villages and it was very
rare for people to leave where they lived. Thus, the arrival of Europeans to Cambodia did
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not have much of an effect on everyday life. The real threat to Cambodia during this time
period was Vietnam, as the Vietnamese gradually extended their boundaries outward, to
the south, to settle in what they claimed was their land. This, of course, opened the door
of opportunities for Thailand. Cambodia was weak, it was their chance to attack and
claim the land that was rightfully theirs as well. By 1848 both Vietnamese and Siam
soldiers were exhausted by the Cambodian guerillas and retreated. For the first time in
over fifty years Cambodia would have peace and live without outside military forces
(Corfield, 2009, p. 20).
With Vietnam and Thailand on either side of the country, the primary concern for
the kingdom in the late 19th century was to ensure an alliance with a country that was
more powerful than either one of its neighbors. Crowned king in 1860, when he was only
26, King Norodom I established the French Protectorate, a “Treaty of Friendship, Trade,
and French Protection” (Corfield, 2009, p. 23). At the time that the treaty was signed,
there were already several French missionaries in Cambodia, so the French were not
unfamiliar with the country or with the attacks that had transpired just years before.
Terms for the treaty among European powers were fairly standard: the Catholic Church
gained special privileges (although Buddhism remained the state religion), a French
representative was appoint to the Cambodian Royal Court, and France would be able to
trade freely throughout the kingdom (Corfield, 2009, p. 23-24).
Despite the revolts that occurred intermittently, the treaty was a success, at least
temporarily. Vietnam and Thailand were in such disdain of the decision that the kingdom
made that there were periods that their monarchy offered their throne just to work in
conjunction to remove the French establishment. In 1884, King Norodom was held at
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gunpoint when he signed the revised agreement that would annex Cambodia to be run as
a colony of France (Corfield, 2009, p. 27). The following year, war erupted. Cambodians
attached the French, and unable to compromise, the French resorted to burning in the
villages and launching reprisal attacks. Six years later Cambodia was at peace once more,
but 30% of its population was dead.
After Norodom’s death, his brother Sisowath became king in exchange for his
support of the French. Indeed, the support was present; when the First World War broke
out in1914, Cambodia did its part for France by enlisting 2,000 men for the infantry
(Corfield, 2009, p. 30). In light of this, rebels began to demonstrate and protest against
the decisions that Sisowath was making, and now it was not just against the French, but
also the Cambodian middle class. Sisowath died in 1929, and was succeeded by his eldest
son, Monivong (Corfield, 2009, p. 34). The events that surrounded the death of Sisowath
and the eventual departure of the French were global incidents that affected Cambodia. In
the 1930s the Great Depression hit the global economy and Communist ideology began
to emerge. Ten years later World War II erupted, where Germany took France and Japan
deployed 8,000 soldiers to Cambodia (Corfield, 2009, p. 38) ensuing the support for
Japan and opposing French rule. In 1945 Japan seized Phnom Penh, nullifying any
Franco-Cambodian agreements, and while there was French resistance, Cambodia was
granted autonomy in 1946. Democracy and socialism were introduced, and violence
erupted. Democracy had failed in a nation that had been under a monarch for thousands
of years.
Full independence was gained in 1953. With a serious fear that Cambodians on
the countryside would continue to be killed and that Communists would come to power,
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King Sihanouk (Norodom’s grandson) appointed himself as Prime Minister and abolished
Democracy. Sihanouk was triumphant. The newly appointed leader of Cambodia made it
a point to be a “good international citizen,” treating visitors with hospitality, befriending
international scholars, and finding an ally in the United States (Corfield, 2009, p. 51). In
1955 he shocked the nation when he gave the throne to his father to rule as king, while he
would remain the political leader as Prime Minister. As Sihanouk continued to focus on
increasing Cambodia’s international prestige, Communism was brewing within its
borders. Dubbed the Red Cambodians, Khmer Rouge, by Sihanouk himself, the
Communist movement was held together with the belief that they would be able to take
over the country, and they were right.
January 1925 “…Pol Pot was born Saloth Sar, the youngest in a family of six
boys and a girl. His parents owned nine hectares of rice land, three of garden-land, and
six buffalo…Rich or poor, everyone tilled the fields, fished the river, cooked tasty soups,
raised children…they were the most deeply Cambodian…But the Saloth family were
Khmer peasants with a difference. They had royal connections” (Totten and Parsons,
2009, p. 342). Pol Pot had a strict upbringing, spending a year in the royal monastery,
followed by Catholic School. He later moved to Phnom Penh to attend high school, just
as his cousin, King Sihanouk was taking the throne. Pol Pot later received a scholarship
to study radio-electricity in Paris, where he became a member of the Cambodian section
of the French Communist Party (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 342). When Pol Pot
returned to Cambodia, he found that his closest brother joined the Cambodian and
Vietnamese Communists and went along. They taught him that they had to work with the
masses and build up member by member.
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In the 1960s a group of young French educated communists, by the name of
Communist Party of Kampuchea, rose against the Sihanouk government and later
proclaimed the Democratic State of Kampuchea (DK, which was comprised of members
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea). Pol Pot was their
secretary general. Pol Pot and his members fled to the countryside after they failed to
seize Phnom Penh, but this was only the beginning. As Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge
were growing in power and numbers, the Vietnamese were at war against the United
States. The United States viewed Vietnamese communism as an international threat and
proceeded to bomb not only southern Vietnam, but also parts of eastern Cambodia, where
Vietnamese communist members were said to be in hiding. Tens of thousands on
Cambodian peasants died in a four-year period, and when U.S. military forces ousted
Sihanouk, he joined Pol Pot. All of this destabilized a centralized country and opened the
doors for a full-on take over.
Like the other nations that were presented in this study, Pol Pot’s paradigm was
primarily concerned with national and racial grandiosity (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p.
346). This meant that national impurities, including the foreign-educated (with the
exception of Pol-Pot and his Paris educated group), hereditary enemies like the
Vietnamese, Chinese, and Muslim Cham had to be abolished, and Buddhism had to be
eradicated to purify Cambodia and eliminate the old society. Khmer Rouge propaganda
proclaimed, “what is rotten must be removed,” and they did just that during Pol Pot’s
reign of terror.
Pol Pot’s first step was sealing off Cambodia both internally and externally.
“Borders were closed, the use of foreign languages banned, embassies and press agencies

150
expelled, local newspapers and televisions shut down, radios and bicycles confiscated,
and telephones suppressed…[Cambodians] quickly learned that any display of
knowledge or skill…” especially if it was contaminated by foreign influence, it was their
certain death (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 344). Logistically, DK was divided into major
zones and 32 regions throughout Cambodia that were then comprised of districts,
subdistricts, and villages. The purging had a common pattern of plowing through
districts, subdistricts, and then the villages (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 345).
Calling it “year zero” Pol Pot was swift in his plan for his new country. The
wealthy, educated, police, doctors, teachers, and former government officials and their
families were killed. Monks were massacred in masses, eliminating Buddhism from the
country in just one year. The U.S. expelled half of the Vietnamese (during the Vietnam
war), and Pol Pot’s regime drove out another 100,000, murdering the ones who remained
(eliminating nearly half a million Vietnamese). The Chinese population was reduced to
half and seen as prisoners of war, and around 100,000 Muslims Chams were massacred.
20,000 Cambodians that were an enemy of the state were tortured and jailed, and others
who were considered to be suspects were shot on the spot. In the last six months of the
regime, murders reached 100,000, and numbers total in the arena of 2.5 million deaths by
1979 (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 350). To date, it is one of the most horrifying events
in modern history.
Rationale Behind the Violence
Even after his death in 1998, scholars cannot properly identify the motives behind
Pol Pot’s desire to cleanse Cambodia. Perhaps it was because he raised on the
countryside, and while he never really lived the village life, he wanted to demonstrate to
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the rest of the lower-middle class that there was more out there, and in order to see that
he had to remove those who he thought where in his way. This train of thought parallels
what is known as rational choice theory, where Pol Pot’s war was not about winning, but
rather served his economic and political functions. As it relates to this study, this theory
provides that framework by underlining that violent conflict is utilized as a tool by
individuals or a group of individuals in order to highlight their economic injustice with
the hope of establishing a form of equality and stability.
With this theory, the motivation of violent conflict into two categories; greed,
where violent actions arise because opposing parties aspire to acquire wealth by capturing
resources and grievance, where opposing parties set out to rid of each other or the unjust
regime. In determining whether a violent conflict is driven by greed or grievance, an
empirical model was developed to quantify such factors through the use of proxies.
Greed’s proxies are primary commodity exports in GDP, the proportion of young males
within a total population, and the average years of education of a population (Denmers,
2017, 103). Grievance’s proxies are the extent to which a society is factionalized by
ethnicity and religion, land ownership, levels of repression and autocracy, and variable
growth rate in the five years prior to the outbreak of the violent conflict (Denmers, 2017,
103). While grievance’s proxies are currently highlighted as the primary drivers for the
genocide that occurred in Cambodia, it is important to consider the economic health of
the nation and what those conditions were prior to the loss of so many lives.
Perhaps Pol Pot was driven by the idea of power and wealth, as he had familial
ties with royalty. With Marxism, getting and keeping economic power is the motive
behind all social and political activities (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). Pol Pot wanted a classless
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peasant society, espousing Marxist principles, and took aim at intellectuals, city residents,
ethnic Vietnamese, civil servants, and religious leaders. The division between the haves
and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical perspective is infinitely more significant that
the division of race, religion, or gender (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). It is this worldview that
allows for the elite to rise in the global society. It is the bourgeoisie that recognize that
class is the most important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining
global society will place a large significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them
to create revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each
other in their own battles. In short, under the Marxist theory Pol Pot’s cleverly placed the
significance of race and religion at the forefront to gain support of the masses and then
allowed them to eliminate who they thought were less worthy on their own accord.
International response did not make itself present as the thousands of Cambodians
were being slaughtered. Finally, in 1979 Vietnamese soldiers invaded and drove out the
Khmer Rouge. The people who were once seen as enemies and ethnically infected were
now the pseudo heroes to the repressive nation. Vietnamese troops remained in
Cambodia until 1989, after they trained a new Cambodian army (Totten and Parsons,
2009, p. 352). October 31, 1991, peace agreements were signed in Paris making both the
United States and Cambodia signatories of the Genocide Convention. Between 1999 and
2006 the United Nations negotiated with the Cambodian government and established a
joint tribunal in Phnom Penh to ensure legal accountability for the Khmer Rouge’s crimes
(Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 356).
Shortly after the peace agreements were signed, several political parties began to
register for the new wave of democracy in Cambodia. Many of which were formed by
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those who were exiled during the reign of Pol Pot (Corfield, 2009, p. 112). As this was
happening, Pol Pot was preparing himself for more bloodshed since the UN officials were
unsuccessful in disarming him. The Khmer Rouge took it upon themselves and attacked
small villages in Vietnam, killing several hundred and expelling hundreds of thousands.
Elections took place in 1993, the first since 1972. The royalist party won, but the
Cambodian People’s Party did not take the defeat well. Considering not breaking up the
freshly unified country, both parties created a joint constitution that involved power
sharing. For Cambodia, the road towards a democratic government was awkward. As the
first term came to an end, the CPP had set themselves up for total political control for the
elections in 1998; this was also the time that the Khmer Rouge was rumored to be split.
When the royalist party realized what the CPP had planned, they sought a political
alliance with the Khmer Rouge and a coup d’état launched in Phnom Penh (Corfiled,
2009, p. 120). By spring, the national was at a stalemate; nevertheless, elections took
place in the summer and the CPP won most of the seats. That same year, Pol Pot died,
marking the end for the Khmer Rouge.
At this point, Cambodia was a pseudo peaceful nation – there were no major
attacks present, but the wealthy and famous continued to be assassinated. The 2003
elections came, and the CPP won the majority once more. Alarmed after their second
victory, the throne decided that it was best for the country to join forces with CPP and recreate a power sharing institution that remains today. Cambodia is now constitutional
monarchy, where the king serves as the head of state, has a bipartisan legislature with an
elected national assembly, and provinces and municipalities have a local government in
place.
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Economic Background
Cambodia had one of the most underdeveloped economies in Southeast Asia,
having only rice and rubber as strong commodities. The Europeans, the French, were
fully aware of this and therein began the symbiotic relationship between the two nations.
Cambodians needed France for protection and the French needed Cambodia for its
rubber. Because of this relationship Cambodia was largely self-sufficient, famine was
low as most families lived in the countryside cultivating the produce and raising the
livestock they ate. However, the economy took a fall when Pol Pot came into power and
deemed foreign investment as toxic. Of course, the removal of any foreign investment
was not the only reason for the collapse of the Cambodian economy; the mass killings,
the burning of villages (and their land) and the seclusion from communications and
trading all had major impacts as well.
In 1979, when the Vietnamese invaded with the aim to bring down the Khmer
Rouge, the economy was in complete disarray. Food shortages were widespread, a large
part of the population was relocated, no central currency existed, and electricity and
transportation services were non-existent (Than, 1992, p. 271). Economic reforms were
finally introduced in 1985, the private sector grew, government industries were granted
autonomy, and international support for the country’s economic freedom was reignited
(Than, 1992, p. 271). The agricultural sector, except for droughts and floods, became
nearly self-sufficient once more.
Humanitarian aid from the international community was implemented in the
reconstruction of the economy, highlighting that Cambodians must assume their
responsibilities and part of this was to ensure the nation’s peace. The pillar of keeping

155
peace in a nation that been involved in decades of war, mass destruction, and economic
downfall was seen as more difficult than the actual economic reconstruction. For several
years after the reconstruction and rehabilitation plan was signed, Cambodian nationals
and foreigners were killed that demonstrated the political uncertainty. Despite everything,
Cambodia rose from the ashes and is now paving its way to success domestically and as
an international partner.
Data Operation
Cambodia has been a country that has long suffered the consequences of violent
conflict and overall governmental instability for decades. Considering this, the dataset for
this case study does not include structural balance, as the information that is currently
published has been unable to quantify such measures. Like Yugoslavia, the results to
these outcomes will inevitably be skewed against those countries that have the complete
dataset available.
Table 20
Data Sheet Cambodia
Y (Population)
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.99
8.228
8.467
8.724
9.009
9.324
9.659
10.007
10.43
10.769

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.021
0.021
0.02
0.021
0.02
0.021
0.022
0.022

X2 (Structural Balance)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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11.091
11.396
11.685
11.96
12.223
12.473
12.709
12.934
13.149
13.356
13.555
13.747
13.941
14.144
14.365
14.605
14.78
15.026
15.27
15.521

0.023
0.023
0.023
0.025
0.026
0.028
0.029
0.03
0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.041
0.042
0.044
0.045
0.047

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 21
Summary Output Cambodia

Despite its missing links, as it relates to Cambodia, you will notice that R Square
(see Table Forty-Four) demonstrates an 88.9% probability of the connection between its
population Y with purchasing power (globalization). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a
probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 88.3%. Significance F, at
approximately 1.63, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1.
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Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and
structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further
evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables X1 being greater than the
alpha 0.05, which indicates that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly
impacted by a country’s economic outlook.

Figure 27. Line Plot Structural Balance Cambodia

Figure 28. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Cambodia
Again, the dataset for Cambodia is unique in that it is impossible to demonstrate
the correlation between migration and violent conflict by way of quantitative measures.
However, Table Forty-Five clearly demonstrates the nexus between the two variables, as
it shows that when the economic outlook of Cambodia grows, so does the population.
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Table 22
Residual Output Cambodia
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Observation Predicted Y (Population)
1
2.152221419
2
2.152221419
3
2.152221419
4
2.152221419
5
2.152221419
6
2.152221419
7
2.152221419
8
8.651808765
9
8.976788132
10
8.976788132
11
8.651808765
12
8.976788132
13
8.651808765
14
8.976788132
15
9.3017675
16
9.3017675
17
9.626746867
18
9.626746867
19
9.626746867
20
10.2767056
21
10.60168497
22
11.2516437
23
11.57662307
24
11.90160244
25
12.55156117
26
13.20151991
27
13.85147864
28
14.50143738
29
14.82641674
30
14.82641674
31
14.82641674
32
15.47637548
33
15.80135485
34
16.45131358
35
16.77629295
36

17.42625168

Residuals
2.152221419
2.152221419
2.152221419
2.152221419
2.152221419
2.152221419
5.837778581
0.423808765
0.509788132
0.252788132
0.357191235
0.347211868
1.007191235
1.030211868
1.1282325
1.4672325
1.464253133
1.769253133
2.058253133
1.683294399
1.621315031
1.221356297
1.132376929
1.032397562
0.597438827
0.154480093
0.296478642
0.754437376
0.885416744
0.682416744
0.461416744
0.871375478
1.021354846
-1.42531358
1.506292947

Standard
Residuals
-1.278582217
-1.278582217
-1.278582217
-1.278582217
-1.278582217
-1.278582217
3.468081777
-0.251774444
-0.302852687
-0.15017526
0.212198595
0.206270097
0.598347731
0.612023727
0.670255393
0.871647019
0.86987705
1.051070106
1.222757952
1.000004119
0.96318369
0.725577967
0.672717497
0.613322195
0.354923826
0.091772853
-0.176130725
-0.448192832
-0.526004478
-0.405407132
-0.274116426
-0.517662905
-0.606761986
-0.846744011
-0.894851877

1.905251682

-1.131863524
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Figure 29. Residual Output Structural Balance Cambodia
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Figure 30. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Cambodia
Like many of the other datasets in this research, the residuals for Cambodia do not
numerically exemplify the thesis. While the standardized residuals in this case study have
increased, the probability of the variables being related has remained low.
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Germany
Having the largest landmass of any European nation (www.europa.eu, 2016),
Germany shares its borders with nine different countries and has access to both the North
and Baltic Seas. It is no wonder that every Reich tried for global domination. Germany
was and continues to be one of the epicenters of Europe, having one of the highest GDPs
and where 16% of the European Union’s population resides (www.europa.edu, 2016).
Today, Germany is part of the G8, one of the eight most industrialized nations in the
world, and a power player in global economics. This, however, was no easy feat. The
German Republic comes from nearly a century of social and political division and has
survived one of the most notorious acts of genocide in history. What follows is the
history of a torn nation, what led to its ultimate demise, and its extraordinary rise to the
top.
Historical Context and Background
Created in 1871, the German Empire was governed under the constitution
designed by Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian Prime Minister (Berghahn, 2005, p. 178).
The constitution by design would grant the Kaiser (“Holy Roman Emperor”) primary
decision power, which by definition means that the decisions on whether to go to war or
stay at peace would be left to the hands of one person (Berghahn, 2005, p. 178). In
principle “the Kaiser had, at his disposal, the use of military force and could set in motion
a violent solution to any domestic political conflict…” (Berghahn, 179, 2005). To this
end, Bismarck launched a cultural struggle, Kulturkampf, a campaign to destroy political
Catholicism, which failed. Bismarck abandoned this battle as a failure and yet another
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campaign, this time with socialism as his target. This campaign also failed, and when the
new emperor, Wilhelm II began his reign in 1888, he asked Bismarck to resign.
It is important to recognize that the constitution and the founding of the German
Empire was made possible after years of war and pseudo liberalization from the Kingdom
of Prussia (which then constituted present day Germany Poland, Russia, Lithuania,
Denmark, Belgium, and the Czech Republic). Thus, it was [almost] natural for Bismarck
to be in constant state of fear of losing his power. For Bismarck, giving into political
parties with opposing views would have been letting his years of work in foreign policy
go in vain and destroying what he considered the unification of a German nation. The
most interesting note what of what comprised Bismarck’s constitution was the little was
written on economics, party structures, political systems, and anything that involved the
growth of German infrastructure. In fact, 80 to 90 percent of the Reich’s expenditures
(Berghahn, 2005, p. 190) were marked for military spending. This alone is an indicator
that the only concern for Bismarck and his political cronies was military stability and
control – which in history has shown is not enough for the growth and stability of a
nation.
The dismissal of chancellor Bismarck was surrounded by a short disruption of
political power, as Wilhelm II attempted to steer the Reich government in a direction of
peace (Berghahn, 2005, p. 248). The new emperor’s aim was to be beloved by all by way
of improving laws that surrounded the Reich’s economic welfare; however, was not taken
lightly by anyone. Wannabe politicos, like Otto von Volderndorff, wrote, “We must limit
ourselves to securing the country…[pursue] a re-founding of the Reich…our industry is
not worth much anyway. It is in the hands of the Jews; it produces ‘cheaply and
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poorly’…” (Berghahn, 2005, p. 248). People of influence (and affluence) such as
Volderndorff were part of the group that planted that first seed of deep-seated hatred in
the events that followed decades later. Wilhelm II’s need to be the emperor of the people
is what led to his comparatively short-lived reign; he was forced to give up his throne
after WWI in 1918.
Triggered by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a
Yugoslav nationalist, the ‘war to end all wars’ pitted the Central Powers (Germany,
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire) against the Allied Powers (Great Britain,
France, Russia, Italy, and Japan). Named after German General Alfred on Schlieffen, the
military strategy known as the Schlieffen Plan was implemented to destroy the enemy in
one swift move, weakening its economic power and destabilizing military capability
(Berghahn, 2005, p. 274). The idea behind this plan was to have a ‘lighting war’ by
attacking France through the West and Russia through the East; this, was undoubtedly
one of the most jeopardizing military strategies deployed by the German government and
to their own surprise were defeated in France and came to a stalemate in Russia. German
forces suffered over two million casualties in a period of four years, but this only marked
the beginning of the horrors that were to follow.
Born in 1918, The Weimar Republic was Germany’s first attempt at a
parliamentary democracy. The newly indoctrinated constitution provided for an election
of a popular president (to hold office for a seven-year appointment), policy design by
majority leaders, and a creation of a socioeconomic framework that would serve as the
charter for the next thirteen years (Pachter, 1978, p. 86). The Weimar Republic is made
notable largely in light on the high involvement of what became known as the Junker
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class, the wealthiest of the wealthy, and the rise of political parties who would be in
opposition (i.e., peasant parties). Germany became highly politicized (Fulbrook, 2014, p.
25) and polarized. This newfound democracy was met with political violence, frequent
assassinations, coup attempts, strikes, and demonstration in its first four years (Fulbrook,
2014, p. 27). It was a combination of these acts, a sense of passive resistance, and poor
socioeconomic conditions that led to the election of Paul von Hindenburg in 1925, a
‘tolerable’ president (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 50).
Heinrich Bruning was elected chancellor in 1930, into a government relied more
and more on the sole authority of the president (Pachter, 1978, p. 191). Refusing to take
any measures on Germany’s economic distress, Bruning reduced wages, prices, and
social services, while increasing taxes. As this was occurring, the Nazi Party had already
been active for ten years and was only increasing in power when they joined communist
forces, and eventually create a cohort of anti-capitalist forces (Pachter, 1978, p. 197).
Fearing the worst, Bruning handed the office to an aristocrat who was later replaced by
Adolf Hitler as a chancellor – this was the beginning of the end of the German Reich.
Born in 1889, Adolf Hitler was one of six children to working class parents.
Growing up, Hitler had strong interests in the fine arts, but his father, who died when
Hitler was fourteen, rejected this idea. Hitler struggled as a young man in school,
particularly after his youngest brother died not long after the passing of his father, so his
mother allowed him to drop out when he was sixteen so that he could pursue his career in
the arts. The following year, in 1907, his mother died. That year Hitler moved to Vienna
where he sold his work, only to make enough to feed himself. The years that followed
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would leave to live a life without a home and filled with political ideology that planted
the seeds of anti-Semitism.
Though he was born in Austria, when World War I began, he was able to enlist in
the German army and fought in the some of the bloodiest battles in the war. It is believed
that Hitler had a strong hatred in the multi-culturalism that was found in Austria at the
time and proving his loyalty with Germany would be his answer – he was right. Hitler
became a well-regarded and decorated solider for his bravery in action, taking everything,
he learned at the front lines to create his national party. Because of the serious impact that
WWI had on Germany, it was made clear to Hitler that he needed to create a party for the
people, a party that would allow Germany to rise up once again and become the powerful
nation that he wanted it to be. This led to the formation of the German Workers Party
(that we now know as the Nazi Party) and the period in which Hitler launched himself
into politics, shaking hands with other national leaders that had similar ideals. And,
despite his setbacks in school during his youth, Hitler had tremendous oratory skills;
skills that would bring in crowds in the thousands to listen to what he had to say, creating
one of the largest support bases in history at the time.
In 1925, Hitler published Mein Kampf (“My Struggle”), outlining his political
ideology and future for Germany. For Hitler “the state was not an economic entity but
racial. He declared the superiority of a white Aryan race, with particular vitriol reserved
for the Jews he viewed as ‘parasites.’ Their elimination, he said, ‘must be necessarily a
bloody process’” (www.bbc.co.uk, 2017). This of course, keeping in mind the fact that
Hitler believed that Jews (among others) betrayed the German Army, which lead to their
ultimate defeat in WWI. In January1933, Hitler was given the post of German
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Chancellor, and with swift political moves, by March he was able to pass laws without
approval, and the only thing he has left to do to fulfill his vision was to build an army.
In 1934, as Hitler was preparing himself to transform Germany into a racially
pure community, he was whipping the military votes with the reminding officers that the
Jews had a large part in the humiliation and defeat of Germany. He then would obligate
officers to swear into policies that some morally rejected. Those who did not comply
were exterminated, and the Nazi reign of terror began (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 62). By 1938,
Hitler was well underway in the expansion of Nazi Germany, starting with Austria, then
Czechoslovakia, and finally Poland. It was at Poland when the rest of the world began to
notice that there might be some trouble coming their way. In 1939, France and Britain
declared war, leaving Germany to form an alliance with fascist Italy and Japan. Upon the
invasion of USSR, WWII became the largest land war in history; German troops had
spread to over six countries in less than a five-year period and Hitler had no plans to stop,
no matter the cost.
In the early 1940s the war was starting to take a toll on the German citizens
themselves. Women and children were living through air raids and surviving in ruined
cities; millions were uprooted from their homelands (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 84) – it was clear
that a ‘normal’ life was far from reach. The war ended in 1945, when Berlin was captured
by Soviet troops and Germany was forced to surrender. 11 million lives were lost, and
millions more were injured in a war that was led by one of the most notoriously
dangerous men on Earth.
The first concentration camp was established in 1933, the year that Hitler first
came into power; at the time, the idea was to hold those who were in political opposition,
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not for the imprisonment of Jews. Introduced in 1935, The Nuremberg Laws were set in
place to “protect” German blood, which meant that Jews and other minorities were
reduced to second-class citizens due to their impure blood (www.bbc.co.uk, 2017). By
1939, a systemic extermination program was underway, needing to weed out those who
were hereditarily diseased. Incorporating eugenic ideas, those who were deemed
worthless were sterilized, the mentally ill and handicapped were executed, children with
abnormalities were taken for experimentation for medical advancement, and groups
including Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and gypsies were brutally killed without
mercy (Pichot, 2001, p. 176). Then there was the mass genocide of the Jews, Hitler’s
“Final Solution.”
Concentration camps, as we know them today, were overcrowded, poorly
maintained, and cruel and harsh treatment often resulted in death. “Disease, starvation,
torture, shooting, and hanging were all common, and violence, brutality and murder were
weapons which had been employed by the Nazis throughout their period of power”
(Fulbrook, 2014, p. 90). Despite this horror, physical extermination of the Jews (in the
camps or otherwise) was not an order until 1941. This operation essentially consisted of
gathering Jewish communities in herd, taking them to the woods (or camps), having them
dig their own graves and then shooting them on site so that their bodies would fall in their
burial site (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 98). By the end of 1945, the lives of 6 million Jews were
lost, and the man responsible to bringing the world to the brink of destruction took his
life upon defeat.
One of the most interesting things about Hitler his political ideology was very
personal. This was a person that grew up constantly being rejected, by his family, by his
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friends, by society. The notion that he could create a unified front based on his ideals,
and in a country where he was not born citizen, is truly what drove him to become who
he was. That said, Hitler’s persona and the events that transpired during his time of power
could astutely be explained with social theory. Social theory as a basis for the
comprehension of man was developed several hundred years ago, as civil societies
developed and people were permitted to express their independent thinking (Lemert,
2010). Its foundation began as the attempt to account for what was different between
modern societies and its preceding traditional ones (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 98).
Today, social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept
human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or
around them” (Lemert, 2010). One such branch that stems from modern social theory is
that of cultural trauma [as a social theory], where as individuals feel as though they have
been subjected to a (or several) horrendous events that leaves marks on their
consciousness; therefore, changing their identity and fundamental ideals forever
(Alexander, 2012, p. 6). This suggests, then that in light of Hitler’s traumatic experience
(i.e., the consecutive deaths of 3 family members in a time of his life that known to be
challenging for a young man), what could have been a somewhat normal politician,
turned into a monster because his identity was changed. Traumas are said to be naturally
occurring events that shatter an individual’s sense of wellbeing (Alexander, 2012, p. 7),
“…it is a blow to the psyche that breaks through one’s defenses so suddenly and with
such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively…” (Alexander, 2012, p. 9). Based
on this, it can be deduced that Hitler was never able to overcome the traumatic
experiences in his life, and his coping mechanism was project his trauma on his fellow
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men (including the Jews) when he laid down the law that anyone who was considered
impure or unworthy should be killed. I am not suggesting that Hitler or his actions are
forgivable simply because he was [clearly] a sick man, but rather am providing a possible
baseline that could stipulate an explanation as to why he did what he did.
What was left after the war was a demoralized nation in ruins. Husbands and sons
were gone, food and clothing for those who remained were scarce, and a general
emptiness was the only thing that filled the air. Allies were unsure on what to do with the
Germany that remained; they had to administer a war-torn country while being cautious
of those who were in position to rattle cages.
By 1949, two German states were founded, one free dictatorship and communism
(west) and the other who was attempted to gain new order under the auspice of Stalinism
(east). The decades that followed became the true indicator on how different the divided
nation had become; West Germans industry and economy flourished, while East
Germany underwent a major dismantling campaign headed by the Soviet Union. In 1961,
the division was literally cemented with the Berlin Wall. The difference in industry,
economy, and population were staggering. West Germany was urbanized, with less than
6% of the population living in small cities, with high number of advance white-collar
works, and a population that grew from 43 million to 61.6 million (despite the terror
attacks that happened in the 1970s and 1980s); East Germany, on the other hand, had
24% of their population living in rural areas, where work was largely blue collars, and
whose population remained identical (16.7 million) in a forty-year period (Fulbrook,
2014, p. 188-189). The disparity in education, policing, and politics was just as apparent.
In 1989 East Germany was shaken by a serious of revolutions, which inaugurated the
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process of the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and destruction of the Berlin Wall between
the two republics and paving the way for a Germany as a unified front.
The year that followed gave way to rapid reunification and introduction to a
unified Germany. Currency union was in effect July 1, 1990; East German shops were
stocked with a wide range of goods, subsidies were removed, properties were reappropriated, a common political administration was planned and institutionalized, and
the by end of 1990 Germany had their first free election since 1932, and the division of
the European superpowers had finally come to an end (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 287-289).
Data Operation
Table 23
Data Sheet Nazi Germany
Y (Population)
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)
X2 (Structural Balance)
76.843
6.536
0
76.988
6.435
0
76.933
6.365
0
76.664
6.303
0
76.355
6.21
0
76.166
6.128
0
76.219
6.063
0
76.233
5.924
0
76.697
5.881
0
77.463
5.895
0
78.949
5.987
0
79.973
6.14
-5.067
80.5
5.617
-4.019
80.947
5.454
-2.755
81.148
5.424
-2.367
81.308
5.315
-2.839
81.467
5.164
-2.888
81.51
5.052
-2.436
81.446
5.016
-2.294
81.423
4.939
-1.685
81.457
4.85
-4.791
81.518
4.816
-3.405
81.579
4.671
-3.599
81.549
4.456
-2.681
81.457
4.283
-2.76
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81.337
81.174
80.993
80.764
80.483
80.285
80.276
80.427
80.647
80.983
81.687

Table 24
Summary Output Nazi Germany

4.116
4.057
3.963
3.889
3.681
3.643
3.636
3.54
3.439
3.397
3.344

-2.375
-1.944
-0.926
-1.023
-1.056
-2.662
-1.403
0.003
0.607
1.163
1.182
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As it relates to Germany, you will notice that R Square (see Table Fifty-One)
demonstrates a 80.6% probability of the connection between its population Y with
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square
demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 79.4%, in
likelihood of a small sample size that is available given the data. Significance F, at
approximately 1.81, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and
X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low
and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is
further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being
greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration
of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook and whether or not
they have endured violent conflict at any level.
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Figure 31. Line Plot Structural Balance Nazi Germany
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Figure 32. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Nazi Germany
Given the history of Germany, the dataset in both Table Fifty-Two and Table
Fifty-Three are the most accurate depiction of the central premise to the research,
whereas migration is impacted by both violent conflict and globalization.
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Table 25
Residual Output Nazi Germany
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Observation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Predicted Y
(Population)
76.6817768
76.82029222
76.916293
77.00132227
77.12886617
77.24132423
77.33046782
77.52109795
77.58006986
77.5608697
77.43469724
80.63014972
80.64310321
80.01717534
79.79756272
80.26425776
80.50427567
80.35410985
80.30805043
80.00437219
82.21382095
81.32898712
81.6582238
81.33614047
81.62649159
81.59678237
81.38804331
80.83281066
80.99948616
81.30692332
82.43835205
81.60183983
80.78859425
80.52119082
80.2051309
80.26504824

Residuals
0.161223203
0.167707784
0.016706999
0.337322268
0.773866168
1.075324231
1.111467817
1.288097947
0.883069858
0.097869701
1.514302759
0.657149723
0.143103211
0.929824656
1.350437277
1.043742235
0.962724325
1.155890152
1.137949572
1.41862781
0.756820954
0.189012876
0.079223801
0.212859527
0.169491591
0.259782374
-0.21404331
0.160189339
0.235486159
-0.82392332
-2.15335205
1.325839832
0.361594248
0.12580918
0.777869103
1.421951765

Standard
Residuals
0.178880802
0.186075592
0.018536795
-0.37426671
-0.858622073
-1.193096634
-1.233198763
-1.429173901
-0.979786046
-0.108588654
1.680153273
-0.729122529
-0.158776259
1.031661554
1.498340802
1.158055694
1.068164484
1.282486353
1.262580871
1.573999745
-0.839710021
0.209714075
-0.087900604
0.236172475
-0.188054766
-0.288234438
-0.237485909
0.177733706
-0.261277237
-0.91416162
-2.389192962
-1.471049379
-0.401197023
0.13958814
0.863063421
1.577687749
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Figure 33. Residual Output Structural Balance Nazi Germany
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Figure 34. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Nazi Germany
In this final overview of residuals, again the plots in Tables Fifty-Five and FiftySix do not make the argument that migration is in fact impacted by other variables. If, for
the purposes of this research, residuals were to be taken into consideration, the numerical
data would negate the hypothesis and the reasons for which this research is created could
be easily counter measured.

176
Chapter 5
Conclusions
As our world has become more internationally integrated, the concept of
globalization (to explain economy in an interconnected world) naturally came to light in
order to dissect the new fear that nations have as a whole – the fear of coming up short.
Because of this, it appears as though there have been more acts of violence in the last
century than there ever was; in fact, since the end of World War II, 236 conflicts have
been active in 150 locations.
The question of nationalistic survival is one of the haves versus the have-nots, and
those who have more, will ultimately survive. Scholarly research has only begun to
scratch the surface where globalization and violent conflict come together. There is an
undeniable gap in the connection between the economic performance of a nation to its
resulting upheavals that are often followed with violence. Considering the lack of
scholarship on this subject, this study provides a baseline that explains the phenomenon
that we are largely faced with today – international migration. This historical examination
provides numerical patterns that allow scholars to see if history repeats itself, and if it
does, what are the conditions in which it can be deterred or prevented, should the
outcomes be of serious detriment. The lack of accountability of a nation’s economic
infrastructure is the driving force behind this study. Completely rejecting the notion that
economics does not have an impact on violent conflict and its consequences is what will
continue to push large populations into foreign countries, further fueling tensions. The
only real hypotheses that have been studied are those involving violent conflict and
political uprisings causing a migrant to “voluntarily” move from one country to the next.
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The purpose of this section is to offer some concluding thoughts, to comment on
the contribution of my research, as well as to identify areas for further exploration. What
does the above analysis tell us about the phenomenon of migration, a premise that has
been part of our humanity for centuries? What areas of theoretical constructs can be used
to understanding these complex relationships? Can social science provide a new platform
in which we can better understand the causal effects behind violent conflict without
diminishing the underlying vulnerabilities of humanity? These are some of the
overarching questions that emerged throughout the development of this research and
questions that academia needs to ask itself as it moves forward in creative alternative
frameworks as they relate to the internationalization of our world.
Throughout this research I have made the case for the inevitable linkage between
mass migration, globalization, and violent conflict, in that: economic performance is a
driver for violent conflict, and consequently migration (in masses) will occur. Indeed,
history, and each of the highlighted case studies in this research, has shown us time and
time again in that the three are undeniably interconnected. This is because all three
factors are bound to the welfare of a state. While each unit of analysis represents a casual
affect, the world context today challenges us in that they are not exclusive from one
another. In large part this is because the fear of losing resources and opportunities to gain
financial power has become more tangible, bringing premise nationalistic survival to the
proverbial table.
In creating the foundation for this research, much of the studies that have been
previously presented are related to the political rationale behind violent conflict, as
opposed to taking it from an economic standpoint. Furthermore, historically it has been
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names that armed groups deliberately targeted marginalized populations to migrate, but
no concrete evidence has been provide as it why it was the case. Thus, one of the goals of
this study was to provide the hard numbers that not only are economic breakdown and
violent conflict are related, but to expand their relationship to mass migration.
Furthermore, this research, with relevant historical context, to an extent debunks that
violent conflict is solely politically fueled, but rather it occurs because the political
agenda is driven by economics.
A New Model for Preventative Measures?
As it relates to human nature, conflict usually unfolds because of crisis related to
identity. We can even put that theory to the test today, given our current administration
and the general anti-black/brown communities sentiment that has been spreading like
wildfire. Violent conflict specifically is the struggle over values or claims to status,
power, and scares resources, where the goal is to essentially eliminate the opposing factor
(usually people) that presents a roadblock. In large part, however, scholars and
policymakers alike have not been able to anticipate when a violent conflict would erupt;
this is especially true when a leader of a nation tacks on a faith-based agenda to their
politics. On its face, this almost seems illogical, but because violent conflict has not
historically been analyzed with an economic lens, it is easy to understand why this last
century has been one of the most violent in human history.
This research provides the foundational groundwork for shifting the way that we
think about how to implement preventative measures for countries that are seemingly
stable from a 30,000-foot view, and also provides the data that quite literally tells us what
it is that the country is “fighting for.” For example, in the case of Rwanda, there is the
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general knowledge that the genocide that occurred in the mid 1990’s was driven by
ethnicity and the need for identity preservation. While this may be true on the surface, if
we dig deeper, history shows us that the two conflicting populations (Hutus and Tutsis)
where in fact provoked by an economic opportunity that was led by foreign nationals.
Social science has taught us that people behave in a certain manner because they
believe it is the rational thing to do. The question is, should all acts be considered
rational? Social theory tells us that societal norms shift as societies develop; therefore, it
would be infinitely impossible to form actual boundaries, making what is rational then
irrational today (or vice versa). However, the inability to form boundaries is directly
reflected on a nation’s current state of economic outlook, in that when countries are
developing and are heavily reliant on other countries to fill their gaps societal boundaries
have the tendency to be more fluid.
This fluidity has also spread to our consciousness of history. Our societies have
been flooded with social innovation, technological progress, and social media, skewing
out worldview, which means that we are allowing for history to repeat itself despite its
detrimental impact. While this last century of genocide has resulted in regime change,
social movements, and an increase of people power to challenge the status quo, it stills
begs the question on how can we make change differently, and perhaps how can we do it
better? Rational choice theory tells us that we are rational agents, and we have a choice,
even in setting of war – so why do we continue to use violence as the catalyst for change?
The assumption here is that violent conflict will give us the greater rate of return by way
of power and resources, thus debunking the myth that ethnicity and religion are the
driving force of violent conflict.
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Final Thoughts
“One of the most robust findings in literature is that many economic conditions
(low income, slow growth, and severe economic downturns) are correlated to the
outbreak of conflict…” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). Indeed, empirical studies have
shown us that poor economic infrastructure is associated with a higher incidence of
violent conflict, but quantitative measures around the impact to migration have not been
at the forefront of social science research. In this research, five countries (case studies)
have been identified and its respective data has been extracted and utilized in casual
design, where one variable is directed impacted by one or more other variables. The
driving rationale for choosing this research design is that one of the most provoking
assertions in casual relationships is the theory that it can be used for change. The
limitation with this research in particular is that literature supporting the thesis that
economics, violent conflict, and mass migration are interconnected is limited; and,
because some of these case studies did not exist as nations in their own right until the fall
of the previous regime, hard data is also scarce, skewing the measurements.
As debates continue over the causes and outcomes of violent conflict, the
economic lens remains underutilized in academic studies, and therefore we are missing
the mark field of conflict resolution. This research has shown us that, yes, history indeed
does repeat itself and that we have lacked the creativity to think outside of the confines
that we hold ourselves in. Violent conflict continues to serve as a tool of social
destruction and economic reconstruction, and it is economic factors that predispose
countries to war (developing nations are even more susceptible to violent conflict be a
reoccurring travesty.
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To date, much of the studies that have been conducted are qualitative and have
been related to the political aims that violent conflict stems from. But, what if we strictly
use a gender lens? This argument allows us to explore new territories of conflict
prevention. While, this design in particular excels in bringing and understanding of
complex issues through the analysis is limited events or conditions and their
relationships. What is more interesting about this research design is that it does not
facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationships (www.usc.edu, June 2016);
which is why a combination of the two was used here. Furthermore, this research design
is not necessarily limited to large-scale violent conflicts that had international impact.
This sort of tool can be broken down and simplified for the use of analysis of local
communities; this is even more true if we are taking about preventing conflict. For
instance, in the United States there is deep-seated frustration, resentment, and anger in the
African American community (that can be traced back to the Civil War era) that has
largely been created by unemployment and underemployment, extreme poverty,
segregation, and the lack of economic and educational opportunities, among other factors.
This is because the African American community has long been looked as a group of
individuals that is less than, and generally speaking they are the target population (along
with other black and brown communities) of the Anglo communities in spaces where the
Anglo [man] is flexing their muscles to gain power. Power here goes back to material
goods, and today that could be money, real estate, or property that has access to goods
that are profitable. If we looked to the Detroit Riots, for example, one of the most
destructive riots in U.S. history, one can deduce that economics was in the front seat
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(along with other factors) to that violence. Despite the fifty-year time lapse, in a first
world nation, Detroit is still rebuilding itself from that catastrophic event.
As academics in the field of conflict resolution it is important to look at history
with a different lens so that the cycle of destruction is disrupted. For decades nongovernment aid organizations, like USAID, IMF, and the World Bank, have provided
billions of dollars of foreign assistance, and to what end? On January 3, 2020, fears
around a third world war surfaced, the question is why? Why do we in the field of
conflict resolution continue to examine these phenomena with the traditional frameworks
time and again? The fear of losing [economic] power continues is one of the most
palpable forces in a world where the aim to be a global power has become fiercely
competitive. If the tool in this research was put into practice, large public and government
conglomerates that provide aid, such was the World Bank, IMF, or USAID can identify
the needs of a country (as it relates to resources) so as to inject that country with the
support it requires to sustain that need and work with international policy makers on a
higher level in order to create preventative measures for any conflict that may be
looming; thus, reducing the catastrophic impact drastically.
Despite the shortage in numerical data, every one of the case studies confirmed
that in fact violent conflict and globalization have a direct impact on migration. Without
fail, the quantitative tests utilized herein demonstrated a probability of more than 60% in
accuracy throughout and a significant indicator that vetted that probability to be true. This
tells us that these variables should not be confined for individual analysis, but rather in
concert in order to make powerful strides in social science. The importance of history
should not be deemphasized here, as it has been history and the origins of each of the
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violent conflicts that have opened the door for this study, but we can do better. While the
bridge between economics, violent conflict, and mass migration has not been widely
made, ongoing research will make a tremendous contribution in moving the needle for
the field of conflict resolution. The notion of using a different lens, and perhaps creating
difficult discussions with other fields, is crucial in this field of study, particularly as new
and challenging power dynamics continue to present themselves. These power dynamics
are still dominated by economic growth, and the inability to maintain positive growth will
continue to threaten the security and stability of a nation. To that end, sustained research
in terms of economy (for both global and domestic players) is imperative. As academics,
researchers, policymakers, and leaders, it is our responsibility to continue to examine
conflict with untraditional lenses so as to develop measures that can be easily quantified
and utilized to minimize long-term detrimental impact.
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